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Can artistic and cultural practices play a critical role in societies in which criticisms 
are reflexively absorbed and immobilised by the prevailing hegemony? And, if yes, 
what kind of political order can they aspire to, given the ‘post-utopian’ nature of the 
human condition? How do we approach the tortuous question of the destiny of both 
the project of modern democracy and that of aesthetic modernity? There is no 
agreement on this issue. We are told that there is no alternative to the existing liberal 
democracy and capitalist pluralism without risking yet another dystopia – the 
dilemma that in the artistic realm is sometimes articulated as the opposition between 
modernism and postmodernism. What might progressive art look like in such times 
when the ideas of progress and modernity are viewed with great suspicion?  
 
The most popular positions concerning artistic and cultural practices’ critical 
dimension revolve around the idea that with the post-Fordist transformation and the 
bankruptcy of the Left, the paradigm of power has really changed. This is reflected 
in the radical character of contemporary artistic practices, which desperately struggle 
to constitute subject at the expense of themselves. However, the question is: can 
these practices be both radical and democratic? This depends on our understanding 
of emancipatory politics, the nature of aesthetics and post-Fordist transformation.  
 
We will examine the different approaches to these subjects influenced by the 
Frankfurt school and post-Operaist theories to argue that neither Theodor Adorno’s 
and Max Horkeimer’s analyses based on the Fordist model, nor Antonio Negri’s and 
Paolo Virno’s post-Fordist appropriation of the significance of art in the new forms 
of production provide a useful framework with which to grasp the nature of the 
changes and challenges that face our society. Such novel ideas as ‘immaterial 
labour’ and ‘spontaneous communism’ or exodus and ‘communism of capital’, 
despite their new vocabulary, are a dangerous inversion of the Frankfurt school’s 
idealism and inability to grasp that social reality is hegemonically constructed 
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through the practices of articulation that temporarily and incompletely ‘fix’ the 
meaning of social institutions.  
 
Neither politics nor post-Fordism should be considered through the matrix of 
culture, but in terms of hegemony. What is at issue is to grasp the nature of the 
democratic and aesthetical paradoxes and envisage how the two could be applied to 
contribute to progressive changes in power relations. Judgements must be made – 
we have to be able to distinguish between who belongs to demos and who does not; 
however, how we judge, which is the subject of aesthetic critique, is at the core of 
democratic artistic-political practice.  
 
One way in which artistic practices can be critical is a counter-hegemonic 
intervention that acts against the position of supremacy of any hegemonic order and 
shows that any fullness exists because there are gaps, but judges this lack in a way 
that resists the totalisation of the sensible. However, perhaps the way to weaken the 
centre is not just to expose its flaws, but to pluralise hegemonies. In this way, the 
idea to pluralise modernism in the era of globalisation could help us to redefine 
modern democracy in the post-political era and outline the positive vision of the 
‘hegemonic trap’.  
 
Could the evolution of artistic-political practice be envisaged as the radicalisation of 
‘oppositional identities’, which undermine the hegemonic forms of subject 
articulation into compository or shimmering identities, making such supremacy 
impossible? Can art become a symbol of emptying ‘democracy’ and thus construct 








The Plan of the Work 
 
In the following we look first at the most influential conceptions of what constitutes 
the political element in contemporary art to understand what is at issue. Attending to 
a number of questions raised by theories such as ‘Relational Aesthetics’, ‘Immaterial 
Labour’, ‘Artistic Machine’ or The Art of Over-Identification’, we will argue that, 
despite their new vocabulary, their ideas correspond to the same old scenario that, to 
be politically effective, artistic practices must produce entirely new models of 
functioning. As discussed in the first chapter, artistic practices pay little attention to 
the aesthetic transformation of the selected materials; rather, they concentrate on the 
transformation of the practice of art as such, which is envisaged as a critical 
intervention in itself. This art is seen as radical because it engages in different ways of 
doing art – i.e. direct action, publicity stunts and creating ‘transversal alliances’. While 
artists are often radical in their actions, they are often reactionary in their thinking. 
Considered as an action, this kind of art is viewed as political in itself, overlooking the 
fact that its ‘social trajectory’ corresponds more to what Luc Boltanski terms a ‘new 
spirit of capitalism’ rather than new politics. It is perceived that since artistic practices 
are no longer about an object, they are radical and hence automatically democratic. 
Meanwhile, art, which constantly needs to go beyond itself by overcoming, linking 
and blurring disciplines, spheres and individuals, tends to represent social reality in a 
consensual way, since this reality is envisaged through the mediated interactivity of 
the ‘united self’. It could be said that the political goal of artistic practices that view 
themselves as political could be envisaged as a peculiar attempt to constitute the 
subject at the expense of itself. We will take issue with such an approach, aiming to 
show that its real meaning is not a construction of new subjectivity, but a retreat from 
it. The fact that ‘political art’ has such a peculiar self-understanding corresponds to 
how politics are envisaged today. Politics are no longer about a radical transformation 
of existing social order, but about individual radicalisation.   
 
Second, we look at conceptions of radical politics – the way in which the view of 
politics as a self-conscious, sensuous and rational activity and the corresponding 
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central role assigned to the artistic practices, of which the Frankfurt school is one of 
the most important examples, has led to its being associated with the disdain for the 
system, the state, a party, a commonality, thereby reducing politics to police.  Even the 
beauty of art was said to be reactionary, since the truly beautiful is not, as Herbert 
Marcuse argues, a bourgeois displacement of hope, but corresponds to the 
individualistic ‘pleasure principle’. To think politically, the Frankfurt school tells us, 
is to think personally and to undermine the ‘soul-destroying’ mass society, where all 
choices were taken away by an all-inclusive ‘administered universe’ of capitalism. 
Although Jacques Rancière finds the discourse of capitalism’s supremacy 
reactionary itself, he nevertheless views politics as a matter of the ‘theatrical and 
artificial sphere’, the one capable of producing the maximum distance from the 
existing social reality. Hence, instead of liberating a political moment from the 
social enrooting, we tend to reject and withdraw from the social order rather than 
transforming it. For Chantal Mouffe, however, radical politics always means the 
engagement with the existing social, since subjects are constructed through 
hegemonic practices and are never the manifestations of a deeper objectivity. Power, 
from this point of view, should not be envisaged as domination but as a 
transformative capacity. Power is constructed and could be reconstructed. While true 
democracy cannot be realised, the possibility of democratic politics lies within the 
complexity of power relations: the tension between logics of liberty and equality, 
between an individual and the demos. The task for democratic politics is to show the 
traces of exclusion and reconstruct the relations of power in a more progressive way, 
and not to take refuge in formulating a paradigm that would assign everything to its 
place. The problem of democracy is not a problem of an individual choice or belief, 
but the problem of the possibility of the construction of collective identities in a way 
that envisages exclusion in an agonistic form.  
 
If we accept that society is hegemonically constructed, then the Frankfurt school’s 
critique of inauthenticity and the conformist domination of a society appear to be 
counter-productive. Such a critique could be understood as liberal, but certainly not 
democratic. This, what Boltanski called an ‘artistic critique,’ led to the further 
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depoliticisation represented by the new speculative Leftism that no longer perceives 
capitalism as a problem but rather as a new biopolitical paradigm, which demands 
the radically new conception of political and cultural spheres. What is at issue here 
is not resistance to the ‘system,’ but placing it in question as a whole.  
 
Third, we seek to show that this post-modern conception of politics, based on the 
belief that the ‘artistic critique’ has either succeeded or failed, forecloses the 
possibility of artistic practices contributing to an emancipatory project. Here we look 
at some of the key transformative ideas of the post-Operaist thinkers such as Paolo 
Virno and Antonio Negri to argue that the post-Fordist transformation should be 
understood in terms of hegemony rather than culture. We will argue that what we are 
dealing with today is not a ‘creative communism’ or ‘communism of capital,’ but a 
form of political articulation of a society in which, through the central role of ‘self-
production’, social relations appear as a mere extension of capital and not in their 
political dimension. The production of subjectivity today is more important than 
ever and artists have to engage with this terrain in order to re-articulate the given 
social order where both politics and aesthetics seem to become redundant. However, 
envisaging what artistic critical intervention means requires not only an adequate 
grasp of what a ‘democratic paradox’ and a political understanding of the nature of 
the post-Fordist transition mean, but also a different approach to aesthetics. There is 
an aesthetical paradox – the questioning of the aesthetical judgment that reveals, 
through the ongoing practice of art, a conceptual impossibility of judgment per se.  
 
Henceforth we investigate different conceptions of aesthetics. Many today contend 
that art theory and practice no longer needs aesthetics, since the ethical significance 
of aesthetic judgments pertaining to nature has disappeared. Boris Groys, for 
example, argues that the true autonomy of art can only be guaranteed by the absence 
of aesthetic judgments. We will take issue with such a view, suggesting instead that, 
following Jacques Rancière and Dmitry Prigov, aesthetics is not a tool for conveying 
ideas, not the value to be assigned, but the fundamental disagreement with existing 
values, according to which the sensible is distributed. Thus, aesthetic critique is 
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better understood not in terms of a judgement per se, but in terms of how these 
judgements are performed. The aesthetic critique of judgement is the judgement 
enacted aesthetically and the one that challenges the latter itself. For Nietzsche, at 
the core of criticality lies an ability to suspend judgement. For Rancière, this ability 
is what constitutes the aesthetic agreement on the disagreement – the necessary 
limitation, fragmentation and conceptual impossibility of any universal agreement. 
Exposing its own inability to reveal all, it suggests that societal systems and 
relations are also lacking essence.  
 
Fifth, we look at the way in which Chilean artist Alfredo Jaar practises art as the 
regime of visibility, which reminds us that the present society is always lacking 
something. Taking into account Jacques Rancière’s understanding of aesthetics and 
Chantal Mouffe’s vision of democratic politics, Jaar’s works unravel the tension 
between two paradoxes – democratic and aesthetical; on the one hand his 
intervention demonstrates that there is always something missing, hidden and 
unsaid, and on the other hand the artist’s ‘inability to show everything’ we want to 
see reminds us that not only is any unity based on cracks, but that the paradoxical 
aesthetic critique of the judgement cannot compensate for the lack of unity. Jaar’s 
works give voices to many individuals who are hidden from view in the neo-liberal 
hegemonic order. However, they do it in a way that not only opposes the totalising 
images of society but also the totalisation of the sensible. In this way, the condition 
of lack is what is shared by both the social and the aesthetic regimes. Democratic 
politics are about making the traces of power and exclusion visible and critical 
artistic practices can create spaces that question the dominant hegemony; however, 
they challenge it in a way that, through the aesthetic paradox, resists all 
determinisms.  
 
We will look at the conception of critical art envisaged by the Dutch thinker Pascal 
Gielen, who is concerned with the preservation of art’s own dynamics, freedom and 
autonomy to argue that today, in a post-political age, instead of slowing and 
narrowing artistic practices to their own sub-systems, alternative to the post-Fordist 
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model, artists need to intervene more and in both the art world and the social. For 
Jaar, what is at issue is not art per se, but the artist, who always emerges as a 
political figure, the product and the producer of a society. Intervening in both the 
social and aesthetical realms, Jaar’s work is not the expression of a circumscribed 
meaning, but a subject-formation instrument.  
 
We conceive of the works of Alfredo Jaar as a counter-hegemonic intervention. 
However, the question is: can the void of meaning become an opening? While 
thinking – starting with ‘inability’, ‘incapacity’, ‘intolerability’ and lack – is a 
powerful tool with which to approach society in a critical way, can there be a 
different approach to weakening ‘unity’? Can there be a positive expression of the 
hegemonic trap? Perhaps the way to weaken the centre is not just to expose its flaws, 
but to pluralise hegemonies. Thus our sixth chapter turns to the tortuous question of 
the destiny of both the project of modern democracy and aesthetic modernity. We 
are told that there is no alternative to the actual liberal democracy and capitalist 
pluralism, the dilemma that in the artistic realm is articulated as the opposition 
between modernism and postmodernism. Is this the case?  
 
Here we look at Nicolas Bourriaud’s recent book The Radicant, where he proposes a 
‘strategic cultural form’ in which, through multiplicity, impurity becomes positive. 
Dismissing both modernism and the concepts born of the Enlightenment philosophy, 
such as emancipation, resistance or alienation, and postmodernism, a pluralist logic 
presupposed by the market, Bourriaud presents the concept of altermodernity, the 
first truly worldwide culture, which neither corresponds to the modernist politics nor 
is dictated by postmodernist market logic. With helpful insights from Okwui 
Enwezor, we argue that the project of altermodernity could be understood as the idea 
of pluralising modernism. By emphasising the transitory, unstable essence of 
modernism, what could also be institutionalised is the arbitrary and contingent 
nature of institutions and systems. Thus we will argue that the idea of pluralising 
modernism in the era of globalisation helps us to redefine modern democracy in the 
post-political era.  
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The altermodern conception addresses the destiny of the ‘modern democracy’, 
suggesting its ‘off-centre’ positioning. Perhaps, to be ‘modern’, after all, could mean 
not making one single sense of our fleeting world but to make many senses, many 
worlds – to broaden the space of the possible, preventing, through wandering, any 
possible ‘ends’ to what art might mean, to what ‘democracy’ should look like. We 
will attempt to evolve Chantal Mouffe’s idea of ‘oppositional identities’, which act 
against the position of supremacy of any hegemonic order into compository or 
shimmering identities, the ones that make such supremacy impossible. Could we 
envisage artistic-political fusion as practices that mobilise effects in ways that run 
not against the dominant forms of subject articulations, but pluralising them in such 






















Anti-Political ‘Politics’ of ‘Political Art’ 
 
Recently, there has been a very enthusiastic return to the subject of ‘art and politics’ 
and advocacy for ‘political art’, which is a rather counterproductive term since it 
implies that either artistic practices can be free of politics or they are automatically 
critical. However, what this term really refers to is new ways of doing art – a radical 
action such as creating ‘transversal alliances’, direct action, event stating, publicity 
stunts, protest and many other forms of interaction and collaboration. The ‘political’ 
element in this kind of art is evaluated according to the effectiveness of the artistic 
actions. In fact, the suppression of its value as a sign in favour of its value as an 
action is considered intrinsically ‘political’. Dwelling on the examples of  
artistic practices that claim to constitute the political element in contemporary art - 
from ‘Relational Aesthetics’ proposed by a French curator and art critic  
Nicolas Bourriaud to ‘Art of Over-Identification’ theorised by the Dutch art 
collective BAVO – it becomes clear that this art no longer attempts to  
criticise anything; instead, its line of enquiry or attack is directed towards radically 
new ways of subjection and forms of life. Such a faith in art as the basis for new 
politics or ethics, which would promise the coherence of the whole, is almost 
exclusively influenced by the theories of the Italian autonomists, such as the notion 
of multitude and a renewed understanding of the potentiality of contemporary art as 
a radical social agent, in which artistic actions and capacities themselves are 
perceived as able to prompt cultural and social change in the forms of projecting 
collective intelligence and collective powers. Meanwhile, it seems that the only way 
to create radically new ways of subjection is to divorce from an idea of the artwork 
and aesthetics as much as possible. Hence the politically-minded artist today is a 
peculiar idealist – he attempts to define the subject at the expense of itself. While 
artists are often radical in their action, they are reactionary in their thinking. The 
choice of socially compelling themes, sites and models is understood as a critical 
intervention in itself, with no attention being paid to the aesthetic transformation of 
the selected materials. A generalised intellectual demeanour obscures the manner in 
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which a political concern could be implanted into an aesthetic and to a wider social 
context. However, what is interesting is not just the inconsistencies between 
‘political’ art’s critical ambitions and its realisation, but the fundamental rupture that 
runs through intellectual or socially-oriented artistic practices – art is conceived as 
social criticism or politics while it evaporates as art. A Dutch thinker and art critic 
Camiel van Winkel, for example, speaks about this rupture as the ‘demystified’ 
artistic practice when today an artwork exists without an artist or the artist without 
an artwork. According to Winkel, these ‘post-artistic’ practices, which consist of 
imitating non-artistic activities, manifest the end of the artist’s function as a 
‘political’ model.1  
 
However, ‘post-artistic practices’ are full of ‘politics’, but their politics do not 
necessarily take an emancipatory direction – laden with democratic connotations, 
they instead stabilise and in some cases institutionalise our sense of disconnection 
and social atomisation. Today we are living in consensual times when not only great 
revolutionary projects tend to vanish, but also the forms of political conflicts 
themselves. In this vacuum of the political, the artists and the actors of the art turn 
their attention to the reality of contradictions and conflicts. The new revolution 
would not come but, meanwhile, newly motivated ‘political art’ acts as a form of 
compensation for the injustices, inequalities and lack of solidarity in  
post-political society, and in this way serves as a stabilising factor in social life 
otherwise demanding for political solutions. The artistic practices discussed in this 
chapter are no longer about an artwork; this art needs other people’s presence, which 
leads to a consensual representation of other people’s reality through mediated 
interactivity of the ‘united self.’ The fact that ‘political art’ has such a peculiar self-
understanding corresponds to how the political is envisaged today. Politics are no 
longer about a radical transformation of the existing state of affairs, but  
multiplications of individual claims and interpretations. Art’s departure from self-
referential object to relational practice or ‘transversal alliances’ presents us with a 
                                                
1 Camiel van Winkel, De Mythe van het Kunstenaarschap, Finds BKVB, Amsterdam, 2007. The 
review of this book was published in OPEN, Nai Publishers, SKOR, 2008, No. 14 by Jordine Sijdel. 
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reading of the world that is based on re-evaluated judgment according to specific 
situations rather than making a judgment.  
  
There are, however, other approaches to the implications of ‘political art.’ For 
Jacques Rancière, for example, who defends the specificity of art, there is a stark 
political choice in art rather than an issue of what ‘political art’ can do today. In 
Rancière’s view, the notion of politicality in art is connected to the establishment of 
scenes of a dissensus. While, for Rancière, there is no such thing as ‘apolitical’ 
artistic practices, some practices produce scenes of dissensus in the sense that  
they acknowledge that, whatever they do, they cannot fulfil or illuminate the ‘gaps’ 
in the blindness of the social order, but only expose them. Instead of following a 
path of knowing, of supporting a particular political or aesthetic theory,  
Rancière suggests that the distribution of the visible itself is part of the configuration 
of domination, so there is little point in attempting to create a radical new 
subjectivity. Instead, Rancière contends that the critical task of art today is to  
render the arts visible, the aesthetic revelation of ‘one world hidden beneath 
another’.2  
 
This chapter explores recent theories of artistic practices, which envisage themselves 
in terms of a ‘new political project,’ and exposes their underlying inconsistencies. In 
the midst of art’s ‘busy resignation’ from its aesthetic dimension, we tend to go with 
Rancière and look for the ‘hidden’ and ‘unsaid’ in what constitutes the given 
subjectivity rather than constructing an entirely new one. What Rancière suggests is 
to transform the way we look at the given world rather than rejecting and  
looking beyond it; and the role of aesthetics, of this paradoxical regime for the 




                                                
2 Rancière, Jacques, ‘Problems and Transformations of Critical Art’, Aesthetics and Its Discontents, 
Polity, 2010: 51 
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Relational Aesthetics as a Stabilising Factor  
 
One of the recent attempts to envisage art not as ‘heavenly artefacts’ but as the 
engine of new art-relations beyond the closure of traditional modernist objecthood, 
visuality and individualism has been undertaken by French thinker, art critic and 
former co-director of Palais de Tokyo in Paris Nicholas Bourriaud, who devised the 
term ‘Relational Aesthetics’3. Bourriaud champions art that understands itself as 
production of new social bonds. These artworks are concerned with the relations 
with or between the spectators, such as cooking soup for the viewers, creating 
environments for a genial talk or directly chatting with the audience. This art is 
‘learning to inhabit the world in a better way’. Bourriaud states, ‘Contemporary art 
is definitely developing a political project when it endeavours to move into the 
relational realm by turning it into an issue’.4 That said, Bourriaud has been an 
effective advocate for the contemporary tendency to emphasise process, 
performativity, openness, social contexts and links, transitivity and the production of 
dialogue. Relational art attempts to construct its own territory of relations, a new 
form of social bond – unconnected to capitalist society or any conventional 
understanding of politics.  
 
If the goal of art is social liberation, then there are three main problems with 
Bourriaud’s approach that I would like to touch upon here. The first one corresponds 
to the way in which Relational Aesthetics supposedly contribute to a more 
democratic society by humanising global capitalist relations. The second issue 
concerns relational art’s position of non-relation to existing social struggles and 
movements. The third problem relates to Bourriaud’s proposal to neutralise and 
reduce aesthetic experience to the level of interactivity and the spectator’s 
transformation into an active agent.  
 
                                                
3 Nicolas Bourriaud, French art critic, former co-director of Palais de Tokyo contemporary art centre 
in Paris. Bourriaud coined the term "Relational Aesthetics", which he outlined in a text for the 
catalogue of the exhibition "Traffic" shown at the CAPC Bordeaux in 1996. 
4 Bourriaud, Nicolas. Relational Aesthetics, Les presses du reel, 2002: 17 
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The purpose of Bourriaud’s theory is to address how art can move beyond current 
capitalism and construct its own ‘political’ territory. In his view, there are two main 
features that characterised Relational Art’s struggle with the dominant social order: 
immateriality and establishing a relation. Bourriaud writes, ‘The contemporary 
artwork’s form is spreading out from its material form: it is a linking element, a 
principle of dynamic agglutination’.5 Regarding a relation, it is understood as an 
everlasting sequence of ‘relational space-time elements’, a network of artist-viewer 
subject positions: ‘the artwork is no longer an end point but a simple moment in an 
infinite chain of contributions’.6  Relational Art seeks to put things in motion rather 
than consolidate any possible positions. That is why its core notions are 
connectivity, flexibility, adaptability, mobility and openness, through which this sort 
of art hopes to escape a given framework and imposed view. The problem is, 
however, that Post-Fordist capitalism operates precisely on this terrain of mobility, 
interconnectedness, relationality and linkage.  
 
In their The New Spirit of Capitalism, Luc Boltanski and Eve Chiapello point out the 
emergence of a new paradigm of social order, which they identify as the third spirit 
of capitalism. While the first and the second spirits were built on the industrial 
model, whereby proprietors were seen as the main holders of modern values such as 
family, state and wealth, the third spirit transforms the definition of value. Boltanski 
and Chiapello meticulously explain a shift from the value of objects, work and 
people (efficiency and professionalism) to the value of relations. They state that 
capitalism, which is characterised by an endless and abstract accumulation process 
and wage earning, inevitably produces aggravation and exclusion, because neither 
executives nor workers can be satisfied with the financial abstract or practical 
reasoning, so they ask for meaning. Following the socialist movements of the sixties 
and seventies, capitalism searched how to create new working conditions that satisfy 
artistic and social critics of the state apparatus as the main force of domination and 
oppression, longing for autonomy and flexibility. The third stage of capitalism – 
                                                
5 Bourriaud, Nicolas, Relational Aesthetics, Les presses du reel, 200: 21 
6 Bourriaud, Nicolas, Postproduction, Lukas & Sternberg, New York, 2005: 20  
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connectionist capitalism – rejects hierarchy, planning and discipline, and embraces 
mobility and flexibility. Words such as openness, teamwork, dynamics and 
mobilisation, and networking have become the new motto of Human Resources 
departments. Previously linked to the product, value now integrates the relation and 
its effects. Boltanski and Chiapello write,  
 
‘Whereas, in a commercial world, the product is separated from persons and 
stabilised by conventions or standards guaranteeing its quality – this, in particular, is 
the role of brands – in a connectionist world the product, which circulates with 
difficulty when separated from persons, is transformed by the relation’.7  
 
While in the trade world the transaction does not modify the product quality or the 
suppliers and consumers down the chain, ‘[i]n a connectionist world, by contrast, 
links are useful and enriching when they have the power to change the beings who 
enter into relations’.8 The opportunity to produce links or mobility thus becomes a 
source of profit. At this point oppression is easy and natural: ‘these who do not 
move around (or move less) contribute to the formation of the value added of those 
who do (more)’.9  
 
This reveals how the Relational Aesthetic is part of the transformation shift from the 
second spirit of capitalism to the third, by focusing on and installing a relationship as 
the main value. The figure of the artist has become the exact model for a new 
leadership – an operator, strong at networking, mobile and flexible. The 
consequence is that promoting network and its values such as connectivity, 
flexibility, mobility and openness now emerges as promoting the core ideology of 
the third capitalism, which Relational Aesthetic claims it is improving. This is a 
‘trend’ that perfectly matches the taste of cognitive capitalism, expanding in the 
same direction and at exactly the same speed.  
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Throughout his book Relational Aesthetics, Bourriaud does not discuss relational art 
practices’ connection or any relevance to ongoing social struggles and political 
processes. For Bourriaud, the inter-human relations and the invention of alternative 
models of sociability are enough to emancipate our perception, since, he argues, the 
‘…emancipation of individuals is no longer an issue in our post-industrial society.’ 
According to Bourriaud, relational art’s politics consist of not playing any ‘power 
game’ any longer, of ignoring any claims or standpoints: ‘The aura of contemporary 
art is a free association’.10 Bourriaud writes,  
 
‘Today, after two centuries of struggle for singularity and against group impulses, 
we must bring in a new synthesis which, alone, will be able to save us from the 
regressive fantasy that is around. Reintroducing the idea of plurality, for 
contemporary culture, hailing from modernity, means inventing ways of  
being together, forms of interaction that go beyond the inevitability of families, 
ghettos of technological user-friendliness, and collective institutions on offer. We 
can only extend modernity to advantage by going beyond the struggles it has 
bequeathed us’.11  
 
What is problematic here is that contemporary culture is already plural. The 
modernist dream of artistic autonomy has in fact been realised, since without the 
postmodernist pluralist market and its reflexivity, there would be no possibility for 
the cultural diversity we witness. In fact, this diversity is thoroughly dependant on 
developments in capitalist production. While modernism pressed for clarity, for a 
strict definition of roles and aims, with the pluralistic market-driven art world, 
disciplines are already inter-connected, there are no stable territories, which drives 
us to accept the given situation as ‘the end of history’. However, while the plurality 
of the market should not be considered in the negative light, the social plurality is 
not automatically progressive. The idea that there could be radically new forms of 
interaction and living together beyond, as Bourriuad argues, existing institutions, 
                                                
10 Bourriaud, Nicolas, Relational Aesthetics, Les presses du reel, 2002: 61 
11 Ibid.: 60 
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seems to repeat the Utopian impulses of a total reorganisation of a society. 
Furthermore, it seems that, in Bourriaud’s view, the alternative models of sociability 
are what constitute new type of art after modernism and postmodernism. In this way 
a bizarre inversion occurs: the goal of art is not social liberation but social 
emancipation would then produce new artistic practices.  
 
Bourriaud insists that a factor of sociability, a founding principle of dialogue is what 
art should concentrate on today, since we live at the age of  
 
‘…an extraordinary upsurge of social exchanges, greater individual mobility 
(through the development of networks, roads and telecommuncations, and the 
gradual freeing-up of isolated places, opening-up of attitudes’.12  
 
As such, relational aesthetics would reflect the ‘end of history’ common 
sense of the 1990s, exemplifying neo-liberal strategies for outsourcing innovation 
and Human Resources in conditions of Post-Fordist production, with its rhetoric of 
‘community’, ‘voluntarism’ and the ‘third sector’. However, Bourriaud goes further, 
positioning relational aesthetics as the successor of the 20th Century avant-gardes, 
except that relational art is disconnected from society in a positive rather than a 
negative way. The old avant-garde, Bourriaud argues, was oriented towards conflict 
and social struggle, while its new version – relational art, relieved from dogmatic 
radical antagonism – ‘is concerned with negotiations, bonds and co-existences’. The 
new relational avant-gardes, claims Bourriaud, ‘…are not naïve or cynical enough to 
go about things as if the radical and universalist Utopia were still on the agenda’.13  
 
Thus, relational art does not have any macro-historical aim of real-world beyond-
capitalist relations: it simply settles for the experience of gallery simulations, 
denying the necessity of any grounds or links to current movements and struggles. 
                                                
12 Bourriaud, Nicolas, Relational Aesthetics, Les presses du reel, 2002: 14 
13 Ibid.: 70 
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Relational art is about human relations, born out of art exchanges, insists Bourriaud, 
not social relations. He states,  
 
‘It does not involve those corporate phenomena which too often act as a disguise for 
the most die-hard forms of conservatism (in this day and age, feminism, anti-racism 
and environmentalism all operate too frequently as lobbies playing the power game 
by enabling it never to have to call itself into question in a structural way).’14  
 
As much as he can, Bourriaud attempts to dissociate relational art from taking any 
sides, making any judgements or statements, or taking part in any political 
processes. Bourriaud insists that Relational Aesthetics is a theory of form rather than 
a theory of art, and it does not imply the statement of an origin and a destination. 
This ‘form’ must therefore be flexible, open to dialogue and exchange.  
 
Bourriaud argues that this ‘relative immateriality’ is a sign of a priority given by 
artists to time in relation to space. ‘They [artists] display and explore the process that 
leads to objects and meanings’15, writes Bourriaud. While it is ambiguous what form 
relational art consists of, it is more problematic to address what possible meanings it 
might lead to. Answering this question, Bourriaud quotes Tiravanija, who, in turn, 
quotes Wittgenstein: ‘Don’t look for the meaning, look for the use.’ While 
Wittgenstein emphasised the role of the context in defining the content, Bourriaud 
implements this standpoint rather literally.  For Bourriaud the politics of use imply 
the elusiveness of the content itself, which, in his words, ‘may be inserted into 
different programs and used for multiple scenarios’.16 In this way, the politics of use 
serve as a rather anti-Wittgenstein standpoint, as it proclaims the power of content 
over context. Bourriaud writes, ‘The artwork is no longer an end point but a simple 
moment in an infinite chain of contributions’.17  Relational art sets up situations in 
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15 Ibid.: 54  
16 Ibid.: 19-20  
17 Bourriaud, Nicolas, Postproduction, Lukas & Sternberg, New York, 2005: 20  
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which audiences form temporal communities, ‘a momentary grouping of 
participating viewers’. 
 
Explaining who the recipients of relational art are, Bourriaud uses the words 
‘audience’ and ‘public’ interchangeably, emphasising that it is ‘the public that is 
taken into account more and more’18 because the audiences nowadays are longing 
for action and not viewing. However, Rosalyn Deutsche has repeatedly called for a 
distinction between ‘public’ and ‘audiences’. In her view, gathering together and 
doing things does not contribute to the creation of a public. In her seminar Making 
Public at the Tate Modern in London (March 2005), she stated that the ‘audience is a 
consumer while the public is always a debating public. It comes into existence 
through a feedback on the work and the contest of the audiences between 
themselves’19. Moreover, the role of the artist is to provoke the debate, that is to say, 
to initiate the ‘publicness’. In Deutsche’s view, artists never deal with the public; 
they deal with audiences, who, in turn, can be transformed into the public. Deutsche 
also points out that what characterises the public and public spaces are gaps and 
discontinuities rather than an ongoing dialogue. It seems that Bourriaud does not 
have much of a problem with making generalisations about the body in a public 
space; for him audiences are the public, although he admits its illusory nature. 
Addressing this problem, Bourriaud writes, ‘The artists seek interlocutors: since the 
public remains a rather unreal entity, they include the interlocutor in the production 
process’.20 However, who exactly are these interlocutors? They are a limited circle 
of artists and curators who direct the process of meaning construction in one way or 
another.  
 
The consumers of relational art are the cultural elite of the dominant classes, not 
marginalised communities. In general, Bourriaud’s audiences do not overlap with 
the people actively attempting to generate pressure for social change. Meanwhile, 
                                                
18 Bourriaud, Nicolas, Relational Aesthetics, Les presses du reel, 2002: 61 
19 Deutsche, Rosalyn, “Making Public” seminar, Tate Modern, London, March 2005,  
http://www.tate.org.uk/onlineevents/ 
20 Bourriaud, Nicolas, Relational Aesthetics, Les presses du reel, 2002: 61 
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the real processes of social experimentation are taking place elsewhere. The 
politically silent site where non-capitalist relations are modelled today is not the 
gallery-based relational art project; it is activity affinity group and the popular 
assemblies, activist camps, mass mobilisations that articulate it with larger social 
movements and emergent struggles. Here the effective collaboration between artists 
and social movements is possible, but not in the neutralising mediating way 
proposed by Bourriaud, where disruptive energies are managed within tolerable 
limits: the social separations, stratifications and self-selections of the art system 
enact a liberalisation – that is, a de-radicalisation of social demands for change.  
 
In his recent book The Nightmare of Participation, Markus Miessen pointed out how 
the insistence on ‘participating viewers’ not only erodes democratic potential but 
also prevents it from emerging in the first place. ‘Not everybody should be asked to 
be included in the decision-making process…’, argues Miessen. The author 
perceives Bourriaud’s ‘aura of free association’ as ‘a minimisation of social 
offence’, which is ultimately concerned with ‘the establishment and maintenance of 
social harmony’.21 Thus, Miessen’s concern is that a ‘relational practice’ 
‘…introduces a world in need of an optimistic and critical rendering of situational 
truths as opposed to moral truism’.22  Such new protocols attempt to understand and 
deal with processes of uncertainty in a counter-productive way: it ‘…challenges 
society’s obedience to conventions and institutions that defy the very creation of 
[art] or architecture with their illusion of controlled virtue’.23 
 
The third aspect of Bourriaud’s vision of politicality in relational art, which we wish 
to address here, is his understanding of the role of aesthetics and aesthetic 
experience. Aesthetics, argues Bourriaud, is an idea that sets humankind apart from 
other animal species. ‘In the end of the day’, he writes, ‘burying the dead, laughter, 
and suicide are just the corollaries of a deep-seated hunch, the hunch that life is an 
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22 Ibid.: 65 
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aesthetic, ritualised, shaped form’.24 Specifying the nature of relational aesthetics, 
Bourriaud argues that, far from being a judgment of any sort, this aesthetic of 
sociability is a much more effective ritual that separates us from animals and 
liberates us as social beings by allowing us to connect easily: ‘Does this work permit 
me to enter into dialogue. Could I exist, and how, in the space it defines?’25 This 
question, Bourriaud claims, does not refer to the aesthetic vision of art, but to a 
simply human vision and forms. 
 
For example, an individual’s relation with music or painting can stimulate a totally 
new process of perception and sensibility. Such a position, however, would 
challenge Bourriaud’s take on the current social order. According to the critic, there 
is nothing wrong with the existing society; no new perception is required, only ‘little 
services’ designed to repair ‘the cracks in the social bond’.26  It is precisely this 
‘human touch’, not aesthetic that, according to Bourriaud, makes Relational Art 
politically relevant. What it offers is the idea of an art relationship with the premise 
that equality could be established through a ‘micro-community’ and ‘chances for 
everyone to exist’; all voices to count during encounters with art.  
 
In our view, the very fact that this kind of art claims to be ‘politically’ relevant and 
even ‘democratic’, manifests the peculiar way in which democratic politics are 
understood today. Based on Bourriaud’s central ‘political’ question of ‘What can art 
do to humanise capitalism?’, what is evident is that capitalist reality is accepted as 
an undeniable fact of life. What is also problematic is Bourriaud’s understanding of 
capitalism as ‘a problem of an object’. It is intriguing how objects can be dismissed 
as purely capitalist in their nature. While how an object is ‘related’ to is important, 
and this form of relationship is not necessarily always inclusive, the objects 
themselves are hardly responsible for the nature of social relationships that 
determine their value. It is exchange values, the social relations that determine the 
functioning and use value of objects. Jacques Rancière points out the ‘clever’ way in 
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which Bourriaud avoids responding to an excess of commodities and signs by 
addressing the ‘lack of bonds’. He states,  
 
‘Relational art thereby aims no longer to create objects, but situations and 
encounters. In so doing, however, it relies on a simplistic opposition between 
objects and situations, effecting a short-circuit where the point is to carry out a 
transformation of these problematic spaces that once contrasted conceptual art with 
art objects/commodities’.27  
 
Instead of contrasting objects and situations, Bourriuad could have compared social 
relations with relations as commodities, but what Bourriuad has in mind is the 
possibility of a single genuine relationship with the world, which corresponds to 
Anthony Giddens’ understanding of democratic political trajectory as ‘pure 
relationship’, ‘i.e. a relationship into which one enters and remains for its own sake 
because of the rewards that associating with others brings’.28 Relational art – where 
collaboration and communication are regarded as a good in itself and ‘people 
meeting people’, in Tiravanija's words, is an end in itself – is a perfect visualisation 
of Giddens’ ‘politics of trust’. Giddens explains,  
 
‘Globalisation, reflexivity and de-traditionalisation creates “dialogical spaces” that 
must in some way be filled. These are spaces which can be engaged dialogically, 
invoking mechanisms of active trust…’29  
 
Although these spaces are described by Giddens as ‘dialogical,’ they are in fact 
spaces of void, exclusion and resistance to the very globalisation and reflexivity. 
Relational Aesthetics is exactly what can turn these gaps into a ‘dialogical’ space by 
providing everyone (marginalised and excluded) with tools to adapt to the current 
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situation by promoting flexibility, connectivity, adaptability, fluidity, responsibility 
and trust. 
 
To conclude our analysis of relations art as a ‘political project’, what could be said is 
that Bourriaud’s theory is a very good description of a problem rather than a solution 
to it. Networking culture is based on consensus and relational art unwillingly 
popularises it. Far from being democratic, its shuts down the space for politics by 
imposing the idea of all-inclusive ‘art co-existence’, which would assure the 
coherence of the whole and provide a solid basis for new politics. We are not given 
any opportunity to voice our ideas; we are merely being asked for consent. Choosing 
between ‘inhuman’ capitalism and a ‘pure relationship’, in this play of oppositions, 
the very possibility of a specific conflict disappears. Meanwhile, relational art is 
indeed ‘political’, but in a very different way to how Bourriaud envisages it. The 
term ‘political art’ also suggests that artistic practices should return to politics, 
implying that they are neutralised by the capitalist framework, while the fact that art 
plays such a strategic role in the imaginary reproduction of capitalism indicates that 
it has reached the height of its politicisation. 
 
When Art Does Not Do Art  
 
Another version of what ‘political art’ might look like today is suggested by Paris-
based writer and art critic Stephen Wright, who argues that, to make collaboration 
between artists and activists fruitful,  
 
‘…we need an almost pre-modern understanding of art, breaking with the 
institutionalised trinity author-work-public; an understanding that grasps art 
in terms of its specific means and not its specific ends’.30  
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Wright proposes that, instead of offering Bourriaud’s relational services to people 
who never asked for them or drug them into unwanted interaction, artists ought to 
re-direct their skills to where they are really needed. Wright argues that  
 
‘The intellectually and aesthetically impoverished practices broadly known, thanks 
to Nicolas Bourriaud, as “relational aesthetics”, are a case in point: artists make 
forays into the outside world, 'propose' usually very contrived services to people 
who never asked for them … then expropriate as the material for their work 
whatever minimal labour they have managed to extract from these more or less 
unwitting participants (whom they sometimes have the gall to describe as 'co-
authors'). In so doing, they end up reproducing within the symbolic economy of art 
the sort of class-based relations of expropriation that Marx saw at work in the 
general economy: on the one hand, those who hold the symbolic capital (the artists), 
and on the other, those whose labour (such as it is) is used to foster the 
accumulation of more capital. And this is precisely what is usually passed off as 
“collaboration” – making cynical mockery of the term – not just by such artists as 
Rirkrit Tiravanija, Maurizio Cattelan and all those whose names figure in all the 
almanacs of relational aesthetics, but by countless others besides’.31  
 
Instead, Wright suggests that art should open up ‘a space within the symbolic 
economy of art to other practices’ without an aim to create an artwork, but rather 
through working alongside the others and helping them to use what Wright calls 
‘artistic competence’. He writes,  
 
‘Art, in short, is the chief obstacle to artistic collaboration. The point is rather to put 
their artistic knowledge at the disposal of a collective project, without forsaking 
their own autonomy; to find a way to compound complementary skills, one 
partner’s inabilities complementing the abilities of the other.’32  
 
                                                





Wright then provides some examples of fruitful artistic collaborations; one of them, 
‘Universal Embassy’, a situation whereby in January 2001 a group of  
"illegals" – sans-papiers fighting for legal immigration status – occupied the 
abandoned building of the Somalian embassy in Brussels to meet their urgent need 
for accommodation. 
 
This property of a vanishing state was soon to become the ‘Universal Embassy’. The 
Embassy’s inhabitants reject the abstract idea of a ‘world citizen’. ‘A hypothetical 
world citizen status is a useless abstraction. Planetary belonging is not a status, it is a 
factual reality’, says their Declaration.  
 
‘The activities of the Universal Embassy are neither limited to individual support or 
social work nor to the carrying out of direct protest actions, or the formulation of 
programmatic demands (based on the models of activism or representation of 
political interests). The Universal Embassy does not represent anything; rather, it is 
just “becoming” what it is – people who desire to articulate their experiences to 
create a new language – ‘the language of a people to come’.33  
 
Wright argues that artistic skills and visibility are here put at the disposal of a 
collective project, thinking together with the people of Universal Embassy without 
claiming an ‘artwork’ or the credits of an artist. The artists living in the Embassy do 
not envisage what they do in terms of a ‘project’, ‘event’ or a ‘representation’. 
Rather, they insist on the inseparable link between form and content,  
producing ‘a new language’ together, without controlling the process. In Wright’s 
view, Universal Embassy is a great example of how artists could assist in the public 
production of meaning rather than meaningless consumption. In other words, here, 
according to Wright, the ‘real’, productive collaboration between artists and activists 
could be seen. Artists here do not envisage their contribution in terms of  
artwork or ‘ends,’ but in terms of its specific benefits to a particular project or 
‘means’. Then these artists are just designers, working to a brief.  
                                                




Since 1990 there has been an unprecedented rise in collaborative and  
community-based forms of artistic practices. It is not just Bourriaud or Wright who 
champion the collaborative model, whether it is a staged or ‘real’ one, as an 
important means by which artists participate in the mediation of new social and 
political meanings. For example, the British critic Suzi Gablik34 (1995) argues 
against the conventional models of aesthetic appreciation and outlines a new 
‘political’ concept of ‘connective aesthetics’. The American academic  
Grant Kester35 (2004) continued the examination into the artistic experiments with 
emphatic models of communication and proposed that this emergent approach 
should be considered a form of ‘dialogical’ art that manifests a new way of being 
political. The Swedish curator Maria Lindt36 (2007) viewed the ‘collaborative turn’ 
as an extension of traditional affinities of artists with political activists and  
minority groups and thus a new wave of politicisation through art. While the 
prominence of collaborative artistic practices is now unmistakable, the  
status of its aesthetic value and its social effects is very much in dispute. In 
particular, there is considerable unease over the similarity between collaborative 
strategies in art and post-Fordist ideology, which promotes networking and creative 
consumption.37  
 
Florian Schneider, a filmmaker and writer based in Munich, questions the merits of 
collaboration in general and points out the specific role of ‘collaborative  
techniques’ in today’s insecure world, which helps to erase the terms such as  
‘together’, ‘common aims’ with a dynamic ‘working together’, ‘common  
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interests’. In his article ‘The Dark Side of the Multitude’, he states that  
 
‘As a pejorative term, collaboration stands for willingly assisting an enemy of one’s 
country and especially an occupying force or a malevolent power. It means to work 
together with an agency or instrumentality with which one is not immediately 
connected’.38  
 
In contrast to cooperation, points out Schneider, collaboration is often driven by 
complex realities such as an increased efficiency of collective identification, pure 
self-interest, lack of autonomy etc. rather than romantic notions of commonality.  
 
Collaboration, argues Schneider, has no external goal; it is, as Derrida points out in a 
different context, ‘friendship without friends’, it creates co-dependence and 
insecurity. He states, ‘This is revealed in Post-Fordist production, ‘affect industries’ 
as well as networking environments in general. People have to work together in 
settings where their efficiency, performance and labour power cannot be singled out 
and measured on its own, but in each case refers to the specific work of somebody 
else’.39 This, claims Schneider, reveals the other, ‘darker’ face of immaterial labour 
that is hidden behind the rhetoric of cooperation, networking and mobility. He 
writes,  
 
‘The nettings of voluntarism, enthusiasm, creativity, ever-increasing self-doubt and 
desperation are temporary, fluid and appear in multiple forms, but refer to a 
permanent state of insecurity and precariousness that becomes a blueprint for 
widespread forms of occupation and employment with the rest of society’. 40 
 
Collaboration represents ‘friends in need’, and the need always overrides the 
‘friendship,’ since it exhorts individuals not to share knowledge, meanwhile  
                                                




telling them to reach a compromise so that a ‘collaborative unit’ is preserved. It is 
collaboration that is often an obstacle to any productive activity. Schneider  
points out,  
 
‘Teamwork often fails because of the banal fact that the internalised models of 
cooperation are characterised by the opposite of sharing knowledge: in order to 
pursue a career, one has to hide the relevant information from others. On the other 
hand, it also refers to the fact that joining forces in a group or team increases the 
likelihood of failure much more than the likelihood of success. Awkward group 
dynamics, harmful externalities, bad management practices are responsible for the 
rest’.41  
 
Thus, following Schneider, Wright’s proposal to shift the position of the artist as a 
producer to the artist as a mere collaborator and remove the ‘otherworldliness’ of the 
artwork as an obstacle to productive activity leads to an increasingly consensual 
representation of other people’s reality through mediated interactivity of the ‘united 
Self’.  
 
It is interesting that Wright invites artists to collaborate with activists and not 
existing institutions or political parties. According to Wright, this sort of 
collaboration would be clear-cut propaganda. Instead, artists should join so-called 
alternative groups or individuals in order to do their own things, to invent their own 
language, to fulfil their own organisational capacities; in short, to make each other 
feel secure – ‘friends in need’ – the purpose of such a collaboration then is not to 
identify with mutual aim but to identify with each other. A collaborative agent, 
points out Schneider, always acts as ‘an escape agent’. He writes, ‘Against the 
background of a post-modern control society collaborations are all about exchanging 
knowledge secretly and apart from borders’.  
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To imagine art as a monolithic and pure essence of, for example, a nation, or a 
particular social or political movement seems nowadays an old-fashioned manner of 
thinking; meanwhile, the political significance of the nation-state or an increasing 
influence of right-wing parties remains an untranslatable and determining force. 
Wright argues that ‘artistic aptitudes and perceptual habitus… can be fruitfully 
combined with other competencies specific to other realms of human activity;’ 
however, these realms of activity must be limited only to activist practices. Why, for 
example, can ‘means’-oriented art not collaborate with the police or a political 
party? Why do activist artists not wish to combine their competencies with existing 
struggles and institutions?  
 
Today, it is artistic competencies that play a central role in the post-Fordist 
networked economy and order. As Eve Chiapello and others have shown, what were 
formerly art-specific competencies such as autonomy, flexibility, inventiveness, 
mobility, creativity and refusal of hierarchy are now used precisely in terms of 
‘means’ and not ‘ends’. This, however, does not mean that we should mirror this 
process in terms of activist practices. What would be the point for artistic models 
and practices to mimic the network strategy of capitalism itself? Why would the use 
of competencies in the framework of social activism be more attractive than its use 
in post-Fordism? How can we distinguish between two similar ‘usages’ of 
competencies?  
 
Instead of using art’s competencies on the ‘alternative’ terrain, we must engage with 
the existing situation. An alternative usage of competencies alone, ‘when, in 
Wright’s words, it quits the artworld for the normative realm of political activism 
and collaboration’, would not challenge the hegemony of post-Fordism. Following 
Chantal Mouffe, ‘…oppositional consciousness requires political articulation’42 in 
the sense that we must actively engage with existing power structures in order to dis-
                                                
42 Mouffe, Chantal writes, ‘It is also missed, albeit in a different way, by the theorists of the multitude 
who belive that its oppositional consciousness does not require political articulation’, in ‘Democratic 
Politics in the Age of Post-Fordism’, Open, NAi Publishers, SKOR, 2009, issue 16 ‘The Art Biennial 
as a Global Phenomenon’: 39 
 33 
articulate and re-articulate the current framework of identifications. Such a position 
then requires a hegemonic approach, which Wright seems to lack. Instead, he insists 
on ‘real’ collaboration, which would then highlight the ‘true’ political potentials of 
art. He states,  
 
‘The business world, however, has been swift to catch on to its own interest in 
breaking down art into an aggregate of skills, which can then be profitably 
instrumentalised. What I am trying to suggest is that in order to avoid the 
performative pitfalls of art conventions on the one hand, and of co-optation by 
capital on the other – in order, that is, to bring about conditions that will make 
collaboration “fruitful and necessary” – we need an almost pre-modern 
understanding of art, breaking with the institutionalised trinity author-work-public; 
an understanding that grasps art in terms of its specific means and not its specific 
ends’.43  
 
The problem is not that art has been hijacked by the business world, making it 
necessary to create an absolutely new ‘usage’ of artistic competencies. There is no 
such thing as ‘free collaborative action’ outside the hegemonic structures; other 
forms of collaborations must take place within the process of where the current 
identification happens. However, such a view requires a hegemonic approach.  
 
Wright, meanwhile, prefers Dewey’s conception of democratic politics as a ‘creative 
democracy’, according to which ‘…democracy is not an alternative to other 
principles of associative life. It is the very idea of community life’. Following 
Dewey, Wright argues that emancipatory potential is incarnated in uniting 
individuals to solve specific problems. He states,  
 
‘Autonomy, after all, is about free and democratic will formation: and Dewey is 
unconvinced that real collaboration can take place in the absence of pre-political 
collaboration. Because, for Dewey, the political sphere is a cognitive tool by means 
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of which society endeavours experimentally to explore, deal with, and resolve 
problems specific to the coordination of social action.’44 
 
Following Dewey, Wright calls for changing the status of aesthetics to mere 
‘competencies’ or skills. What Wright wants from the arts is to bridge the gap 
between the capitalistic use of competencies and artivistic (from art and activism) 
use of competencies, thus opening the way to ‘unite individuals in solving common 
problems’. However, when the two become totally equivalent, what kind of 
‘commonality’ would be possible? Perhaps, if Wright really wants to challenge the 
power of the Post-Fordist use of artistic competencies, it is necessary not to mimic 
this situation, not to transfer this strategy into the relationship between art and social 
activism, but to concentrate on its pitfalls, contradictions and shortcomings. It is 
worthwhile to consider how this hybridity as trope of postmodern aesthetics and 
conception of politics is already linked to a late-capitalistic logic of utilisation. This 
art, which does not do art, is yet another fascinating, new, efficient and mobile 
structure, which entirely fits into the Post-Fordist paradigm of permanent flexibility, 
innovation and transformation.  
 
NGO Art – Art of Consensus  
 
Responding to Bourriaud and Wright’s theorisations of political art as artistic 
practices, which tend to ‘solve problems’ through participation or collaboration, a 
Dutch artistic collective, a collaboration of artists, architects and philosophers 
BAVO, points out that the ‘politics’ of art ‘not doing art’ but directly improving 
society – what BAVO calls NGO art – refers to the strength of the current 
consensus, which is ready not only to sacrifice art but also political activism itself in 
order to keep going. BAVO states,  
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‘A hallmark of this form of engaged art is its no-nonsense attitude, its realism: if 
you are not striving for immediate improvements…you have no right as an artist to 
produce great art. It is precisely this compulsion to achieve immediate results that 
prevents NGO artists from contesting the crisis in which the public now finds itself 
in a more fundamental way, and condemns them to political neutrality in order to 
realise their actions. Because they suppress any political critique in order to achieve 
their actions, these actions can be easily co-opted by the system as a sign that things 
are not bad in the world after all’.45 
 
Indeed, the philosophy of consensus dominates the most ‘politically’-minded artistic 
groups and activities. For example, nomadic Manifesta46, an artistic collaboration set 
up to deal with Europe and the issues of European identity via art politically, 
promotes itself exclusively as a ‘radical political branch’ of contemporary art. 
Comparing it with other Biennials, Hedwig Fijen, director of the Manifesta 
International Foundation of Amsterdam and President of the Manifesta 2007 
committee, says that  
 
‘The process of installation in the territory has always been important, even more so 
than the final presentation. This led to a flexible structure and therefore a radical 
change…’47  
 
The latest Manifesta 7, which took place in the summer-autumn 2008 in 
Trentino-South Tyrol, was supposed to ‘culturally relaunch’ this territory, to 
improve the visibility of two poor Italian provinces in terms of their cultural and 
business potentials. Alessandro Franceschini, architect and researcher at the 
Università degli Studi in Trento and a Manifesta member, explains:  
                                                
45 BAVO, ‘How Much Politics Can Art Take?’, Open, NAi Publishers, SKOR, 2008, issue 14 ‘Art as 
a Public Issue’: 109-111 
46 Manifesta is the only international biennial of contemporary art with a nomadic character; it has so 
far been hosted by the cities of Rotterdam (1996), Luxembourg (1998), Ljiubljana (2000), Frankfurt 
(2002) and San Sebastian (2004). Manifesta is based on a concept that aims for the constant re-
definition of its role towards European cultural and political issues, and is focused on the question of 
European identity.  
47 Interview with Hedwig Fijen, ‘Next Stop Trentino-South Tyrol’, Work Art in Progress, Manifesta 7 
Special, Trento, Spring 2008, Issue 22: 27 
 36 
 
‘It seems that having this event in the region is one to be exploited well – if not 
exactly as an investment in the future, then certainly as a bridge to the world. In this 
sense Manifesta 7 is growing and fulfils political, institutional, local and cultural 
expectations as well as those simply of administrative opportunity’.48 
 
In answering the question of what Manifesta represents for Trentino-South Tyrol, 
Margherita Cogo, Cultiral Minister of the Autonomous Province of Trento, says:  
 
‘Manifesta represents a great opportunity for the two provinces, a chance to 
culturally re-launch our territory… Culture and art, in particular, is an extraordinary 
instrument for reinforcing ties between the provinces…’49  
 
I find it interesting that reflections concerning Manifesta 7, which was 
published in Work: Art in Progress magazine, consist of interviews with numerous 
‘directors’, ‘public relations officers’, ‘ministers’ and ‘curators’ and only one actual 
artist. The questions of ‘what it is that Manifesta is set to address and why such a 
location has been chosen’ are met with abstract theorisations about the ‘usefulness’ 
of the event and ‘the willingness to actively participate’. Antonio Lampis, director of 
the Department of Italian Culture and the Autonomous Province of Bolzano insists, 
‘You need to look after the public. It should be imperative in museums and 
institutions for the sake of the public to have activities which promote contemporary 
art’.50 Words such ‘promote’, ‘long-term profit’ or ‘careers’ are widely used in 
Manifesta’s 7 materials, which seem to be odd given the radical ‘political’ 
orientation of the Biennale.  
 
Apart from the desire to ‘install’ in the territory and ‘promote’ it together with the 
contemporary art, Manifesta’s 7 ‘political’ ambitions seem to be rather vague. In our 
view, Hedwig Fijen summarises these potentials well. He says,  
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‘I think that Manifesta could become a Non-Governmental Organisation as well as 
in interdisciplinary institutions open to politics, science, environmental and cultural 
changes…but in general like to think that only of Manifesta is able to maintain its 
experimental nature and therefore evolve based on historical and sociological 
developments of the European identity, will it have the right to exist’.51  
 
So-called ‘NGO’ art has recently become the central framework, through which 
‘radical’ artistic groups avoid political issues. BAVO argues,  
 
‘Unlike traditional activism, these artists are not interested in initiating long-term 
political processes in which “the impossible is demanded” and of which no one 
knows whether they will ultimately produce a concrete improvements for the social 
group in question. NGO art in fact is characterised by a denial of politics: it 
concerns itself, above everything else, with the practical feasibility of a given 
action. If the motto of humanitarian organisations is “first the victims, then politic”, 
the motto of these artists is “no politics please, only the victims”. These artists 
deliberately avoid confrontations with authorities or investors, because this could 
compromise their ability to obtain the permits or funding they need to implement 
their actions’.52  
 
It seems that the Manifesta 7 committee not only avoids confrontations with 
authorities, it actively seeks and relies on their approval and collaboration. Instead of 
addressing, as it declares, the issues of European identity – what this identity is and 
how can it be formed, challenged and sustained, Manifesta ‘installs’ itself in the 
territory of Trentino-South Tyrol, ‘promotes’ contemporary art in general and help 
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locals to feel ‘Europeans’ in the sense of belonging to the fashionable and profitable 
art world of Manifesta’s projects and well-connected curators. Apart from ‘small but 
real’ improvements in Trentino-South Tyrol people’s life – a local architect gets a 
job or the Biennale’s participants get to improve their ‘careers’ – the ‘political’ 
intervention stops here. Concerning the issue of European identity, it is 
‘contemporary art that brings it’, promotes and uses – given, as Hedwig Fijen says, 
‘will it have the right to exist’.53  
 
BAVO concludes,  
 
‘A hallmark of this form of engaged art is its no-nonsense attitude, its realism: if 
you are not striving for immediate improvements…you have no right as an artist to 
produce great art. It is precisely this compulsion to achieve immediate results that 
prevents NGO artists from contesting the crisis in which the public now finds itself 
in a more fundamental way, and condemns them to political neutrality in order to 
realise their actions. Because they suppress any political critique in order to achieve 
their actions, these actions can be easily co-opted by the system as a sign that things 
are not bad in the world after all’.54  
 
Over-Identification as Dis-Identification  
 
While BAVO’s criticism towards NGO’s art is valid and timely, the 
alternative the group suggests seems to take for granted that art, certainly, could 
reach political goals if the correct strategy is located. In contrast with ‘no-nonsense 
attitude’, BAVO argues for ‘more-nonsense’ such as their latest proposal of ‘the art 
of over-identification’, which adopts the opponent’s point of view and strategically 
over-identifies with this position in order to subvert it from within. For example, 
Martijn Engelbregt has distributed pseudo-governmental inquiries, asking people in 
Amsterdam to report illegal residents. This project entitled ‘Regoned’ (short for 
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Registratie Orgaan Nederland) caused confusion and outrage. People not only fail to 
recognise this project as art, they pointed out the repetition of the Nazi propaganda 
against Jewish people at the times of the Second World War. Supposing the strategy 
of exposing the flawed nature of the opponent’s view through over-identification is 
actually works, the question is how this actually might challenge the existing order? 
The necessity to first identify with the position in order to over-identify with it and 
the question of individual’s capacity to present oneself in a reverse – to its ‘true’ 
ideological position, points out at the simplistic understanding of social reality – that 
there is ‘wrong’ and ‘right’ or true’ and ‘false’. BAVO argues that over-
identification is a progressive tendency in contemporary art.  
 
‘…in which artists, faced with a world that is more than ever ruled by a calculating 
cynicism, strategically give up their will to resist, capitulate to the status quo and 
apply the latter’s rules even more consistently and scupopiusly that the rest of 
society’.55  
 
What has to be abandoned is such an understanding of two-sided reality and 
a possibility of such a modernist move of radical negation or elevation. Public 
outrage is not enough to re-politicise citizens or make people think in a different 
way. There are could be many artistic activist strategies but the belief that there must 
be the one, which is destined to fulfil one immutable function is no less counter-
productive that the NGO type of art BAVO scrutinises.  
 
 
 No Politics, No Art – Just a Machine  
 
There are no short of approaches looking for a miracle recipe – the one that would 
finally ensure the affinity between art and politics. Some thinkers believe that what 
is needed is both: self-suppression of politics and of art as a separate practice. Such a 
double act would identify itself with the elaboration of new forms of life represented 
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by a philosophy elaborated in a bid to assimilate biopolitics to the movement of the 
multitudes supposedly breaking open the shackles of Empire.  
 
For Austrian philosopher and art critic Gerald Raunig, political art is the merger of 
art and activism, which forms a new terrain of transversality that neither belongs 
exclusively to the artistic field nor to the political field. Today, according to Raunig, 
in the context of the global protest movements, the old division between art and 
politics has become redundant and what must be encouraged is the refusal to 
participate in the old prescriptions of how artists relate to marketplace and authority 
and instead creation of radical new methods of engagement.  
 
Raunig’s book Art and Revolution presents an alternative art’s history of the ‘long 
twentieth century’ as the bridge between the Paris Commune, the October 
Revolution and the counter-globalisation protest in Genoa in 2001 and the 
Situationist International, Russian activism movement represented by Sergei 
Eisenstein and Tretyakov, Viennese Actionism and, the most recent, activist artistic 
practices such as PublixTheatreCaravan. According to Raunig, there is a 
revolutionary process, which is capable of enacting political change without taking 
the power. Following Antonio Negri, for Raunig, a revolution is a heterogeneous, 
machinic assemblage of three separate components: resistance, insurrection and 
constituent power. Taking the leads from Negri’s argument that the Italian factory 
workers’ refusal of waged labour and exodus from the working place took labour 
processes outside the factory walls and produced new forms of political 
organisation, Raunig contends that resistance and constituent power are tied since 
every move against the power is simultaneously a ‘movement of power-to’ that 
‘creates the sort of relations which are desired’.  
 
Raunig considers the Paris Commune as a historic example that allows one to think 
of alternative paths to the Leninist revolutionary project as creation of a new society 
only after ascending to power. Instead, Raunig argues that the absorption of all 
autonomous forces of the revolutionary process could be prevented by a movement 
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‘across the middle’, ‘…a transversal concatenation of art machines and 
revolutionary machines in which both overlap, not to incorporate one another, but 
rather to enter into a concrete exchange relationship for a limited time’.56 Raunig 
takes the concept of a ‘machine’ from Gilles Deleuze and Felix Guattari and 
suggests it should be understand not as a technical device and apparatus but a social 
composition and concatenation, It is an arrangement of technical, bodily, intellectual 
and social components which subverts the opposition between man and machine, 
organism and mechanism, individual and community. In considering the function of 
art in this concatenation, Raunig first analyses the case of Gustave Courbet in the 
days of the Commune. While painters such as Pisarro, Monet, Sezanne and others 
fled Paris, Courbet remained in the city, joined the uprising and become a member 
of the Council of the Commune. In the aftermath of the revolt, Courbet was put on 
trial and eventually died in exile. In his ‘Authentic Account’ before the court, 
Courbet styled himself ‘as a peace-maker and preserver of art treasures’. According 
to Raunig, the situation with Courbet indicates that art and revolution failed to 
concatenate transversally in the Paris Commune. In Courbet’s progression from art 
to revolution and back to art, the prototype of the bourgeois artist that clings to the 
abstract universalism and eternal value of art in order to save himself from 
prosecution is simply restored after dramatic events. Thus, Raunig argues, ‘…the 
Courbet model embodies the model in which there can no be systematic overlapping 
of the revolutionary machine and the art machine’.57 However, this failed 
concatenation, according to Raunig, does not mean that the merger of art and politics 
is impossible; rather the conditions of possibility were not mature at that time. Thus, 
Raunig turns to what in his view was more successful attempt of art to directly 
intervene in politics – the case of the Leftist Front of the Arts (LEF) in revolutionary 
Russia. Focusing on the collaboration between Sergey Eisenstein and Sergey 
Tretyakov in creating an ‘eccentric theatre’ based on a ‘montage of attractions’ 
aimed to transform the audiences’ emotions into extreme tensions. The ‘Theatre of 
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Attractions’ practiced and theoretised by Eisenstein and Tretyakov around 1923 
involved aggressive and physical moments of theatre, the effects of which were 
intended to disrupt the mechanism of illusion and empathy associated with the 
traditional theatre. To counter the totality of the subject matter they mounted and 
‘molecularised’ the piece as piecework of single circus-like attractions. Eisenstein 
and Tretyakov’s collaboration also produced further two shows, ‘Do You Hear, 
Moscow?’ (1923) and ‘Gas Masks’ (1924) where performances were organised in 
gas works at Kursk train station. Raunig claims that ‘the theatrical treatment of the 
self-organised and collective action was intended to examine what the future of 
labour could look like…’ and ‘…specifically attempted to provide an impulse for 
trying out new modes of subjectivation’.58 Hence, in Raunig’s view, LEF’s activity 
was radically different from a regular propaganda machine. Raunig claims that 
‘Tretyakov’s micropolitics’ created a laboratory ‘waiting for concatenation’ and 
were substantially external to ‘Stalinist molar apparatus’.  
 
Yet, Tretyakov’s own account of LEF’s activity points out that there was hardly any 
‘concrete exchange relationship’ between what Raunig calls art and revolutionary 
machines, not even for a limited time, as Raunig claims. According to Tretyakov, 
the experiments with ‘attractions’, which were aimed at showing that the audience, 
actors, the sounds are nothing other than pure elements, were increasingly ending 
with fistfights causing an impressive chaos not only in the theatre but also on the 
streets of Moscow afterwards. Tretyakov states, ‘…after [performances] they 
[crowds] moved through the streets, breaking shop windows and shouting songs.’59 
Soon the Proletkult has decided that experiments gone too far, the theatre was closed 
and artists were asked to produce more calculated strategy. Tretyakov has complied 
with Proletkult’s new memo to promote specific audiences, which were more 
homogeneous in terms of class.  This new strategy has reached its climax in 1924 
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when the third and final theatre cooperation between Eisenstein and Tretyakov took 
place. In February 1924 the theatre people left again, but this time not to go ‘into the 
streets’, but instead into the gigantic hall of the Moscow gas works at the Kursk train 
station, where they agitated a specific audience, carefully selected from the workers 
in this plant with their new play ‘Gas Masks’. Not only the content, but also the 
location intended to guarantee a success: an audience this time consisted solely of 
workers. Wearing gas masks, the actors operated alongside the gigantic apparatuses 
of the plant on the scaffolding. Their intention was to blur the difference between the 
workers and the actors, thus, directly integrating art into life and vice versa. 
However, workers perceived the performance as an insult to their situation and 
complained to the authorities, demanding to halt theatre’s intervention to the 
working environment of the gas factory. Tretyakov writes, ‘However, soon it 
became evident that we were disturbing their work. They put up with us for four 
performances and then demanded that we leave.’60  
 
If Tretyakov’s performances were different from the propaganda activities, it was 
not because it offered an alternative ‘models of subjectivation’ but because masses 
in general failed to identify with pseudo-abstractive activities of Proletkult, which 
did not create, as Raunig suggests, ‘the sort of relations that are desired’. Raunig 
claims that ‘…rapprochement of art and revolution fails’ because  
 
‘Artistic activism and activist art are not only directly persecuted by repressive state 
apparatuses…they are also marginalised by structural conservatisms in 
historiography and the art world’.61  
 
However, what he fails to recognise is that it was the people and not the 
Soviet authorities, which rejected Proletkult’s experiments as insulting and simply 
arrogant. Furthermore, Tretyakov seems to be exclusively interested in ‘the 
dissolution of art and life’ in the sense that he was aiming at transforming art and not 
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the masses. He admits that that the real life surroundings were incompatible with the 
artistic illusion: ‘These surroundings overwhelmed the artwork, making it seem 
absurd and useless. Reality has won over art’.62 Hence, Proletkult’s activities could 
be understood as a definition of this problematic connection between the 
revolutionary movement and art rather than a proof that it exists. While Lenin’s 
‘Draft Resolution on Proletarian Culture’ rejected Proletkult ‘… in the most resolute 
manner, as theoretically unsound and practically harmful, all attempts to invent 
one’s own particular brand of culture, to remain isolated in self-contained 
organisations …”63, the latter was self-contained and self-interested, it hardly 
worked as a part of a ‘revolutionary machine’ or overlapped it, even temporarily.  
 
Considering historic relations between artists and political regimes, Raunig seems to 
select only these groups, which engage in political theatre and street actions while 
the visual and the plastic arts remain outside of the picture. Indeed, he hardly 
discusses the aesthetic sphere in its concrete historic development or aesthetics per 
se. In fact, this subject is entirely substituted with a dialogue with the Italian post-
Marxists workerist theories of immaterial labour and the French post-structuralism 
of Deleuze and Guattari. What Raunig seems to implement from Deleuze and 
Guattari is the insistence on creation and not judgement. As Deleuze states, ‘What 
expert judgment, in art, could ever bear on the work to come? Judging prevents the 
emergence of any new model of existence’.64 Following Deleuze, Raunig rejects 
‘old’ categories of art such as aesthetic critique or judgment, authorship, aura, work 
of art etc and prefers to borrow new concepts of how artistic practice could be 
understood exclusively from political theory rather than aesthetic one. We must, he 
claims, suspend aesthetic judgments and concentrate on re-composition and 
invention. Raunig’s understanding of political artistic practice only as a fusion of art 
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and activism, is informed by Hardt and Negri’s faith that with the emergence of the 
multitude – the creative, pluralistic subject whose  
constitutive power new empire simultaneously creates, requisitions and repress; a 
new understanding of political subject altogether is required. Therefore, what is also 
required is a new understanding of art, not through aesthetics but though blurring 
any boundaries between artistic and political action. In the past, Raunig claims, this 
transversality has failed because state apparatuses repressed art machines or because 
the latter was later absorbed or institutionalised. Today, however,  
following Hardt and Negri, ‘the regulative and repressive empire, which itself has no 
positive reality at all, reacts to the multitude, is impelled by the resistance of the 
multitude. Resistance places itself, so to speak, before its object, becomes  
‘prior to power’.65 Since, according to Raunig, ‘it is not clear who or what could be 
the object of resistance in a global setting, how or where opposition could be 
defined’,66 then what makes sense is to follow Empire’s strategy: 
 
‘If the mechanisms of power function without a centre and without central control, 
then it will simply be necessary to attack power from every place, from every local 
context’.67  
 
Thus, Raunig accepts Hardt and Negri’s theoretical precondition for 
micropolitical practices as the only basis from which art can finally realise its 
revolutionary potentials. However, dwelling on Raunig’s considerations, it becomes 
clear that he is hardly interested in the realm of art. For him, multitude represents a 
new revolutionary subject and artistic activism is a possible objective of this new 
political formation. Through transversalisation of the artistic and the political field, 
multitude can produce entirely new forms of subjectivity as ‘collective forms and 
                                                
65 Raunig, Gerald, Art and Revolution Transversal Activism in the Long Twentieth Century, 
Semiotext(e) Active Agents, The MIT Press, 2007: 53 
66 Ibid.: 54 
67 Ibid.: 54 
 46 
models of becoming, which resist – at least for a time – reterritorialisation and 
structuralisation’.68  
 
It is interesting that while activist art is supposed to attack power from any place, 
from any context, when it comes to concrete examples, some places seem to deserve 
the activist’s attention more than others. In fact, these are always places, which are 
to do with activist art’s relationship with authorities. For example, Raunig describes 
the function of the artistic collective PublixTheatreCaravan as ‘…precisely this 
machine that sets out to oppose the violence of the state apparatus, the order of 
representation’. Dwelling on PublixTheatreCaravan’s activities, the artistic group 
which, according to Raunig, ‘acts along a line of flight’ and ‘travels unknown paths’, 
we can see that all these activities circle around well known paths such as borders, 
refugees camps, protests around G8 summits, in short, they always are aimed at 
dramatising and disrupting zones of control or authority – almost if they need the 
apparatus to prosecute them in order to prove that they exist. Thus, when the Italian 
police kept members of the group in custody for four weeks following Caravan’s 
participation in protests around the G8 summit in Genoa, 2009, it was considered an 
ultimate victory of micropolitics through its ‘failure’. Raunig speaks, in a similar 
manner, about attempts to criminalise and repress micropolitical elements such as 
the case of the Critical Art Ensemble and Steve Kurtz in the USA or the exhibition 
‘Caution, Religion’ at the Sakharov Centre in Moscow. What unites all these cases, 
including PublixTheatreCaravan, is that their nature is offensive, yet, neutral 
towards the existing institutions. In other words, pursuing their ‘lines of flight’, such 
practices do not engage with institutions but only require them as a basis for their 
‘instituent’ possibilities. Raunig explains,  
 
‘…instituent practice as a process and concatenation of instituent events means an 
absolute concept beyond the opposite of institution: it does not oppose the 
institution but it does flee from institutionalisation and structuralisation’.69  
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What follows is that without ‘mechanisms of power’ art activism would hardly exist, 
meanwhile, activist insists that what is at stake is to ‘attack power from everywhere’. 
If resistance places itself ‘prior to power’, as Raunig argues, then, why the activist is 
so afraid of a proper engagement with institutions? According to Jacques Rancière, 
this takes place because theoreticians such as Raunig believe that we now live in a 
new biopolitical paradigm, creative and productive beyond the measure of politics or 
capital. Rancière reflects,  
 
‘They tend to regard artistic action as a new political activism, specifically because 
of the fact that we live in a new phase of capitalism, in which material and 
immaterial production, knowledge, communication and artistic action merge into 
one and the same process of the actualisation of a collective intelligence…Naturally 
that does not mean that the artistic practice has become a political practice, as some 
theoreticians think’70.  
 
Meanwhile, Raunig insists that what is at stake is not substituting political 
action with artistic practices but creating zones of indistinguishability between the 
two. For Raunig, such a trajectory implies that having arrived at the age of ‘political 
maturity’, when in the context of the global protest movements, ‘artistic-political 
practices finally seem to have left behind the dichotomy between art and activism’, 
the state of transversality could now be achieved and the ‘desired relations’ finally 
created. Activist strategies of the avant-garde have failed since artists were merely 
preoccupied with aesthetic questions and also repressed by state apparatuses. Today, 
according to Raunig, we are dealing with an entirely new scenario: ‘The activists 
hardly seek their own success in the arts field, nor they striving for special 
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distinction’.71 This is not, however, how Ranceiere envisages the current rise of art 
activism. There is nothing ‘final’ about this phenomenon. According to Racniere, the 
fusion of art and politics is desired not because it represents a new type of politics 
but because the latter is lacking. He states,  
 
‘But the paradox of our present is perhaps that this art, uncertain of its politics, is 
increasingly encouraged to intervene due to the lack of politics in the proper sense. 
Indeed, it seems if the time of consensus, with its shrinking public space and 
effacing of political inventiveness, has given to artists and their mini-
demonstrations, their collections of objects and traces, their dispositifs of 
interaction, their in situ or other provocations, a substitutive political function’.72  
 
While Raunig insist that these dispositifs can reshape political spaces through 
self-suppression of both: politics and art, Rancière seems to think that such practices 
are often content with merely parodying them. Indeed, if we look closely at Raunig’s 
preferred examples such as activities of PublixTheatreCaravan or the exhibition 
‘Caution, Religion’ at the Sakharov Centre in Moscow, what stands out is that these 
activities attempt to destabilise the already given framework whether is it a context 
of a border or religious fundamentalism. These activities are always ‘against’ 
something and by irritating and dramatising what exists, they reinforce the given. 
For example, what do PublixTheatreCaravan’s activists do when they wear orange 
overalls and UN uniforms, stopping cars and distributing no-border passports and 
pamphlets among the drivers crossing between the Hungarian and Croatian border 
posts? According to Raunig, this creates ‘the no-man’s-land against the absolute 
borders of the national state’. Perhaps, instead of talking from the superior position 
of artistic ‘understanding’ and ‘appropriating’ reality, instead of presenting an 
‘artistic opposite’ of what exists, they could have attempted to allow something else 
to speak: to show the link, for example, between the violence of the border and the 
happiness of belonging, of having a passport and ability to cross borders. The 
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question is, how artistic actions of PublixTheatreCaravan are critically different 
from that of authorities? What new understanding of the situation does it actually 
bring?  
 
Of course, this is not to denounce all activist art practices as ineffective and 
‘constituent’ merely of itself. Certainly, Raunig is correct in stating that the artistic 
strategies of Yomango, the net culture hoaxes by groups such as Yes Men or RTMark 
seek to thwart the ‘common sense’ in the distribution of the sensible. These practices 
are indeed an effective parody of the consensus. However, this effectiveness does 
not locate in the zone of indistinquishability between political and artistic practices 
but through juxtaposing, contradicting elements which belong to the current 
common sense with the very same elements being appropriated and interpreted 
though artistic means. When Yes Men presents a fake website of the World Trade 
Organisation and then appears as its representatives making people realise the hoax, 
artists cross border between life and art, they change the status between art and non-
art and thus introduce a new way of seeing the common world through their 
appropriation. What is at stake here is to cross this border and not to dissolve it 
completely. Furthermore, the satire strategy is becoming increasingly ineffective 
precisely because of what Raunig describes as a situation of non-clarity of who or 
what represents the object of resistance in a global setting. Rancière points out that 
the dimension of humour or parody has become the strategic way in which 
commodities are presented. He states,  
 
‘…advertising now increasingly used to play on the undecidability between a 
product’s use-value and its value as a sign – and image-support. In their [artistic 
activist practices] passage from the critical to the ludic register, these procedures of 
delegitimisation have almost become indiscernible from those spun by the powers 
that be and the media or by the forms of presentation specific to commodities’.73  
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What Rancière suggests is that artists can play on this undecidibility only through 
exposing it rather than reinforcing.74 However, to be able to clarify the difference 
between value of the sign and its use-value as a product or a situation, one needs to 
return to the dimension of aesthetics, to reserve spaces belonging to art. Contrary to 
Raunig, who argues that undecidibility plays in favour of artistic activism, Rancière 
contends that the political task of art today locates in rendering visible the arts, the 
aesthetic revealing of ‘one world hidden beneath another’.75  
 
The way to denounce the dominant consensus for Rancière is to reveal more 
contradictions, more inconsistencies behind it. For example, Rancière argues, when 
Krzysztof Wodiczko’s projections of homeless onto American monuments point to 
the exclusion of the poor from the public vision or Hans Haacke’s sticking small 
plaques into museum works suggests their nature as objects of speculations; in this 
way, ‘…the politics founded on the play of exchanges and displacements between 
the art worlds and that of non-art’.76  One should not replace the aesthetic dimension 
with the activist scenario but rather actively appropriate the given world through the 
radical difference and strangeness of an aesthetic object, an aesthetic approach to the 
common world one. ‘Political’ art for Rancière does not start from borrowing from 
the political theory, insofar plausible it seems, but borrowing from the connections 
between specific aesthetics of politics and the politics of aesthetics. Rancière writes,  
 
‘The difficulty of critical art does not reside in its having to negotiate the 
relationship between politics and art. It resides in having to negotiate the 
relationship between two aesthetic logics that, insofar as they belong to the very 
logic of the aesthetic regime, exist independently of it’.77  
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Rancière is speaking about a third voice, which can come forward when art 
contrasts, crosses borders and changes of aesthetics’ status between what belongs to 
art and what does not. When art works ‘politically’, it never follows a particular 
political theory or an aesthetic theory exclusively but rather becomes involved in a 
double critique – of existing images of the given and self-images of art as 
mechanisms which supposed to construct an entirely different reality. Dissensus, for 
Rancière, does not mean distributing the sensible in a radically new way or 
interrupting such a distribution – rather, it is about opening every situation ‘from the 
inside, reconfigured in a different regime of perception and signification’.78 This is 
where Rancière and Raunig seem to disagree.  
 
Dissensus: Politics or Police?  
 
In his interpretation of the ‘distribution of the sensible’, Raunig follows Deleuze’s 
understanding of ‘distributing’ not as establishment of a new arrangement but as a 
process of ‘distributing themselves in space’, which is radically open. Taking his 
lead from Deleuze’s take on ‘nomadic distribution’, Raunig states,  
 
‘In this type of distribution there is no law, no authority; the movement of the 
arrangement takes place as principally open, unlimited, covering a space as large as 
possible. The place itself is taken here neither as empty, waiting to be filled, nor as 
full but previously divided, but rather as a ‘space of scope’.79  
 
This is not how Rancière envisages a space. For him, there is no other reality 
‘concealed behind apparatuses’ or market, only ‘the unity of the given and the 
obviousness of the visible’.80 This ‘visible’, however, is not associated exclusively 
with the ‘police’ as the given distribution of the sensible as Raunig argues. He 
reflects on Rancière’s understanding of dissensus as follows,  
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‘The event that introduces this unrest into the police distribution of the sensible is 
dissensus. Rancière does not consider dissensus at all simply as an opposition or 
deviation in content, but rather specifically as disobedience towards the distribution 
of the sensible…the revolt against the form of police, the usurpation of equality’.81  
 
For Rancière, however, dissensus does not mean thwarting the principles of the 
police or establishing new sensibilities, which cannot be ‘policed’ as they are always 
in a process of instituting and never institutionalised. Ranciére’s statement ‘Move 
along! There is nothing to see here’82 represents what he calls the ‘police order’, the 
term, which, however, does not directly refer to the police but rather to institutions, 
social positions, modes of communication, images and ways of speaking and 
showing – all operations, that generate what Ranciére calls ‘the given’. Dissensus for 
Ranciére involves ‘…understanding that the distribution of the visible itself is part of 
the configuration of domination and subjection’.83 This is linked to this idea of the 
‘distribution of the sensible’ – one what it does and does not do, and about what one 
is included and excluded from the field of vision. Contrary to Raunig, who believes 
that the ‘new events of instituting’ in the space barred by the police but otherwise 
open, Ranciére does not envisage the possibility of grasping an entirely new way of 
subjection free of the ‘police’. It is not that people are deliberately kept in the dark, 
but the ‘order’ is blind, what constitutes its ‘common sense’ would never allow all 
points of view, or otherwise there would be no order. What is at stake here is not 
interrupting the ‘police order’ – what is allowed to see and what is not but, most 
importantly, to question how we see things – to dismiss the opposition between 
looking and acting.  
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Ranciére suggests that looking ‘at places or questions that are not supposed to be 
your place or your questions’ creates space that weaken ‘…the bonds that enclose 
spectacles within a form of visibility … within the machine that makes the “state of 
things” seem evident, unquestionable.’84 Looking where one is not supposed to look 
does not imply showing true horrors and suffering, what Ranciére calls ‘the 
intolerable image’. However powerful the ‘intolerable’ image is, it never acts on its 
own but always belongs to a particular system of visibility. Ranciére states,  
 
‘The image is pronounced unsuitable for criticising reality because it pertains to the 
same regime of visibility is that reality, which turns displays its aspect of brilliant 
appearance and its other side of sordid truth, constituting a single spectacle’.85  
 
What is at stake here is the regime of visibility itself, which does not anticipate 
effects of the images. What is needed are different politics of the sensible based on 
the resistance of the visible where the ‘intolerable’ image does not constitute the 
other side of the spectacle. Ranciére says,  
 
‘The shift from the intolerable in the image to the intolerability of the image has 
found itself at the heart of the tensions affecting political art’.86  
 
According to Rancière’s understanding of dissensus, activist artistic practices would 
belong to the same regime of visibility since they operate in the given framework, 
they are too ‘content focused’. Raunig finds it plausible that art activists neither wish 
to do art, nor politics and thus there is no specific content captured in their 
operations. Raunig states,  
 
‘Counter to the pejorative identification of the works by artists who understand their 
practice of expression on social and political topics as political art, which Rancière 
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declares as unpolitical, because of their focus on content, it must be objected that 
this argument not only concerns the rare case of post-Stalinist propaganda artists, 
but also these who regard their art as counter-formation, as a means of distributing 
marginalised messages…What Rancière overlooks in these cases is that a message 
that is impossible in a certain context can shift the partage du sensible like the 
examples in his political philosophy of dissensus. A similar case is Rancière’s 
schematic representation, which throws not only Bauhaus and Beuys into the same 
pot of reproach…but also the whole spectrum of post-revolutionary Russian avant-
gardes along with Guy Debord and even Negri and Hard as well’.87  
 
However, how post-Operaist agenda for mass mobility as a ‘counter-empire’, as 
microphysics of resistance is different to post-Stalinist propaganda? Whether what is 
at stake is about a construction of a proletarian culture or a cultural ‘proletarian’, 
these strategies remain firm beliefs that one way or another, things can be radically 
different, that, as Raunig, argues, if something is ‘suppressed’ or sacrificed, for 
example, ‘art suppressing itself as a separate practice’, then entirely ‘new forms of 
live’ would be elaborated. To be the activist is to know already what are you fighting 
for and this certainty is what Rancière is questioning. Instead of following a path of 
knowing, of supporting a particular political or aesthetic theory, Rancière suggests 
that the distribution of the visible itself is part of the configuration of domination. It 
is from this point of view that Rancière understands what critical art does. While, for 
Rancière, there is no such thing as ‘unpolitical’ artistic practices, some practices 
produce scenes of dissensus in the sense that they acknowledge that whatever they 
do, they cannot fulfil or illuminate the ‘gaps’ in the blindness of the social order.  
 
Critical art for Rancière is not about building awareness of the mechanisms of 
domination with the goal to turn spectators into conscious or unconscious agents of 
world transformation – rather it is about being aware that artistic practices are also 
part of the distribution of the sensible and thus part of the police as well. As we have 
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already argues in the first chapter, aesthetics itself has its own politics of tension 
between the logic of art becoming life and the logic of art becoming involved in 
politics on the express condition of not having anything to do with it. The difficult 
moment of critical art resides in the negotiation between these two aesthetic logics. 
Rancière argues,  
 
‘Critical art has to negotiate between the tension which pushes art towards “life” as 
well as that which, conversely, sets aesthetic sensorality apart from the other forms 
of sensory experience’.88  
 
According to Rancière, the political question in contemporary art could be grasped 
through the metamorphoses of the ‘third’ way, the politics founded on the play of 
displacements between the art world and that of non-art and not by following a new 
biopolitical paradigm, creative and productive beyond the measure of politics and 
art. There is no other space or ‘life form’ to be attained beyond power relations, 
beyond the distribution of the sensible. Rancière writes, ‘What Deleuze calls the 
logic of sensation is much more a theatre of de-figuration, where figures are 
wrenched from the space of representation and reconfigured in a different space’.89 
What should be discouraged is not art as means of representation and not political 
practice but the dream of purity, that only through particular type of political or 
particular forms of artistic practices, entirely new subjectivity would emerge.  
 
For Rancière, such a great influence of Italian autonomists on how political 
identification of art is envisaged manifests the repetition of old universality, of the 
idea that only today, the final break through is possible or desirable. What is at stake 
is not to search for what political art might look like or what it can achieve but 
rather, there is a stark political choice in art: it can either keep supporting a new 
reactionary mysticism of artistic multitude and new forms of life or to move towards 
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radical democracy, the trajectory, which exposed flawed societal systems rather than 
‘restoring social bonds’ or imposing ‘non-hierarchical organising’.  
 
According to Rancière, the very idea of micropolitical artistic practices as fusion of 
art and politics beyond recognition implies ‘the matching of sense with sense’ and 
this is what consensus means: the accord made between a sensory regime of 
presentation of things and a mode of interpretation of their meaning. Rancière 
writes,  
 
‘The consensus says that there is but a single reality whose signs must be depleted, 
that there is a single space, which reserving the right to redraw its borders; that one 
unique time exists, while allowing itself to multiply its figures. All this goes to show 
that we are merely being asked for consent’.90  
 
Instead, critical art work towards dissensus. This dissensus does not mean a 
mere interruption of the police or continuous instituent practices without 
institutionalisation but establishment of different regimes of visibility where the 
relationship are suspended rather than created, where action is halted rather than 
enabled, where the narrative, which the given regime of visibility is unfolding, 
friezes in the aesthetic break.   
 
Rancière speaks about the pensive nature of the image, the state, which he associates 
with the political dimension in all forms of artistic practices. The pensiveness 
corresponds to a change of status in the relationship between through and art, action 
and image. Rancière argues that the pensive image or a third way of thinking about 
the aesthetic break implies  
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‘…not the abolition of the image in direct presence, but its emancipation from the 
unifying logic of action; it is not a rapture in the relationship between the intelligible 
and the sensible, but a new status of the figure’.91  
 
What is interrupted here is the relation between expression and narration. What is 
thwarted is the very logic of action, of any conclusion or finality and not the police 
or the sensible. Critical art emerges to suspend the action, to suspend the knowing 
and not to duplicate, improve or erase it.  
 
Rather than suppressing the mediating object in favour of any social or political 
immediacy, Rancièreis convinced that there should be a critical third term which 
both parts – politics and aesthetics refer to and interpret. The distance that this 
imposes is not an evil that should be abolished or sacrificed, since it is the 




Having discussed the contemporary models of artistic practices, which claim to be 
politically relevant, what seems to be at stake is an ongoing confusion what politics 
are about. For despite their decidedly engaged political agenda, artists and critics 
apparently consider regular politics no longer capable of being a significant factor 
for any form of positive social change or emancipation. On the one hand, artists and 
cultural producers attempt to express an aesthetic and ethical imperative with the 
goal of fuelling new subjectivity under what they perceive as entirely new 
geopolitical and social conditions, however, on the other hand, this sense of urgency 
and passion to be ‘political’ seems to be reactive to conditions of contemporary 
capitalist framework. By throwing off a prevailing subjectivity and offering new 
modalities of experience that are based on radically new ways of practicing art 
rooted in the here and now, many politically motivated artistic practices fuel what 
Boltanski and Chiapello calls the third spirit of capitalism and thus assist in the 
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sense of disconnection and further social atomisation. At the times when forms of 
political conflicts and visions are said to be outdated, when they are no longer stable 
territories or disciplines, artists attempt to manoeuvre through this field of 
uncertainty through new ways of doing art – creating ‘transversal alliances’ or 
imitating other social practices – they are radical in their actions but not thinking. 
Attempting to divorce itself as further as possible from the capitalistic world but at 
the same time lacking an external world as an object of its criticism, art seems to 
turn against itself. This dynamic tends to reduce the tensions between art and non-art 
and thus contribute to the consensual rather than critical subjectivity. Emphasising 
the ethical, social or moral values that have been lost by traditional politics or by 
other ethical authorities in society, in this way such art, as it were, sets the seal upon 
status as a substitute and, wasting its critical potential, is transformed into the role of 
a surrogate.  
 
Our next chapter examines different conceptions of emancipatory politics, which are 
reflected in the prevailing understanding of art’s politicality. What we have inherited 
from the Frankfurt school’s legacy is as a widespread disdain for universalism, 
liberty, modernity, social change and the longing for utopia. Far from a celebration 
of political and social achievements of liberal democracy, modernity is seen to lead 
to the unprecedented victory of capitalism, a pathological distrust of political and 
politicians and environmental catastrophe. For many radicals today, the preferred 
option is to seek ways in which to retreat from the ‘deadlock’ of modern day life. 
Artistic practices have in many ways become a convenient path of abundance and 
deconstruction. The effectiveness of artistic activities is measured by the radicality 
of their actions; however, what is at issue is the very question: what does it mean to 








Conceptions of Emancipatory Politics: Radical or Democratic? 
  
In his The German Ideology, Introduction to the Critique of Hegel’s Philosophy of 
Right, Thesis on Feurbach (1845) and elsewhere, Marx argued against the idealism 
of contemporary thought in 1840s Germany and insisted that the criticism of religion 
needed to be replaced by the criticism of politics – by political activism and social 
change based on the emerging proletariat. To be sure, the idea that there must be a 
privileged agent or modus operandi capable of transforming a given social order 
must be abandoned; Marx’s insistence on politics instead of religion remains a 
potent thought. Today, the claim of many radical and left-wing thinkers is that 
capitalism developed far too much and far too fast and therefore, as Habermas 
complains, for example, ‘one can no longer coax an unredeemed promise from the 
production-centred capitalist project’. Such a fatalistic tone penetrates the work of the 
Frankfurt school’s members, such as Theodor Adorno, Herbert Marcuse or Jurgen 
Habermas. Based on the premise that late capitalism devised an all-inclusive 
‘administered universe’, a political order purged of the objective possibility of 
choice, society could no longer be trusted to form any progressive relations; therefore, 
as these thinkers argue, the hope lies within self-conscious activity and reflection, 
instead of in the exercise of human agency, and individuals can find the relief in a 
metaphysical and more transcendent experience found in an aesthetic ideal, as Adorno 
maintains; the aesthetic-erotic rebellion, as Marcuse argues; or Habermasian faculty 
of the language aimed at mutual understanding. It is a common belief today that in a 
society dominated by global capitalism and the media, individuals lack the capacity 
for autonomous action, and that the democratic promise of the Enlightenment cannot 
be realised.  
 
The Enlightenment ideal of autonomy implies the right of everyone to pursue their 
destiny according to their beliefs – this represents the foundation for choice, moral 
and political decision making and political action. Immanuel Kant claimed that the 
‘enlightenment is man’s emergence from his self-imposed immaturity,’ where the 
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latter is understood as ‘the inability to use one’s understanding without guidance 
from another’.92 According to Kant, this immaturity was self-imposed and its ‘cause 
[lay] not in lack of understanding but in lack of resolve and courage to use it without 
guidance from another’93. Following the motto of the Enlightenment – ‘Sapere 
Aude’ or ‘Dare to Know’ – Kant challenged individuals to use their understanding. 
The Enlightenment ideal of individual autonomy, which insists that society must 
recognise the independence of each individual, offers people the promise of choices, 
but it is precisely because some individuals have taken this ideal seriously that they 
successfully challenged repressive institutions and power structures that sought to 
thwart their dimension. Even though human actions often result in unpredictable 
outcomes, some of which could be disastrous, the choice between the ‘ideal’ and 
‘actions’ is a false dilemma. According to Adorno, for example, because there is no 
choice, we must keep an ideal alive as represented in his aesthetic theory; 
meanwhile, it is because there is an ideal that individuals can act upon it. In Kant’s 
view, people fail to change their circumstances not because they lack an 
understanding of their condition, but because they do not dare take action. The 
problem therefore is not the fallible nature of human agency, but the pessimism 
towards the impossibility of the ideal. This ideal, according to Kant, is not there to 
be realised, but to keep individuals acting and challenging their current condition.  
 
Political theorist Chantal Mouffe’s approach embraces ideas of the Enlightenment – 
it defends its promise of individuals’ liberty to fulfil their human capacities and 
aspirations – but in a different way: without the pessimism towards the impossibility 
of ideals. In fact, the ‘self-refuting ideal’ of democratic politics liberates individuals 
from the paralysis of the Frankfurt school’s individualism and rationalism. Mouffe 
maintains that there is ‘the level of the political’, which concerns the ontological 
horizon, ‘the symbolic ordering of social relations and is much more than a mere 
‘form of government’’. This political form of society does not include its possible 
articulation with an economic system such as capitalism. Everything is political, 
                                                




including capitalist relations. There is no ‘system’, no objective world outside 
subjectivity. To envisage how we can transform our existing conditions is to grasp 
what is at stake in democratic politics and not to reveal the ‘true reality’.  
  
This chapter examines understandings of the nature of democratic politics found in 
the work of the Frankfurt school’s members since they were pivotal in the 
relationship between cultural and political modernism and other approaches, notably 
those of Jacques Rancière and Chantal Mouffe. Shall we view politics as a self-
conscious activity and or as a practice? Shall we reduce politics to an activity confined 
within strictly assigned boundaries whether it is conceived, in Adornian vision, as an 
apolitical artist practising some sort of universal and neutral aesthetic ideal or, in 
Habermas’s view, as a speaking individual aiming to reach a mutual understanding? 
Shall we understand politics in terms of the philosophy of consciousness or a theory of 
language?  
 
Different conceptions of what emancipatory politics entail lead to a very different 
treatment of the question regarding the political role of art and culture. Today, art 
discourse is characterised by both: idealistic and rational assertions of artistic 
practice’s independence of material and political life. Instead of passionate 
engagement with the existing conditions, it reduces artistic practice to a completely 
different type of practice – social liaison and help. So-called ‘political art’ today does 
not wish to intervene in the social, but appears to wish to create it in the first place. 
Such a self-image corresponds to the flawed way in which politics are envisaged today 
and, in many ways, the legacy of the Frankfurt school has contributed to the current 
predicament.  
 
Adorno & Horkheimer: A Great Despair  
 
Many believe that Theodor Adorno and Max Horkheimer's account in Dialectic of 
Enlightenment, which focuses on the capitalist appropriation of high art through its 
mass reproduction and hence neutralisation of cultural critique, today has become a 
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description of a given reality. A hallmark of the Frankfurt school was its overriding 
concern with the cultural sphere, which was no longer capable of disclosing its own 
contradictions and make a mark of alienation appear in the deceptive appearance of 
reconciliation. For Adorno and Horkheimer, the autonomy of aesthetic experience 
and its heterogeneity with respect to all other forms of experience contrasts with the 
faked community of sense. The political act of art is to save the heterogeneous 
sensible that is the heart of the autonomy of art and its power of emancipation. The 
social function of art consists of having no function, Adorno declares. However, this 
subversive and transcendent character of culture has been eradicated through its 
integration into the capitalist system. Cultural entities have become standardised, the 
profit motive has been transferred onto cultural forms and cultural products have 
become ‘a species of commodity…marketable and interchangeable like an industrial 
product’.94 To ensure its own reproduction, the culture industry produces forms 
compatible with the capitalist system, thereby transforming art and culture into 
powerful tools of mass deception. In the final draft of the Dialectic, Adorno and 
Horkheimer replaced the term ‘mass culture’ with ‘culture industry’ to denounce any 
idea that popular culture was something that ‘arises spontaneously from the masses 
themselves’.95 Adorno maintains that the outcome of this transformation was that 
‘conformity has replaced consciousness’. The capacity to think and act 
autonomously was destroyed. Adorno writes,  
 
‘The total effect of the culture industry is one of anti-enlightenment, [which] 
becomes mass deception and is turned into a means of fettering consciousness. It 
impedes the development of autonomous, independent individuals who judge and 
consciously decide for themselves. These, however, would be the precondition for a 
democratic society…’96  
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Thus, in Adorno view, democracy corresponds to individuals’  
consciousness and the capacity to judge. It appears that the problem for Adorno does 
not lie with the culture industry or capitalism per se, but in the fact that individuals 
have become a part of the masses. The problem then is not the mass industry but the 
masses.  
 
Certainly, some of Adorno’s most remarkable analysis – for example, his discussion 
of Schoenberg in the ‘Philosophy of Modern Music’ – documents his assertion that 
the greatest modern art, even the most apparently anti-political, in fact holds up a 
mirror to the ‘total system’ of late capitalism. Yet the fate of modernism in 
consumer society itself, what was once an oppositional and anti-social phenomenon 
in the early years of the century, later become the dominant style of commodity 
production and demanding reproduction of itself. Furthermore, as Peter Burger 
demonstrated in his Theory of the Avant-Garde97, what made art autonomous was the 
fact that the artist could produce works for the autonomous market rather than for 
the prince or the cleric. And market here does not solely imply the mechanism of 
exchange (buying and selling), but the whole public sphere where artworks could be 
produced, discussed or distributed. Autonomy is thus a necessary part of the market 
construction as a network of individuals. It appears that what Adorno is really 
concerned with is not art or art’s autonomy, but the fact that anyone could practice 
what Adorno holds as an ideal of a spontaneous, authentic and creative individual. In 
fact, throughout their work, Adorno and Horkheimer mourn ‘the fallen nature of 
modern man’. This fall of the individual corresponds to the rise of the masses. In a 
subsequent discussion Horkheimer speaks of his concern over ‘the shift of 
subjectivity from the individual to the collectivity’, reducing an individual to a mere 
member of the deceived masses, who think and act as if they were capable of it. The 
real enemy of Adorno and Horkheimer is not capitalism, but the people who seek 
not to change the world, but to keep it the same. This is evident in Adorno’s 
discussion with his contemporaries. Dwelling on Adorno’s responses to Brecht’s 
conception of political theatre, Bloch’s call for ‘utopian thinking’ or Lukacs’s 
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defence of ‘critical realism’, it is where we can witness the political character of 
Adorno’s assessment and where his political idioms become more nuanced and 
concrete. In a nutshell, Adorno’s response to any attempts to envisage what kind of 
artistic practices could be the most productive intervention into the existing state of 
affairs is that it is ‘idealistic, philistine and ideological’.  
 
Georg Lukacs was concerned with defending the titles of realism in the post-
capitalist societies of the East. In contrast with its ‘classical’ or ‘critical’ siblings, 
Lukacs’s ‘socialist realism’ was grounded in a ‘concrete socialist perspective’ and 
constructed ‘from the inside’, socially and ideologically. Silenced in his country 
(Hungary), subject to attacks and increasing vehemence, Lukacs insisted on ‘non-
rejection’ of socialism as an historic possibility and maintaining ‘social realism’ as a 
‘naturalists’’ transcription of the actual state of society, which he saw as a valuable 
element in the culture of the workers’ states. Meanwhile, Adorno, contemptuous of 
the optimism prescribed by Soviet orthodoxy, accused Lukacs of having ‘mental 
chains’ and an inability to distance himself from ideological systems, producing 
artworks identical to the reality they attempt to interfere with. Adorno writes,  
 
‘Lukacs still behaves like a Cultural Commissar…indifferent to the philosophical 
question of whether the concrete meaning of a work of art is in fact identical with 
the mere ‘reflection of objective reality…’98   
 
Why would Adorno, who saw capitalist development as the sole cause of the lack of 
any political choice action, attack Lukacs’s attempts to formulate an alternative 
theory of political art in non-capitalist societies? It appears that the problem does not 
lie within a different understanding of the role of art – in both cases art is seen as a 
privileged means of assessing historical reality or capitalism itself – but within a 
different vision of politics. Examining Adorno’s assessment of Lukacs’s ‘socialist 
realism’, it becomes clear that the real disagreement lies in a different understanding 
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of the role of human agency. The question Lukacs asks is ‘What is Man?’, pointing 
out that ‘…artistic reality cannot be separated from the context in which they are 
created’. While for a modernist, Lukacs argues, ‘man means the individual who has 
always existed, who is essentially solitary, asocial and – ontologically – incapable of 
entering into relationships with other human beings’, Lukacs insists that men are 
capable of changing their relationships and ‘…the intellectual and emotional values 
placed on those relationships change accordingly…at any specific time one human 
relationship may be progressive and another reactionary’.99 Meanwhile, for Adorno, 
‘…the procedures of socialist realism…are simply the ideological transfiguration of 
the prevailing unsatisfactory state of affairs’.100 It appears that what Adorno does not 
trust is not a society corrupted by capitalism, but man’s ability to form any 
progressive type of relationships. Therefore Adorno is convinced that it is an 
aesthetic ideal of the appropriation of the objective world by the subject in 
accordance with the ‘laws’ of aesthetic form that should take ‘authority’ out of the 
hands of people, because they cannot be trusted. At first, such a proposition appears 
to be democratic, since, like science, it takes the certainty out of priests, kings or 
governments and puts it out into a suspended realm, open to be reflected upon, tested 
and questioned. However, Adorno’s fundamental categories of aesthetic ‘truth’ 
remain so opaque and unassailable – ‘autonomous art’, the ‘laws’ and ‘logic’ of 
artistic form, ‘essences’ – that they close off any further discussion. It seems that 
what Adorno and Lukacs’ discussion reveals is that they are attempting to fix in the 
artistic realm a problem, that is in the political realm: the closure of possibilities.  
There seems no good reason why artistic practices should ‘fix’ the problems of 
politics, or, indeed, why artistic work cannot proceed while wider society is in 
difficulties. 
 
Antagonisms were not ‘overcome as they call it’ in the states of the Eastern bloc, 
asserts Adorno, no alternative to be found in the present, and concludes, ‘Only those 
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thoughts are true which fail to understand themselves’101. In this case, it is not just 
emancipatory politics that are meaningless, but all politics – no debate is necessary.  
 
Adorno’s fatalism could be seen in his dialogue with Ernst Bloch on the subject of 
utopia. ‘Whatever utopia is’, Adorno argued,  
 
‘...whatever can be imagined as utopia, this is the transformation of totality. And the 
imagination of such a transformation of totality is basically very different in all the 
so-called utopian accomplishments – which, incidentally, are all really like you say: 
very modest, very narrow. It seems to me that what people have lost subjectively in 
regard to consciousness is very simply the capability to imagine the totality as 
something that could be completely different’.102  
 
Bloch countered. The word ‘utopia’ had indeed been discredited, he noted, 
but utopian thinking had not. He pointed to other levels of the mind that were less 
structured by Western capital. We can still think utopia, suggested Bloch. However, 
Adorno saw the only possibility to reside in the notion of an unfettered life ‘freed 
from death’. All at once the discussion of utopia expanded, it became ancient. 
Adorno declared that there could be no picture, no thought of utopia cast in a 
positive manner.  
 
What Adorno appears to advocate is not a pessimistic theory of culture and an elitist 
artistic space as a Marxist defence of modernism, but a theory of a distinctively 
modernist ideology, according to which to grasp the monolithic historical reality of 
ideological domination politics can only be comprehended in terms of a more 
transcendent alternative that found its leverage outside of the world as it currently is. 
In other words, unable to deal with reality, politics as a concept would only enter 
into a conflict with the latter and experience it as ‘suffering’.  
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Politics, Adorno continues, even though ‘supposedly progressive’, belong to the 
system and therefore ‘true’ political intervention would not be intervening but rather 
showing the impossibility of such a task. Adorno writes,  
 
‘The feigning of a true politics here and now, the freezing of historical relations 
which nowhere seem ready to melt, oblige the mind to go where it need not degrade 
itself. Today every phenomenon of culture, even if a model of integrity, is liable to 
be suffocated in the cultivation of kitsch. Yet paradoxically in the same epoch it is 
to works of art that has fallen the burden of wordlessly asserting what is barred to 
politics. Sartre himself has expressed this truth in a passage, which does credit to his 
honesty. This is not a time for political art, but politics has migrated into 
autonomous art, and nowhere more than where it seems to be politically dead’.103   
 
For Adorno, there could be no real emancipation but only a metaphysical 
experience, which begins in the negative redemptive moment of a turning against 
life. Within this moment, the possibility of a different mode of relating to objects 
could emerge. What Adorno envisages as emancipation is a form of cognition and a 
state of society, which could allow a non-dominating relationship between subject 
and object. He writes,  
 
‘Reconcilement would release the non-identical, would rid it of coercion, including 
spiritualised coercion; it would open the road to the multiplicity of different things 
and strip dialectics of its power over them’.104  
 
Since the subject, in Adorno’s view, can never understand the object, the 
subject has to direct his attention toward the particular - ‘change succeeds only in the 
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smallest things. Where the scale is large, death dominates’105 – this change 
corresponds to the relation of the subject with his or her self – retreating into a life of 
mind and inner freedom, which only a few are capable of having. Adorno writes, 
‘Whoever wants to change things apparently do so only by making this impotence 
itself and his own impotence as well into a factor of what he does’.106 Since 
understanding is itself always incomplete, our efforts to change society must be 
informed by an appreciation of our own impotence. There is a hint in the Dialectic 
that the possible reconceptualisation of politics might follow from reconciliation 
with nature as a new ‘non-dominating’ relationship with oneself and others. An 
example of such politics could be found in the contemporary ‘green movement’. 
Like Adorno’s hostility towards cultural mass production, ‘green activists’ are 
hostile to mass consumption. Similarly to Adorno’s view on the impotence of 
humans, they seek the threat of nature to compensate for the lack of the political will 
and decision. Supposedly progressive environmental politics perceive people as the 
problem and not the solution. People are not to be trusted – what we have in 
common is only Earth.  
 
Such politics is not the ‘politics of despair’, as commonly described, but of the 
contempt for ordinary people, for the masses and thus for the political action itself.  
 
‘A Great Refusal’ 
 
Another member of the Frankfurt school, the ‘father’ of the New Left, Herbert 
Marcuse, in contrast with his colleagues, favours the realm of action – a protest, 
alternative forms of living and a counterculture would provide a radical subjectivity 
necessary to change the world entirely. While for Adorno ‘death dominates’, for 
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Marcuse, the relentless rebellion and action rescues humanity from the clutches of 
capitalism.  
 
In 1964 Marcuse published a major study of advanced industrial society, One-
Dimension Man, in which he theorises the development of new forms of social 
control through the creation of consumer and conformist needs that integrated 
individuals into the existing system, producing a ‘society without opposition’. For 
Marcuse, there could be no meaningful strategy for social change unless individuals 
themselves are liberated from capitalist consciousness and acquire ‘radical 
subjectivity’. Explicitly renouncing any reformism or piecemeal change, Marcuse 
envisages the seeds of an alternative subjectivity in the most exploited and 
persecuted outsiders. He states,  
 
‘They exist outside the democratic process; their life is the most immediate and the 
most real need for ending intolerable conditions and institutions. Thus their 
opposition is revolutionary even if their consciousness is not. Their opposition hits 
the system from without and is therefore not deflected by the system; it is an 
elementary force which violates the rules of the game and, in doing so, reveals it as 
a rigged game’.107  
 
Marcuse’s emphasis on humans as the centre of the universe, not just as 
subjects but simultaneously as the objects of liberation, led Marcuse to suggest that 
there is a biological basis for freedom. Humans, according to Marcuse, have an 
instinctive need to be free. The radical subversion of values can never be the mere 
byproducts of new social movements and institutions:  
 
‘It must have its roots in the men and women who build the new 
institutions…Socialism, as a qualitatively different way of life, would not only use 
the productive forces for the reduction of alienated labour…but also for making life 
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an end in itself…In this context, the liberation of women would indeed appear 
as…the revolutionary function of the female in the reconstruction of society’.108  
 
Therefore, the possibility of social change lies not in the ripening of objective 
conditions, but in a radical restructuring of human psychology. Marcuse attempts to 
locate the kind of psychic structure that would characterise a ‘free’ man and found it 
in communities in which the ‘Pleasure Principle’ is the principle that organises 
society. In Civilization and its Discontents, Freud argued that individuals must 
internalise mechanisms to repress our instinctive desires and needs and that the 
superego develops methods of repression that allow the normality of urban life. 
Marcuse, however, went further, claiming that the superego has become so great a 
constraint on the ego in mass society (in which the ‘father’ is replaced by institutions 
as the dominating force) that this new personality structure makes individuals 
impose far more repression on themselves than is actually needed for civilisation to 
exist. Hence he concludes that  
 
‘The economic and political incorporation of the individuals into the hierarchical 
system of labour is accompanied by an instinctual process in which human objects 
of domination reproduce their own repression. The revolt against the primal father 
eliminated an individual person who could be (and was) replaced by other persons; 
but when the domination of the father has expanded into the domination of society, 
no such replacement seems possible and the guilt becomes fatal’.109  
 
Any departures from mainstream society, which search for your inner self 
and follow the ‘Pleasure Principle’, represent the way out of what Marcuse calls ‘the 
mutilated consciousness of individuals in consumer society’.110 Personal becomes 
political. From now on, counter-culture, drugs and ‘free love’ becomes a celebration 
of transformative politics. Indeed, Marcuse saw in sexual, sensual, moral liberation 
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and the use of mind-altering drugs ‘the rediscovery within themselves of the 
instinctual basis of freedom…needs that are the ‘absolute negation’ of the current 
order’.111 Looking back at her experiences in Paris in 1968, Julia Kristeva 
emphasises the sexual aspect of new personal politics:  
 
‘Group sex, hashish, etc. were experienced as a revolt against bourgeois morality 
and family values…striking savagely at the heart of the traditional conception of 
love’ and ‘…1968 was a worldwide movement that contributed to an unprecedented 
reordering of private life’.112  
 
Marcuse’s emphasis on the individual revolt and self-transformation has also 
contributed to a new understanding of art’s revolutionary potential as a means of 
self-expression and self-construction. For example, the correspondence between 
Lygia Clark and Helio Oiticica (1968-69) is supportive of Marcuse’s view that the 
experience of creative self-transformation is in itself revolutionary. Dwelling on the 
importance of self-expression instead of illustrating, Oiticica writes to Lygia,  
 
‘As Marcuse would say, it [artistic expression] liberates the Eros that is repressed by 
repressive activities: the relax in participation is a non-repressive activity, which 
confuses and liberates truly unpredictable forces, and in this, I believe, you base 
yourself in your own experience, which is also highly revolutionary…’113  
 
In other letters Oiticica, following Marcuse’s proposal of a ‘biological 
society that would be unrepressed and based upon a direct chain of 
communication’,114 suggests that Lygia Clark’s art practice could be considered a 
creation of ‘all-encompassing biological entity’, which can lead to a truly ‘open 
communication’ between individuals. Thus, for Marcuse there is a biological need 
for freedom, which expresses itself most effectively through artistic channels.  
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Marcuse has long admired bohemian and counter-cultural refusals to conform and 
the avant-garde that rejected bourgeois society. He borrows his term the ‘Great 
Refusal’ from Andre Breton to advocate alternative cultural forms and behaviour as 
new oppositional politics. Having insisted on the radical potential of art linked to  
the utopian dimension, Marcuse points out the difficulty of realising ‘an aesthetic 
society’, ‘…the most utopian, the most radical possibility of liberation today’.115  
He states,  
 
‘In the affluent society, art is an interesting phenomenon. On the one hand, it rejects 
and accuses the established society; on the other hand, it is offered and sold on the 
market. There is not a single artistic style, however avant-garde, that does not sell. 
This means that the function of art is problematic, to say the last. There has been 
talk of the end of art, and there really is among the artists a feeling that art today has 
no function. There are museums, concerts, paintings in the homes of the rich, but art 
no longer has a function. So it wants to become an essential part of reality, to 
change reality’.116  
 
According to Marcuse, once we shed the idea of affirmative culture and 
practice art as an autonomous domain of private, personal and inner experience, the 
emancipatory values of art would be released into the world and reveal the 
oppressive character of material life in affluent society.  
    
The construction of a truly free society for Marcuse presupposes a type of man with 
a different sensitivity and consciousness: a ‘new’ man who would speak a different 
language and follow different impulses.  This new sensibility would reject all 
dominant values. An aesthetic dimension is especially emphasised in this concept; 
however, these aesthetics must be recovered from beauty as an ideological 
construction the norms of which varied historically and across cultures. Marcuse 
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argues that bourgeois art, by purveying beauty as a displacement of hope, enables 
established society to reduce unrest and proposes a different understanding of what 
beautiful might look like if it is to contribute to a ‘non-repressive order’. Marcuse 
speaks of ‘the erotic quality of the Beautiful’ and states that ‘…as pertaining to the 
domain of Eros, the Beautiful represents the pleasure principle’. Imagination and 
memory for Marcuse are similarly linked to this aesthetic-erotic fantasy, which 
speaks ‘the language of the pleasure principle, of freedom from repression, of 
uninhibited desire and gratification’.117 While for Marcuse the idea of beauty in a 
work of art is reactionary, the subversive ‘beautiful’ corresponds to the need for 
sensual gratification that paves the way for the new consciousness.  
 
Art critic Dave Hickey was among the first of many who, in the early 1990s, started 
to argue that aesthetics must be recovered from the reactionary standards of beauty. 
Following Marcuse, Hickey defines beauty as the visual pleasure located in the 
affect of images. Discussing the work of Robert Mapplethorpe, Hickey argues that it 
was threatening to conservatives because it made gay subcultural practices appear 
beautiful, which meant that they were somehow ‘good’. This, Hickey argues, 
suggests that the beautiful is linked to the ‘good’.118 More recently, critics such as 
Elaine Scarry and Arthur Danto argued that works of art that possess beauty 
generate a sense of good, wellbeing or usefulness. Danto famously proclaimed the 
‘end of art’ insofar as aesthetics itself has been made to accord with everyday life.119 
Scarry went even further, declaring beauty as the condition of possibility of ethics.120 
What is beautiful has become something morally good or useful. In fact, Marcuse 
himself connected the idea of the beautiful not just with Eros, but also with the use 
and everyday living. In his latest paper ‘Society as a Work of Art’, he develops the 
idea that if technology and art are traditionally separated as the beautiful and useful, 
the divide can be collapsed – as between work and play – allowing ‘…a possible 
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artistic formation of the life world’.121 This form would be the form of freedom, a 
practice of living, ‘…which free people in a free society are able to provide for 
themselves’.122 The definition of the beautiful dissolves into a free formation of raw 
materials – according to the pleasure principle and the definition of art – into free 
living. Indeed, Marcuse states that ‘For art itself can never become political without 
destroying itself…’123  
 
If anything or anyone is to become political, according to Marcuse, it must radically 
alter its own status, it must go ‘inwards’: the most radical act is an essentially private 
exploration of oneself. The development of the needs and consciousness that create 
the subjective conditions for radical social change is no longer related to economic 
conditions or political structures. Instead of the working class, Marcuse puts his 
hopes on student activists, hippies, the counterculture and youth in general. This new 
revolutionary subject expands both the rebellion against the system and visions of a 
better society beyond the economic and political. It is ‘sexual, moral, intellectual and 
political rebellion all in one…it is total, directed against the system as a whole’124; 
creating needs that capitalist society would not be able to satisfy. For Marcuse, the 
vital need for revolution encompasses aesthetic-erotic sensibilities, which lead to 
very different forms of radical politics: the politics of individual transformation 
directed inward. Marcuse writes, ‘There is no free society without silence, without 
the internal and external space of solitude in which individual freedom can 
develop’.125 
 
Today the general condemnation of mass consumer society along with the emphasis 
on personal commitment or awareness of problems rather than attempts to engage 
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politically with society become a norm. According to Marcuse, advanced capitalism 
promotes gratification and fulfilment, thereby creating ‘transcendent’ needs for 
freedom, individuality and self-determination that are subversive to the ‘system’. It 
is ironic that today the desire for authenticity is increasingly experienced not through 
the prism of autonomy, but of isolation. As art critic John Kelsey points out, ‘…the 
more individual we make ourselves, the more alike we become…’ so that, becoming 
slaves to authenticity, we have to ‘get smaller, weirder, and more monstrous’.126 
Meanwhile, no ‘transcendent’ needs have emerged. As Ernesto Laclau and Chantal 
Mouffe argue, ‘But this “consumer society” has not led to the end of ideology, as 
Daniel Bell announced, nor to the creation of a one-dimensional man, as Marcuse 
feared’.127 Different struggles and movements do keep emerging and the lesson we 
can learn from Marcuse is that they should not be overlooked by focusing, as 
Marcuse did, on alternative forms of living or thinking. Politics do not belong to or 
start with the inner human structure or ‘journey inwards,’ but develop through 
articulation with other struggles and demands.  Individualistically oriented struggles 
– struggles for their own sake as a form of personal empowerment – reduce political 
energies to the registration of opinions and the transmission of feelings. It is not that 
the individual must be sacrificed, but that political association cannot be limited to a 
particular agent or social relation. While Marcuse’s analysis of an advanced 
capitalist society’s ability to ‘buy off’ opposition and discontent remains compelling, 
the problem, perhaps, lies within the latter – understanding that opposition in terms 
of ‘the unity of moral-sexual and political rebellion’ did not take us very far. In fact, 
such an understanding has contributed to the common perception of politics as a 
protest linked to the development of revolutionary consciousness as a natural 
precondition for radical change. Therefore we tend to agree with Erich Fromm, who 
argued that  
 
‘Marcuse is not even concerned with politics; for if one is not concerned with steps 
between the present and future, one does not deal with politics, radical or otherwise. 
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Marcuse is essentially an example of an alienated intellectual, who presents his 
personal despair as a theory of radicalism’.128  
 
Professor David Chandler of the The Centre for the Study of Democracy in London, 
points out the narcissistic character of what is understood by politics today. He 
writes,  
 
‘Rather than political engagement with the world, it seems that radical political 
activism today is a form of social disengagement – expressed in the anti-war 
marcher’s slogan of “Not in My Name”, or the assumption that wearing a plastic 
bracelet or setting up an internet blog diary is the same as engaging in a political 
debate. In fact, it seems that political activism is a practice which isolates 
individuals who think that demonstrating a personal commitment or awareness of 
the problem is preferable to engaging with other people who are often dismissed as 
uncaring or brainwashed by consumerism’.129  
 
Marcuse, for this matter, has contributed to the fact that as long as the appeal 
of politics is an individualistic one, these kinds of ‘radical’ politics are doomed to 
fail. 
  
 Habermas: A ‘Good Life’ Through Language 
 
We will now turn to the most contemporary member of the Frankfurt School, 
leading German Leftist social theorist Jurgen Habermas, whose theory of 
deliberative democracy has become today’s common sense. Like his predecessors, 
Habermas perceives the capitalist economy and modern state as the dark side of 
modernity. However, the way out of this darkness, for Habermas, lies not within the 
theory of consciousness, but within a theory of language, which expresses the 
universal.  
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According to Habermas, the domination of the ‘system’ over ‘lifeword’, which he 
refers to as the ‘colonisation of the lifeworld,’ threatens the positive 
accomplishments of modernity and creates pathologies in otherwise essential and 
natural processes of ‘lifeworld’ reproduction. The threshold between ‘normal’ 
mediation and pathological colonisation is crossed when domains of action that rely 
on the medium of communicative action – the transmission of culture, social 
integration, socialisation of individuals – become commercialised and 
bureaucratised. The ‘system’ penetrates deeper and deeper into areas in which action 
is coordinated by communication. Habermas argues, ‘…the subsystems of the 
economy and the state become more and more complex as a consequence of 
capitalist growth, and penetrate ever deeper into the symbolic reproduction of the 
lifeworld’130. Habermas then argues that as the state increasingly intervenes in the 
economy to manage the dysfunctional effects of the capitalist process, it keeps class 
conflict latent by neutralising and normalising the roles of employee and citizens. 
State intervention safeguards capitalist accumulation, which, in turn, makes possible 
‘mass compensation’, which is ‘distributed accordingly to implicitly agreed upon 
criteria, in ritualised confrontations, and channelled into the roles of consumer and 
client in such a way that the structures of alienated labour and alienated political 
participation develop no explosive power’.131 As an empirical example and measure 
of the colonisation process, Habermas looks at the explosion of legal regulations 
governing social life, what he calls the ‘juridification of communicatively structured 
areas of action’.132 Today, he argues, what begun as a means by which the state 
protected rights and freedoms has become a means by which those freedoms and 
rights are rendered meaningless.  
 
Dwelling on the modern state’s ‘mismanagement’ of dysfunctional capitalism, 
Habermas concludes that the ‘struggle’ is over. He states,  
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‘Today, with its dysfunctional side effects, we are more aware of the 
dangers; we now experience the inexorable development of productive forces 
and the global expansion of western civilisation more as threats. One can no 
longer coax an unredeemed promise from the production-centred capitalist 
project’.133  
 
A question, however, arises: if the capitalist project is so overwhelmingly 
powerful, why does Habermas hold the state responsible for conspiring and 
spreading a global capitalist network, thus preventing the explosive nature of 
‘lifeworld’? Perhaps, if the national state is capable of playing such a role, the 
capitalist expansion is not so fatal, since it is far more dependent on national states 
than Habermas is willing to acknowledge. However, Habermas is not interested in 
the idea of using this dependency to undermine the capitalist project or to proceed 
with an alternative version of globalisation. Rather, he believes that there is an inner 
mechanism, something inherent to the ‘lifeworld’ that keeps pathologies from 
becoming fatal.   
 
According to Habermas, in such a pathological situation, ‘lifeworld’ cannot 
intervene but only defend their humanity in dialogue with each other. He argues 
further that the formation and activities of ‘autonomous public spheres’ can only 
arise out of this ‘lifeworld’ through ‘…intelligent self-restraint that is needed to 
sensitise the self-steering mechanisms of the state and the economy…’134 
 
This ‘autonomous public sphere’ for Habermas is the way out of the darkness of the 
capitalist domination safeguarded by the modern state. His theory of the 
communicative action locates the emancipatory thrust within the primary medium of 
interaction – language. At the centre of Habermas’s political thought is a shift from 
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Marx’s paradigm of production to a paradigm of communication – from the 
philosophy of consciousness to a theory of language. Habermas writes,  
 
‘What raises us out of nature is the only thing whose nature we can know: language. 
Through its structure, autonomy and responsibility are posited for us. Our first 
sentence expresses unequivocally the intention of universal and unconstrained 
consensus’.135  
 
In The Theory of Communicative Action Habermas points out that what is 
liberating in communicative action  
 
‘is not the relation of a solitary subject to something in the objective world that can 
be represented or manipulated, but the intersubjective relation that speaking and 
acting subjects take up when they come to an understanding with one another about 
something’.136  
 
According to Habermas, the use of language in its ‘original mode’ is oriented 
towards reaching understanding and expresses the intention of the good life. The 
claims to truth and normative rightness are discursively redeemable: a problematic 
truth may become the subject of theoretical discourse, while the ‘rightness’ or 
‘appropriateness’ of a speech act may become the subject of a practical discourse 
that addresses the validity of the underlying norm. The discursive redeemability of 
these validity claims forms, according to Habermas, the rational foundation of 
communication. He asserts:  
 
‘The idea of rational speech…is the first found not in the general structures of 
discourse, but in the fundamental structures of linguistic action…Anyone who acts 
with an orientation towards reaching an understanding, since he unavoidably raises 
truth and rightness claims, must have implicitly recognised that this action points to 
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argumentation as the only way of counting consensual action in case naïvely raised 
and factually organised validity claims become problematic. As soon as we make 
explicit the meaning of discursively redeemable validity claims, we become aware 
that we must presuppose the possibility of argumentation already in consensual 
action’.137 
 
The communicative action is crucial because there is something to be 
communicated: language expresses the universal, the idea of a good life, which, as a 
conception, already exists and has a substance of its own. There is already an 
essence – for Habermas the presence of rules and structure in the language indicates 
this. 
 
In Habermas’s model, the use value of a message depends on its orientation. A 
sender communicates with the intention to be understood, and any acceptance or 
rejection of the message depends on this understanding. However, as Luc Boltanski 
and Eve Chiapello point out in the New Spirit of Capitalism, in the connexionist 
world, ‘product…circulates with difficulty when separated from persons’ and ‘is 
transformed by the relation’.138 It is communication that makes a product authentic 
and therefore desirable. In communicative capitalism, a message does not need to be 
understood but only to be repeated, reproduced, forwarded. Boltanski and Chiapello 
write, ‘The transmission of information plays a key role in establishing the link in all 
those sectors where the value added is cognitive in kind…The relationship alters the 
information each of the partners possesses concerning the other, and thereby change 
the image of the other. It is an unfolding process of this kind that people refer to 
when they speak of earning (or losing) someone’s trust – something that 
consequently opens or shuts off access to resources (the use of goods or services, 
credit reputations).’139 Hence communication in communicative capitalism is not, as 
Habermas argues, oriented towards reaching a mutual understanding, but mutual 
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benefit. This also demonstrates that there are no essences or ‘original mode’ attached 
to the faculty of language, but rather that its meaning changes with contexts. In fact, 
what Habermas perceives as the liberating aspect of the intersubjective relation 
serves as an alienating mechanism in communicative capitalism. Habermasian 
intersubjectivity does not bring people together but, on the contrary, atomises them. 
As Boltanski and Chiapello point out, the reference to intersubjectivity as en masse 
communication is associated with removing borders, centres or any fixed points and 
constituent entities through the relations they enter individually. The volatility of the 
individual, who no longer belongs to groups, institutions, organisations, is then 
stabilised by the network. Boltanski and Chiapello write, ‘To describe the network is 
to observe and report these operations of reduction which, in the open state of 
interconnections, create relative irreversibility’.140 There is no ‘discursive 
redeemability of these validity claims forms’, as Habermas argues, but a discursive 
reduction of any claims. In communicative capitalism, discourse is not used to 
redeem the ‘claims to truth;’ rather, claims are dependent on the relation. Boltanski 
and Chiapello clarify,  
 
‘...the seemingly most stable properties of individuals – for example, sex or 
profession – are themselves signs subject to interpretation in interaction. Rather than 
treating them as substantial properties…it is in interactions, where they are subject 
to interpretation, that these qualities are invested with meanings; and meanings, 
depending on the relation as they do, vary as we pass from one relation to 
another’.141  
 
What follows is that Hebermas’s ‘ideal form’ of communicative action, in which the 
universalisation of interests does not descend from on high but emerges from the 
free, frank discussion between particular claims, is ideal for the reproduction of 
communicative capitalism, which Habermas perceives as a pathological threat. It is 
ironic that while Habermas’s predecessors’ critique was directed at inauthenticity as 
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the massification and standardisation of individuals, he, in fact, justifies capitalism’s 
response to the intense demand for differentiation and demassification as 
internalising authenticity. Adorno, Horkheimer and Marcuse condemned the 
consensual levelling, the conformity, and the destruction of any difference, while 
Habermas welcomes it. His insistence on the ‘original mode’ of language that 
expresses the intention of the good life support what Boltanski and Chiapello 
describe as: ‘In a network world, the question of authenticity can no longer be 
formally posed…’ They continue,  
 
‘In a connexionist world, loyalty to the self looks like inflexibility; resistance to 
others seems like a refusal to make connections; truth defined by the identity 
between a representation and an original is regarded as a failure to understand the 
infinite variability of the beings who circulate in the network, and change every time 
they enter into relations with different beings, so that none of their manifestations 
can be taken as a point of origin with which other expressions can be compared’.142  
 
Insofar as the Frankfurt school’s members’ analysis asserts the impossibility of a 
revolutionary transformation of society, there is still a sense of hope that something 
could be attained because there is an object to be strived for, Habermas’s theory of 
‘communicative action’ destroys any such hope: problems and potential solutions 
are removed in advance through legitimate, democratic channels. Emancipatory 
politics becomes not a matter of gaining control over the object world, but of 
communicating claims and interpretations with the goal of achieving a mutual 
understanding of the objective world. As capitalism has managed to internalise the 
quest for authenticity, Habermas internalises hope that things could be otherwise. 
What is crucial to Habermas’s account of universalisation is the idea that normative 
claims to validity, which already exist, are actually debated. Since it occupies the 
space between facticity and validity, Habermas’s theory of deliberative democracy 
presents ideals and aspirations as always already present possibilities. Such an 
                                                
142 Boltanski, Luc and Chiapello, Eve, The New Spirit of Capitalism, Verso, London, New York, 
2005: 451. 
 83 
approach brings any ideas of utopia inside, eliminating it as an external space of 
hope.  
 
With Habermas’s emphasis on constitutional forms on the one side, and the 
corresponding alliance between liberal and deliberative democrats on the other, we 
have a contemporary theory of democracy that finds justification elements in real-
life practices. Rather than providing reconstruction and transformation of everyday 
practices and institutions, the theory of deliberative democracy uses these practices 
to justify the validity of deliberative procedures. To this extent, such a theory, which 
circulates between validity and procedures, presents democracy as adequate to its 
notion. It appears that the problem lies within the notion.  
 
It also appears that what is problematic is not the ‘nature’ of Habermas’s ‘lifeworld’ 
or capitalism, but the nature of his understanding of the subject, which is defined by 
language and aimed at mutual understanding. According to Habermas, human actors 
are partners in dialogue; therefore, transforming and enlarging the sphere of 
discursive action would entail understanding. Habermas’s image of a better society 
is one defined by the requirements of communicative rationality where the self-
reflective and cooperative competencies of actors are the most privileged. This 
conception of politics is no longer informed by or oriented to agents or aim: both are 
now derived from communicative action. Emancipation here is achieved not through 
taking power and struggle, but through a cooperative process in which means and 
ends become one and the same. The goal of such emancipatory politics is a 
deliberative process. Decisions are envisaged through procedures. When deliberation 
only circulates around the decision as a justification of itself, people never have to 
accept responsibility for it, much as the democratic theorist does not need to accept 
responsibility for a political outcome. The issue of democratic politics becomes the 
process and keeping the process open to a future it has already imagined in terms of 
itself. Meanwhile, individuals who disagree with a particular claim are perceived as 
unable to understand, and therefore not human. 
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In The Democratic Paradox, Chantal Mouffe fights Habermas’s conception of a 
better society as inclusive non-restraint public sphere of rational argumentation. She 
deploys Austrian philosopher Ludwig Wittgenstein’s conception of ‘language 
games’ to demonstrate that there is no meaning outside the ‘language game’. 
Wittgenstein argues that the boundaries, which shape the meaning, are built over 
time as the members of the social group who share the language game in question 
engage in imperfectly repetitive usages. There could be no ‘ideal speech situation’, 
and a language game for Wittgenstein does not represent anything but ‘…a means of 
representation ... something with which comparison is made’. Thus, language does 
not posit any ‘structure, autonomy and responsibility,’ as Habermas argues. 
According to Wittgenstein, we do not just communicate through language. Most 
importantly, language communicates to us through an aesthetic overlay or 
performativity, what Wittgenstein calls ‘a picture’.143 Wittgenstein says, ‘We speak, 
we utter words, and only later get a sense of their life’.144 Language is somewhat a 
vessel – we get a sense of what we are and what we are saying through the particular 
context in which the language is used.  
 
In contrast with Habermas, for Wittgenstein, it is expression that organises 
experience and gives it its form and structure. However, expression is not just words, 
it is both: words and actions – the uses of these words. Thus, Mouffe writes, ‘There 
is nothing…in the nature of language that could serve as a basis for justifying to all 
possible audiences the superiority of liberal democracy’.145  
 
For Wittgenstein, ‘…in order to have agreement in opinions, there must be first 
agreement in forms of life’,146 which are not rules and procedures created out of 
principles. Any belief is a form of life, which implies that consensus can never be 
reached, since there are ontological obstacles to rational perspectives such as ‘ideal 
speech’ situation or ‘original mode’. Mouffe writes,  
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‘Indeed, the free and unconditional public deliberation of all on matters of common 
concern is a conceptual impossibility, since the particular forms of life which are 
presented as its “impediments” are its very condition of possibility’.147  
 
No communication takes place in the absence of forms of life.  
 
Mouffe locates the failure of Habermas’s political theory and his predecessors in 
their understanding of the subject as a holder of original qualities and rights and a 
rational agent. She states, ‘In all cases, they are abstracted from social and power 
relations, language, culture and the whole set of practices that make agency 
possible’.148 This abstraction has certainly contributed to a negativity and pessimism 
regarding modernity and the Enlightenment ideal of autonomy. However, the most 
important aspect, in our view, of the Frankfurt school’s theorising is its attitude 
towards the masses. Believing that the ‘Culture Industry’ absorbs and nullifies any 
oppositional forces, the Frankfurt school presented a general disdain of universalism 
and modernity as radical politics. A desire to put distance against the imaginary 
masses and their cultural tastes defines today’s radicalism. For many radicals today, 
the preferred option is to seek ways in which to withdraw from the ‘alienation’ of 
modern life via aesthetical-ethical retreats or organising life around ethical 
consumption habits. Such assumptions about the objective destructiveness of 
ordinary people inform much of the environmentalist and anti-globalisation 
movement’s agenda as well. The ‘soul-destroying’ mass society must be lectured, 
helped or ignored. The apparent ‘blindness’ of ordinary people needs to be combated 
by high-minded artists and intellectuals who are battling to save the planet from the 
rapacious domination of modernity and mass society. Democratic politics become 
the struggles against forms of collective identities such as the state or a consumer 
society.  
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What the Frankfurt school has perceived as a solution – the retreat into self-
conscious activity or rational judgment – is today a description of a problem. 
Paraphrasing Marx, what is needed is the criticism of politics and not capitalism or a 
mass society. As Ernesto Laclau argues, ‘While the task of political philosophy 
traditionally has been to reduce politics to police, truly political thought and practice 
would consist in liberating the political moment from its enthralment to policed 
societal frameworks’.149  
 
While the Frankfurt school has presented the ordinary masses as the problem, 
French philosopher Jacques Rancière’s view of politics corresponds to the notion of 
the ‘people’ as an ultimately political category.  
 
Rancière’s Disagreement as Politics 
 
Regarding the issue of contemporary capitalism and politics, French philosopher 
Jacques Rancière is refreshingly different. Rancière points out the reactionary 
character of the persistent desire among artists and critics to escape the logic of the 
market and to become autonomous. He writes, ‘The critique of the market today has 
become a morose reassessment that, contrary to its stated aims, serves to forestall the 
emancipation of minds and practices. And it ends up sounding not dissimilar to 
reactionary discourse. These critics of the market call for subversion only to declare 
it impossible and to abandon all hope for emancipation. For me, the fundamental 
question is…how to produce forms for the presentation of objects, forms for the 
organisation of spaces that thwart expectations. The main enemy of artistic creativity 
as well as of political creativity is consensus – that is, inscription within the given 
roles, possibilities and competences’.150 
 
According to Rancière, the problem of modern democracy is not capitalism but the 
logic of consensus, which divides people by making some parts invisible in order to 
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claim consensus. On the other hand, by determining the roles, rules and relationships 
of reaching consensus, it claims itself as the result of deliberation in which each part 
of society is represented. Rancière describes this situation as post-democracy: ‘The 
government practice and conceptual legitimisation of a democracy after the demos, a 
democracy that has eliminated the appearance, miscount, and the dispute of the 
people and is thereby reducible to the sole interplay of state mechanisms and 
combinations of social energies and interests’.151 As the political decisions are 
identified with the totality of the community, the space for staging dissensus is taken 
away. This means that no part that has no part can claim recognition, because it is 
already assumed as recognised. Politics thus are made invisible.  
 
Instead, true politics concern the ‘uncountable’ that disrupts the very principle of 
counting and makes possible the emergence of the political. Rancière writes, ‘There 
is politics – and not just domination – because there is a wrong count of the parts of 
the whole’. Rancière argues that political conflict differs from any conflicts of 
interests; what is at stake is the principle of countability as such. For example, his 
understanding of a class points out that what is at stake is not the sociological nature 
of people’s identity, but a particular determination caused by exclusion. He writes,  
 
‘The proletariat are neither manual workers nor the labour classes. They are the 
class of the uncounted that only exists in the very declaration in which they are 
counted as those of no account. The name proletarian defines neither a set of 
properties…that would be shared equally by a multitude of individuals nor a 
collective body, embodying a principle of which those individuals would be 
members…”Proletarian” subjectification defines a subject of wrong’.152 
 
He further states, ‘Politics occurs by reason of a single universal that takes the 
specific shape of wrong. Wrong institutes a singular universal, a polemical universal, 
by tying the presentation of equality, as the part of those who have no part, to the 
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conflict between parts of society’.153 According to Rancière, politics are rare and 
only occur when a disturbance is caused by a group demanding a ‘recount’ – the 
disagreement. What is important to Rancière is the legitimacy of this countability 
and not who is counted. He argues that the emergence of the demos brakes any 
division between those who are deemed able and those who are not. Thus what is at 
stake in politics is the disruption of the unequal order by assuming the principle of 
equality. From this disagreement emerges a conflict event, and this is what politics 
means for Rancière.  
 
Hence what is essential in Rancière’s understanding of politics is the very principle 
of ‘countability’ as the ‘people’. Placing ‘demos’ at the centre of politics prevents 
any social order from crystallising into a totality of society. The presence of the 
‘class of the uncounted’ ruins established hierarchies. However, what appears to be 
missing is the very question of how the ‘uncounted’ will constitute themselves and 
re-order the existing order. As fascism demonstrates, the ‘uncounted’ do not 
necessary constitute themselves around a progressive identity. This politics might 
not be emancipatory, but the opposite. Because Rancière is interested in the very 
legitimacy of this countability and not in who is going to be counted and how it 
might develop, he concentrates on the issue of how to make disagreements visible, 
how to stage dissensus. In his view, political action no longer needs to be informed 
by a detailed understanding of how the contemporary world works and how 
exploitation operates. ‘We already know this’, says Rancière; everyone has always 
understood the way they are exploited or oppressed. Unlike Chantal Mouffe, who 
aims to channel democratic politics in a certain way, Rancière’s understanding of 
politics begins with the axiological principle of equality, which implies the constant 
disruption of the unequal order.  
 
Rancière argues,  
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‘Nothing is political in itself for the political only happens by means of a principle 
that does not belong to it: equality. The status of this “principle” needs to be 
specified. Equality is not a given that politics then presses into service, an essence 
embodied in the law or a goal politics sets itself the task of attaining. It is a mere 
assumption that needs to be discerned within the practices implementing it...’154  
 
Rancière’s equality is not a process of a fairer distribution of social roles and 
material outcomes, but of the temporal interruption of any such distribution. He 
writes,  
 
‘Equality is not a goal that governments and societies could succeed in reaching. To 
pose equality as a goal is to hand it over to the pedagogues of progress, who widen 
endlessly the distance they promise they will abolish. Equality is a presupposition, 
an initial axiom – it is nothing’. 155 
 
Such an understanding of equality, independent of social mediation, leads Rancière 
to envisage political activity as a suspension of all forms of authority or 
authorisation. His view of governance allows for a kind of permanent contestation 
without any responsibility for actual decisions. ‘Democracy’ for Rancière is not a 
form of government or a state of affairs, but a break in the existing order by a group 
of people who are not considered to be equal. Hence ‘democracy’ can only be 
‘sporadic’. By connecting ‘democracy’ with sporadic activities, Rancière turns away 
from the channels of existing practices, institutions and discourses, and thus from the 
possibility of reinvesting in a democratic politics. For him, politics are always rare, 
new and spontaneous.  
 
It appears that the problem here is that Rancière confuses political equality with 
aesthetic equality. For Rancière, the literary and visual equality of ‘aesthetic regime’ 
has something liberating about it, since it escapes brute political determination. 
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Rancière points out that everyone can think and speak and thus can subvert the given 
meaning.  The idea that ‘everyone thinks’ means that people actually think in the 
absence of any necessary link between who they are, the roles they play or the places 
they occupy: they think through the freedom of their own self-disassociation. 
Therefore, thinking is more a matter of improvisation than one of decision, direction 
or deduction. Every thought has its stage, every political subject is first and foremost 
‘a sort of local and provisional theatrical configuration’. The artistic equalisation of 
literature and painting in the ‘aesthetic regime of arts’ for Rancière serves as the 
direct model for political disagreement. Aesthetic regime produces ‘a different type 
of equality’ abstracted from social roles and places. Using art as a base category, 
Rancière maintains that politics always flow out of the theatrical disagreement rather 
than a rational agreement. In emphasising the affective qualities of disagreement, 
however, Rancière appears to go too far. The ultimate equality of the ‘people’ is 
achieved through the establishment of a ‘grey zone’ of indistinction between who 
belongs to demos and who does not.  
 
Since there cannot be any equality within a given order or political process, but only 
as the ultra-radical elimination of the excluded, of any hierarchies of values or roles 
and ‘false’ identities, then, the more distant and artificial this interruption in relation 
to the police (existing institutions and practices), the more political it is, since it 
achieves ultimate equality. Rancière continues, ‘For me, politics is the constitution 
of a theatrical and artificial sphere’156 where ‘a political subject is a type of theatrical 
being, temporary and localised’157. Subjects invite themselves to play at the ‘king’s 
table’ but they do not represent themselves directly; instead, they do so from under a 
mask or from the point of view of a stage that they construct in a particular situation. 
A good actor is one who manages to distance his identity fully from the persona that 
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he plays. Therefore, for Rancière, progressive politics are those that manage to place 
a gap between the speaking ‘we’ and ‘the people’ in whose name this ‘we’ purports 
to speak. This ‘double think’ is what, in Rancière’s view, distinguishes ‘rare political 
performance’ from a trivial popular spectacle. While the latter presupposes an 
authorised stage and a passive, watching audience, theatrical politics is a matter of  
 
‘…performing or playing, in the theatrical sense of the word, the gap between a 
place where the demos exists and a place where it does not . . . Politics consists in 
playing or acting out this relationship, which means first setting it up as theatre, 
inventing the argument, in the double logical and dramatic sense of the term, 
connecting the unconnected.158  
 
Before it is a matter of institutions, legal procedures or organisations, politics 
is a matter of building a stage and sustaining a ‘political performance’.  
 
Just as actors play another identity rather than their own identity, political actors 
must blur the gap between who belongs to demos and who does not. The matter of 
politics is not to explain how certain people were made invisible or establishing a 
line of demarcation between who is entitled to equal rights and who is not, but to 
demonstrate that the very distinction between demos and non-demos is flawed, that 
there is no foundation for some to rule others. The objective for politics, then, is to 
perform this ‘gap between a place where the demos exists and a place where it does 
not’. The political ‘stage’ is identified by Rancière with a paradoxical scene where 
discourses are staged in their difference. He insists on the emancipatory 
breakthrough that sets a new stage for the political by giving a new visibility to the 
discourses and the bodies that were barred from public expression. Based on a 
Brechtian emphasis on the reciprocity of perspectives between theater and politics, 
which allows one to understand how political agents can distance themselves from 
their own representations in history and instead produce new ones, Rancière argues 
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that every theatrical act is performed by but not for the people. He states, ‘Politics 
has no ‘proper’ space nor does it possess any ‘natural’ subjects…Political 
demonstrations are thus always of the moment and their subjects are always 
precarious and provisional’.159 This is why Rancière’s politics cannot be accounted 
for in terms of antagonisms, interests or communication.  
 
Rancière’s theatrical sphere is directly political and therefore cannot be used by any 
party, movement, etc. An artistic Collective BAVO explains the implications of 
Rancière’s understanding of democratic politics as a ‘grey zone’ or the ‘zone of 
indistinction of artistic practices and life’. BAVO states,  
 
‘On the one hand, it is difficult for the politicians involved to ‘aestheticise away’ the 
accusations expressed by the artist, dismiss them as “merely art”, as the opinion of 
just one eccentric artist: the political accusations are too direct for this. On the other 
hand, it denies politicians the opportunity to defuse the indictment in the usual way, 
with familiar political arguments: it is too artistic for that. This third way prevents 
the confrontation with the artist becoming a home match for the political 
establishment’.160  
 
Rancière’s thinking or imagining politics does not flow from or through to the 
political forums. Theatrical concepts can energise politics but, for example, the anti-
globalisation movement did not need the ‘play’ of the multitude to protest against 
the G8. Even though politics today has turned into policy or management, it does not 
mean that antagonism and division can be avoided through the conceptualisation of 
politics as the ‘stage’.  
 
Hence Mouffe’s emphasis on the unavoidability of antagonism and division – and 
therefore of the constitutive role of the political that marks the intensity of a relation 
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– indicates a weak point in Rancière’s discussion of politics and his analysis of post-
politics. While both Rancière and Mouffe share an emphasis on disagreement and its 
affective qualities as a constitutive aspect of democratic politics, for Mouffe, 
democratic equality ‘requires the possibility of distinguishing who belongs to the 
demos and who is exterior to it; for that reason it cannot exist without the necessary 
correlate of inequality’.161 By constantly challenging the relations of inclusion-
exclusion implied by the political constitution of the ‘people’, the liberal discourse 
of universal human rights plays an important role in keeping the democratic 
contestation alive. On the other side, it is only thanks to the democratic logic of 
equivalence that frontiers can be created and demos established, without which there 
could be no real exercise of rights.  
 
We will now turn to Chantal Mouffe’s understanding of democratic politics, which 
defends the Enlightenment’s promise of individuals’ liberty to fulfil their human 
capacities and aspirations. In contrast with the Frankfurt school’s pessimistic view of 
politics as an individual revolt against ‘mass society’, Mouffe points out that the 
democratic conception of equality is directly related to the political constitution of 
people. However, this is not the equality that Rancière has in mind. While the 
Frankfurt school privileges the ideas of liberty characterised by the individualist and 
rationalist approach and Rancière insists on assuming a radical equality as the 
disruption of the unequal order, Mouffe effectively reconfigures the dilemma of 
incompatibity between liberty and equality, between an individual and demos into a 
different vision of politics where the tension between the two becomes constitutive 
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‘Back to Hegemonic Struggle’ 
 
There is no blueprint or privileged agent who could transform a given reality. 
Mouffe states, ‘There is no unique privileged position from which a uniform 
continuity of effects will follow, concluding the transformation of society as a 
whole’.162 The subject is not understood in terms of self-conscious activity, its 
relation to the object or subject’s relation to each other with the goal of achieving 
mutual understanding about objective world, but as a hegemonic subject. There is no 
objective world outside subjectivity. The subject is constituted through its relation to 
other subject-positions. Any given social order depends on hegemonic articulation in 
conditions of contingency. For Mouffe, there could be no politics without 
hegemony. There are two key concepts in Mouffe’s conceptualisation of politics: 
antagonism and hegemony. The dimension of the political marks the intensity and 
unavoidability of antagonism and division and corresponds to the lack of any final 
solution. Mouffe writes, ‘Every order is the temporary and precarious articulation of 
contingent practices’.163 These practices of articulation through which subjects and a 
given society are constructed are ‘hegemonic’ practices. A society is not dominated 
by any single unitary and positive logic – there is no central point of a hegemonic 
formation – but always emerge from a ‘surplus of meaning’ resulting from a 
displacement, through a confrontation with other antagonistic practices. Mouffe 
writes,  
 
‘What is at a given moment accepted as the “natural order”, jointly with the 
common sense that accompanies it, is the result of sedimented hegemonic 
practices, it is never the manifestation of a deeper objectivity exterior to the 
practices that bring it into being’. 164 
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The given order is fixed through ‘nodal points’:  
 
‘As far as politics is concerned, this means the need to envisage it in terms of a 
hegemonic struggle between conflicting hegemonic projects attempting to incarnate 
the universal and to define the symbolic parameters of social life. Hegemony is 
obtained through the construction of nodal points, which discursively fix the 
meaning of institutions and social practices and articulate the “common sense” 
through which a given conception of reality is established.’165  
 
However, there are always ‘elements’ that are not fixed and thus any 
hegemonic order can be disarticulated.  
 
Since there is no objective, transcendental or rational ground on which to reconcile 
or overcome differences, antagonism remains the everlasting presence and challenge 
to politics. The non-existence of a foundation leaves us groundless in dealing with 
political disagreements. In order to address this problem, Mouffe provides a 
framework with which to understand how political conflicts are constituted. 
According to her, they emerge from the irreconcilable confrontation between two 
logics: liberalism and democracy. In The Democratic Paradox, Mouffe examines 
Carl Schmitt’s critique of liberal democracy in order to understand the components 
of the paradox. According to Schmitt, there is an insuperable opposition between 
liberal individualism with its moral discourse centred on the individual and the 
democratic ideal, which aims to create identity based on homogeneity. He argues 
that in order to assign sovereignty to the people, democracy requires the 
determination of who belongs to ‘the people’ and thus necessitates a distinction 
between friend and enemy. Therefore the democratic political community rejects 
pluralism and liberal democracy is therefore destined to fail due to the 
insurmountable opposition between the individual and the demos. Mouffe criticises 
Schmitt on the grounds that, while he admits the political constitution of the people 
as democratic, in his discussion of pluralism he maintains that political identities are 
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pre-constituted. However, Mouffe emphasises the constitutive opposition that 
liberalism and democracy entail. By constantly challenging the relations of 
inclusion-exclusion, the liberal discourse of universal human rights plays a vital role 
in keeping the democratic contestation alive. In liberal democracy, the paradox that 
neither liberty nor equality can be completely realised provides ‘the condition of 
possibility for a pluralist form of human coexistence’.166 Instead of providing an 
understanding of politics in which either liberty or equality is eliminated, Mouffe 
considers the network of relations and identities that this opposition produces.  
 
Examining the relationships between power and legitimacy, Mouffe brings forward 
the role of power in the constitutive paradox of liberalism and democracy. On the 
one hand, power is legitimate because it is recognised as such; on the other hand, in 
principle, it is contingent, since there is no foundation on which to provide a 
permanent legitimacy. This paradoxical situation creates the tension between the 
logic of ‘politics’ and ‘the political’. Mouffe states,  
 
‘By “the political” I refer to the dimension of antagonism that is inherent in human 
relations, antagonism that can take many forms to emerge in different types of social 
relations. “Politics” on the other side indicates the ensemble of practices, discourses 
and institutions which seek to establish a certain order and organise human 
coexistence in conditions that are always potentially conflictual’.167  
 
Therefore we should not understand ‘politics’ as a kind of truth or ideology, 
but as a logic that comes out from the possibilities to organise society in another way 
and that is not necessarily automatically emancipatory. While the political refers to 
the dimension of antagonism, politics refers to the hegemonic nature of any social 
order in the sense that it reveals that any society is hegemonically constructed – 
there are practices and institutions that conceal the original acts of their political 
institution and instead are taken for granted. Any ‘natural’ order or ‘common sense’ 
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is the result of hegemonic practices and not a manifestation of any ‘deeper’ 
objectivity.  
 
This opposition between ‘the political’ and ‘politics’ creates antagonistic relations 
between those who wish to create unity in one way and those who want to create it 
in a different way. This is the opposition between ‘us and them’. The question then 
for democratic politics is not how to eliminate exclusion, but to construct them as an 
‘adversary’ rather than as the enemy. Mouffe writes,  
 
‘This is the real meaning of liberal-democratic tolerance, which does not 
entail condoning ideas that we oppose or being indifferent to standpoints that 
we disagree with, but treating those who defend them as legitimate 
opponents. This category of the “adversary” does not eliminate antagonism, 
though, and it should be distinguished from the liberal notion of the 
competitor with which it is sometimes identified’.168  
 
This is the way in which the antagonistic relationship is transformed into 
agonism. To make the contrast, agonistic opposition is processed on the common 
ground of ‘shared adhesion to the ethico-political principles of liberal democracy’.169 
Accordingly, the purpose of the opposition is not to bring them to a rational 
resolution of the conflict, but ‘…to make room for dissent and to foster the 
institutions in which it can be manifested…’170 If this common ground for 
contestation is not established, ‘…the danger that this democratic confrontation will 
be replaced by a confrontation among other forms of collective identification, as is 
the case with identity politics’.171 With regard to this proposition, Mouffe aims to 
revive democratic politics by centering its concern on equality. She states, ‘What a 
left-wing project today requires is to envisage this struggle for equality that has 
always been at the core of social democracy in a way that takes account of the 
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multiplicity of social relations in which inequality needs to be challenged’.172 
According to Mouffe, the project of the plural and radical democracy demands 
liberty and equality for all, but there is no ‘simple equality’ that makes all people 
equal to each other in all areas, ‘it does not consist in an identity of possession’, so 
what is at stake is to envisage ‘…the struggles against inequality in a way that 
deepens pluralism instead of stifling individual freedom’. While we can agree on the 
importance of ‘liberty and equality for all’, what should be contested is ‘the way 
they should be implemented, with the different configurations of power relations that 
this implies’.173 This is what informs democratic politics – the disagreement within 
an ‘agonistic’ pluralist democratic framework. It is a legitimate conflict between 
‘adversaries’ around different positions and alternatives on the basis of left/right 
distinction. 
 
Such a view differs from rationalistic, individualistic or other positions in today’s 
political theory. Rancière, for example, argues that politics is an event that takes 
place only through the assumption of equality. He states, ‘The open set of practices 
driven by the assumption of equality between any and every speaking being and by 
the concern to test this equality.’174 According to Rancière, when the social 
inequality becomes obvious, the political rule is challenged. Thus, the political 
disagreement concerns the conflict rather than its outcome. The assumption of 
equality does not process according to a particular understanding of politics; the 
converse is true: it constitutes political subjectivities and understanding after the 
event takes place. For Mouffe, however, ‘the political’ should not be reduced to the 
‘dimensions of antagonism’ or understood either as a systematic opposition or the 
free public deliberation. Claiming their ultimate equality, the ‘uncounted’ might 
construct their collective identities in a non-progressive way while ‘agonistic 
pluralism’ is aimed at transforming antagonism into agonism. Democratic politics 
acknowledges that equality cannot be entirely realised due to power relations that 
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constitute the social; its constitutive aspect is revived through the struggle for 
equality.  
 
Capitalism, Culture, Politics 
 
An agonistic understanding of democratic politics acknowledges the contingent 
character of the politico-economic articulations, which determine the specificity of 
social order at a given moment. Since society is always hegemonically constructed, 
there is little point in resigning to the idea that there is an overwhelming force such 
as the capitalist economic system, which has robbed individuals of their 
consciousness and transformed art and culture into a powerful tool of mass 
deception. It is insisting on the exclusivity of artistic and cultural practices as a 
somewhat privileged site of the true identity of the subject that led to a type of 
identity politics, which were then re-articulated into the present form of ‘common 
sense’. If Adorno was alive today, he could have asserted that it is not ‘conformity 
that has replaced consciousness’ but the diversity and insistence on the self-
assertion. Today consumerism is no longer about conformity but differences as we 
will demonstrate in the next chapter. The problem then is not consciousness, but 
politics. The subversive character of culture has not been eradicated by the economic 
necessities but welcomed and appropriated.  
 
While modern liberal democracy is a site of confrontation between projects 
attempting different incarnations of the universal, capitalism has become a universal 
excuse for not forming collective political identities. There are no ‘people’, only 
individuals who are now, as many believe, are finally have been transformed into 
passive affects of the capitalist framework.  
 
Mouffe reminds us that it is important to separate the ideas of modern liberal 
democracy from capitalism. Leaving aside its possible articulations with an 
economic system, it is a political form of society, which concerns the symbolic 
ordering of social relations, and results from the tension between two different 
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logics: the liberal conception of equality and the democratic one. Even though the 
capitalist domination is to be overcome, this does not mean that the perfect social 
order would be finally realised. As Laclau and Mouffe explain,  
 
‘Every project for radical democracy necessarily includes, as we have said, the 
socialist dimension – that is to say, the abolition of capitalist relations of production; 
but it rejects the idea that from this abolition there necessarily follows the 
elimination of the other inequalities’.175  
 
Society would never be fully liberated, since it exists due to the power 
relations and the consequent exclusion that these relations entail. The task for 
democratic politics is to show the traces of exclusion and not taking refuge in 
formulating a paradigm that would assign everything to its place. Capitalism, 




If we accept that society is hegemonically constructed, then the Frankfurt school’s 
critique of inauthenticity and the conformist domination of a society that destroys 
any differences appear to be counter-productive. In the years around 1968, this form 
of denunciation of mass society enjoyed unprecedented public success. The critique 
of the ‘consumer society’ brought out on to the streets the contempt of a world given 
over to an order, mass production, standardised opinion. Any form of organisation – 
political such as the state or economical such as democratic capitalism – is seen as 
people being deprived of their free consciousness, capable of knowing its own 
desires. Politics become reduced to the proliferation of differences. An entire 
generation was teaching itself how to make creative, strategic use of the difference, 
to withdraw from ‘systems’ and calling for an experimental re-appropriation of 
everyday life.  
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Following the Frankfurt school, Left-wing politics begun to be associated with 
disdain for the ‘system;’ instead of viewing differences as conditions of possibility 
of establishing unity and thus affecting change, individuals were invited to take 
solace in creative realm. Hopes were placed into anything: art, language, sex, but not 
‘the people’. Furthermore, since the Frankfurt school extended the analysis of 
domination to the sphere of culture, arguing that capitalist despotism works through 
cultural mechanisms, culture has ceased to be perceived as a broader public good, 
but something one must preserve and exercise as the self-authority principle.   
 
In more recent years, the collapse of the Left, the working-class as a distinct social 
force and the emergence of post-Fordist capitalism could also be said to confirm the 
Frankfurt School’s thesis of the impossibility of social transformation. And yet, in 
many ways, the political response to such recent social developments seems to draw 
the Frankfurt school’s verdicts in quite a disturbing way.    
The contemporary political framework can perhaps be defined as a general disdain 
for universalism, liberty, modernity and social change. Far from a celebration of 
political and social achievements of liberal democracy, modernity is seen to lead to 
the unprecedented victory of capitalism, a pathological distrust of political and 
politicians and environmental catastrophe. For many radicals today, the preferred 
option is to seek ways in which to retreat from the ‘alienation’ of modern day life via 
aesthetical-ethical retreats or organising life around ethical consumption habits. 
Above all else, a desire to put some distance against the imaginary masses and their 
cultural tastes constitutes and defines ‘radicalism’ today.  Ordinary people are 
presented as destructive and unable to organise themselves in a progressive way – 
this could only lead to fascism. That is why Habermas, for example, had to come up 
with the thesis that the communicative actions as a site of an inter-subjective 
agreement can save humanity from a tendency to self-destruct. It is the Frankfurt 
School’s claim to be far-left that has enabled such destructive ideas to gain 
considerable purchase amongst the radical intelligentsia since the 1960s. And it is 
that radical intelligentsia that has presented ordinary people as an objective 
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‘problem’ to be controlled and monitored. Even Rancière, who recovers the notion 
of the ‘people’ as the protagonist of politics, concludes that the ‘disagreement’ can 
only take a disruptive and temporary character. To be Left always meant to be on the 
side of the people against the powers that be. Today, to be Left means to refuse, to 
despair, to condemn, to be radical, to be different.  
 
Thus, the reproduction of differences for commercial ends became easier since there 
was no ‘people’, no other alternative projected. In the absence of collective politics, 
capitalist logic internalised the intense demand for differentiation and 
demassification, and post-Fordism’s appetite for self-directed activity was not a 
coincidence. Thus our next chapter examines the transformation of capitalism to the 
post-Fordist model of production, which had particular consequences for the artistic 
field. Shall we envisage this transformation in terms of culture? Should we accept 
that what we are dealing with is a radically new biopolitical model, which already 
includes both politics and aesthetics and therefore does not require either a political 
action or an aesthetical practice? Or shall we come in terms with the hegemonic 
nature of any transformation, and thus argue for for the renewal, albeit in the way 
















Transformation of Capitalism – Post-Operaist Approach or Hegemonic Approach? 
 
It is not just politics that has been transformed. There was another transformation, 
from the Fordist to post-Fordist mode of production, which had particular 
consequences for artistic and cultural self-understanding and production. Semiotic 
production today is at the core of capitalism’s valorisation technique. What follows 
is that artistic practices can play a strategic role in undermining this new capitalist 
imaginary. However, the common belief regarding the new condition still refers to 
Adorno and Horkeimer’s accounts that with the growth of the global culture 
industry, we cannot really defend the cultural sphere, since today subjectivity itself 
is embedded in the processes of capitalism. Paolo Virno, for example, accepts that 
‘their [Adorno and Horkheimer] diagnosis of culture industry as undeveloped 
capitalism…is a description of a given reality…’176 In this context, the cultural 
sphere as an autonomous space of resistance or criticism is no longer sustainable as 
such and instead we should concentrate on the inventive production of radical public 
spheres outside current institutions. According to Virno, capitalist production has 
become ‘virtuosic’ and productive labour becomes indistinguishable from artistic 
production. Therefore we should understand post-Fordism through the matrix of 
culture. Two other Italian post-Operaist members, Antonio Negri and Michael 
Hardt, theorise post-Fordism as the victory of the multitude and of immaterial labour 
over the process of capital accumulation. Instead of culture being subjugated to the 
demands of capitalist production, the creative and cognitive power of labour has 
transformed capitalism into a matter of activity rather than a commodity. The 
emergence of the immaterial, cognitive and affective labour, they contend, manifest 
the fact that capital has responded to the workers’ desires and struggles. According 
to Negri, the transformation from the Fordist mass of workers to a post-Fordist 
multitude of single workers opens up the possibility of, as Marx once predicted, ‘the 
development of all human powers as such…not as measured on a pre-determined 
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yardstick’.177 The central conflict of the era of immaterial labour, according to the 
Italian Autonomist movement’s thinkers, is over the possibility of universal access 
to knowledge and culture, which would eventually override capital’s appropriation 
and construct a new type of social relations whereby, as Negri asserts, ‘Value will be 
determined only by humanity’s own continuous innovation and creation’.178  
 
Despite some differences between the Italian Autonomist movement’s thinkers, 
which we will address, they nevertheless reassert Marx’s view that labour produces 
its own political and resistant forms within the process of capital accumulation. 
Furthermore, it is capital’s attempt to overcome this resistance that fuels its 
continuous and creative expansion. There are, however, different approaches to the 
subject of post-Fordist transformation and the role of culture and artistic critique. 
Andre Gorz (1923-2007), for example, has a sombre view of the emergence of so-
called immaterial labour.  
 
In his recently translated book The Immaterial (L’immateriel, 2003), Gorz argues 
that the immaterial dimension that sells material commodities functions as ‘self-
production’. He critiques the spread of economic rationality to activities that value 
redesign, the giving of self and the transmission of meaning. Incorporated into the 
exchange economy, these activities are corrupted and autonomy is replaced by 
egoistic calculation and the pursuit of private rewards. Rather than assisting in a free 
and spontaneous development of cognitive and affective labour power, it appeals to 
the imagination and desire of each private and not all individuals. Each person can 
escape the common condition by becoming the ‘happy privileged individual,’ 
occupying a fantasy world. For Gorz, the immaterial dimension corresponds to the 
‘antisocial socialisation’. It is this excess of socialisation that puts a block on 
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individual autonomy. ‘People must become enterprises for themselves’179, living 
commodities, and this is where the central conflict is staged. 
 
According to Gorz, post-Fordism neither reflects the success of the worker struggles 
nor manifests their failure, since it is not a matter of economy or labour. This 
questions Hardt and Negri’s Marxist view that labour generates its own political 
forces. Furthermore, Gorz considers the state of cognitive capitalism to be the crisis 
of capitalism, not in the sense that the latter is coming to its logical end but that its 
instability, incoherence and the narrowness of its social base contains different 
possibilities of developing in opposing directions. Gorz states, ‘It isn’t a capitalism 
in crisis – it is the crisis of capitalism, which is shaking society to its roots’.180 The 
possible alternative, Gorz argues, depends on a possibility of articulating and 
motivating individuals to challenge ‘self-production’ and ‘value fundamentalism’ in 
favour of the modern ideal of the autonomous or ‘sovereign’ subject.  
 
The position of David Harvey also challenges Hardt and Negri’s belief that the 
workers have finally managed to remove ‘a pre-determined yardstick’ and are now 
on the way to realising the full potential of their human power. According to Harvey, 
there was a neo-liberal counter-revolution on the back of a free-market revolution. 
Neo-liberalism, presented as a permanent solution to the instability of capitalism, in 
fact, has been built on over-accumulation and dangerously uneven development 
across the world. Since the 1990s, there has been massive financialisation – the 
expansion of capital way beyond the functionality of trade and investment. 
According to Harvey, this neo-liberal move was, and remains, a political project 
with the ultimate aim of reasserting the power of the capitalist project over the 
refusal of the capitalist work discipline. For most workers, the post-Fordist 
economic restructuring brought with it lower pay, far longer work hours, weaker 
unions and no safety. An emphasis on cognitive as opposed to manual labour 
permitted a few to be productive: one has either to succeed of fail miserably. There 
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is a little grey area in between for which neo-liberalism takes no responsibility. 
Workers lost, Harvey argues. Instead of gaining liberty, we are all now living in a 
precarious world where the value of labour is irrelevant.  
 
Hence Chantal Mouffe suggests that the post-Fordist transformation, with its 
centrality on the production of subjectivity suitable for capitalist reproduction, 
should not be considered in terms of culture, labour or economy as a particular 
signifier that can possibly affect all other positions. In Hegemony and Socialist 
Strategy: Towards a Radical Democratic Politics, Laclau and Mouffe argue that any 
universal economic explanation of society is merely a fetish. According to them, if 
economic relations really do determine subjectivity, what follows is that the 
economy has to be ‘defined independently of any specific type of society; and the 
conditions of existence of the economy must also be defined separately from any 
concrete social relation’.181 The same would apply to the fetish of culture as the 
political agency that determines all other elements. Therefore, instead of one 
political agency, there is hegemony – ‘social agents lack any essence’ – a discursive 
construction that articulates a social ‘text’ that consist of different, multiple and 
conflicting positions in a particular direction. It is not labour, even immaterial with 
its general intellect, culture, or, for that matter, the artistic critique, that are 
responsible for the transformation to post-Fordism, but a process of rearticulating 
existing discourses in the direction favoured by capitalists. Capitalism is not a 
totality, and the construction of a different social order depends on counter-
hegemonic intervention to rearticulate the current state of post-Fordism into a 
different configuration compatible with democratic politics, as discussed in the 
previous chapter. Thus the artistic intervention into the public sphere, which under 
the post-Fordist capitalism increasingly looks like an extension of capital, is more 
important then ever. What is at issue is not to withdraw into creativity or abandon 
artistic practices, believing that either immaterial labour would lead to the collapse 
of capitalism or that the cultural sphere is no longer capable of being a space of 
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resistance and criticism, but actively to engage with the current semiotic terrain of 
capitalism in order to construct different forms of identification. It is the artist today 
who can play a particularly effective role in undermining the myth that, with the 




Hardt and Negri understand the transition from Fordism to post-Fordism as a 
positive change that has been brought by capitalism’s surrender to the human powers 
of workers. Following Mario Tronti’s ‘The Strategy of Refusal’ – where he warned 
against concentrating too much on the power of capital, paying more attention 
instead to workers as a class for itself rather than a class against capital – Hardt and 
Negri developed this thesis further in their Empire, claiming that it was the workers’ 
constant resistance that forced capitalism to make a leap into the post-Fordist era of 
immaterial labour and general intellect. Similary to Tronti’s argument that it is 
always capital that ‘seeks to use the worker’s antagonistic will-to-struggle as a motor 
for its own development’182, Hardt and Negri asserted that capitalism is always 
reactive, since it is the proletariat that ‘actually invents the social and productive 
forms that capital will be forced to adopt in the future’.183 Thus, as a consequence of 
the workers’ struggles, capitalist production has been forced to move towards the 
‘general intellect,’ whereby the products are no longer material objects, but new 
social (interpersonal) relations themselves. Hardt and Negri state, ‘What the 
multitude produces is not just goods or services; the multitude also and most 
importantly produces cooperation, communication, forms of life, and social 
relationships’184. The factory is no longer at the centre of value production; instead, 
putting the whole of society to work creates the value. Thus, according to Hardt and 
Negri, instead of an industrial working class, today we can speak of the ‘multitude’ – 
all the ‘people’ who work in services, in nursing, in linguistic relations; ‘people’ 
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who work in the cultural field, in short – all the ‘people’ who are put to work to 
create profit. The character of this labour is increasingly immaterial in two aspects: 
the process of value creation has an intellectual, networking, inventive and scientific 
base. The second aspect is that, compared to the industrial working class, where a 
worker made his or her particular contribution to the creation of value, today this 
value is produced en masse. This does not mean that the realm of material labour is 
vanishing – people still work in factories, in sweatshops, on the streets or inside 
homes – we still work materially. However, the emphasis in value-creation is put on 
a more open network of brainpower and inter-relations instead of focusing on a 
relationship to the means of production.  
 
For Hardt and Negri, it is the new mass labour power or the ‘multitude’ as the 
‘general intellect’ that can be thought of as new commons rather than a particular 
social class or as the ‘people’ confined to a single nation. They write, ‘The virtuality 
of world space constitutes the first determination of the movements of the 
multitude…[which] must achieve a global citizenship. The multitude’s resistance to 
bondage – the struggle against the slavery of belonging to a nation, an identity, and a 
people, and thus the desertion from sovereignty and the limits it places on 
subjectivity – is entirely possible’.185 Hardt and Negri describe multitude as neither 
one nor many. They maintain that the multitude ‘…violates all such numerical 
distinctions. It is both one and many’, and such a configuration allegedly threatens 
all the principles of order. It is this lack of any connection between one and many, 
between the various groups and struggles, that defines the multitude and makes it a 
new powerful agent. This lack of connection is described by Hardt and Negri as 
‘incommunicability’. They state, ‘This paradox of incommunicability makes it 
extremely difficult to grasp and express the new power posed by the struggles that 
have emerged’. Thus, Hardt and Negri’s multitude is partly framed as an abstract 
heuristic device: ‘[it] has a strange double temporality: always-already and not-
yet…’, however, most importantly, multitude is also a normative project. They 
argue, ‘The proletariat is not what it used to be’ therefore ‘Multitude needs a 
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political project to bring it into existence’. The task, then, is to discover a new form 
of global agency. Since, according to Hardt and Negri, it is the immaterial labour, 
the labour, that is involved in the production of the informational, communicative 
and cultural content of the commodity that is now central to capital’s survival, the 
latter could be envisaged as the new vanguard of the productive forces. More 
recently, in their Multitude (2004), Hardt and Negri have attempted to clarify their 
position on immaterial labour:  
 
‘When we claim that immaterial labour is tending towards the hegemonic position 
we are not saying that most of the workers in the world today are producing 
primarily immaterial goods. The labour involved in all immaterial production, we 
should emphasise, remains material – it involves our bodies and brains as all labour 
does. What is immaterial is its product’.186  
 
Therefore, the hegemony of immaterial labour is embodied in the ability to 
create new type of products that do not divide but unite and mobilise the most 
universal aspects of human beings, such as intellect, senses, language, emotions etc.  
 
Hence for Hardt and Negri ‘multitude’ is the virtual political subject, but it has a 
wide-open potential represented by the self-organising and self-constituting 
capacities of ‘immaterial labour’. Such a position invites people to‘re-appropriate’ 
the productive energies that they were already put into operation through their 
salaried or freelance cooperation, and asserts that the self-organising multitude 
should be capable of directly producing the immanent forms of exchange, of 
governing its own production, thereby superseding the sterile and divisive forms of 
coordination that structure and rule the world market. In other words, the process of 
accelerating and reinforcing exclusive identities and homogeneous groups could be 
the starting point for a new kind of emancipation. The idea is to use networks just as 
capital does. The force of this movement is really in this networking method: a 
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multitude, a spontaneous and unpredictable movement – not, for example, a political 
party or an institution. Hardt and Negri are convinced that  
 
‘…certainly, there must be a moment when re-appropriation and self-organisation 
reach a threshold and configure a real event. This is when the political is really 
affirmed – when the genesis is complete and self-valorization, the cooperative 
convergence of subjects, and the proletarian management of production become a 
constituent power.... The only event that we are still awaiting is the construction, or 
rather the insurgence, of a powerful organization’187.  
 
In his recent article ‘Production and Distribution of the Common’, Michael Hardt 
envisages the generalisation of immaterial labour not as a precondition for an event 
when creative excesses will supposedly break through the capitalist form of life, but 
as an ongoing process of de-capitalisation. According to Hardt, today we are no 
longer required to struggle against capitalist domination, since the latter does not 
operate in terms of commodities and therefore does not imply exclusions and 
inequalities, as we know it. Hardt writes, ‘If I use an automobile or a house you are 
prevented from using it, but my using an idea or an image does not imply any such 
exclusion.’188 Therefore, what is at stake today is to produce more ‘ideas,’ so to 




‘Even though capital continues to impose instrumentality, immaterial products are 
not exhausted in their use. The effects created in a service relationship, for example, 
or the images and ideas created in an advertising campaign always exceed the 
instrumental goal capital sets for them. Furthermore, such production is 
characterised by language and speech, which Arendt identifies as central to the 
political.’189  
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Therefore, Hardt states, ‘…the talents and skills generated and employed in 
biopolitical economic production tend to be the same as those required for political 
action. This claim has a great significance for the possibilities of democratic 
participation…’190  
 
According to Hardt, this biopolitical model already includes both politics and 
aesthetics, and the main objective is not to struggle against capitalism, but to speed it 
up: to participate, distribute and create more. The capitalist form of life today is 
already political because of the economic centrality of the arts, which makes 
capitalist production an entirely different game – a game without rules, so to speak. 
Hardt writes,  
 
‘If, as I claimed earlier, the skills and talents required for biopolitical economic 
production also apply to political action and the creative capacities of artistic 
practice are the same needed for economic production, then it is similarly true, to 
complete my set of three parallel relations, that increasingly today abilities 
developed in artistic practice are those required for political action.’191  
 
The implications of Hardt’s understanding of the post-Fordist model as a 
biopolitical paradigm ruled not by economics but by the distribution and connection 
of human beings are that there is no need for political articulation or aesthetic 
reflection as separate practices, since both are already included in the biopolitical 
economy. Hence, instead of struggling against capitalism, we should embrace it, 
thus allowing cognitive and linguistic patterns or ‘general intellect’, through 
cooperation with others, to transcend capitalism from within. In other words, the 
emphasis should be put on the creation and exercise of the common, since art and 
labour have already merged into one sphere. Art is a living labour, which can now 
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‘…become the flesh of the world’.192 This enables Negri to redefine the nature of 
artistic production and rewrite the history of art according to a specific mode of 
production and labour character.  
 
Art is Multitude?    
 
In his Art & Multitude, Negri argues that today, when art and labour both become 
abstract, ‘…the desire for artistic expression presents itself in all places’.193 This 
means that art has become a living labour, but it can only achieve beauty when the 
signs and language through which it expresses itself turn into a community. Artistic 
experience and production are always related to the modes of transformation of 
labour. Dwelling on the historic periodisation of art, Negri makes the case that any 
particular artistic style or expression always expresses a new condition of labour. 
For example, Impressionism for him corresponds to a deepening of the division and 
specialisation of labour, the abstraction period represents the 'scientific’ conception 
of labour organisation, ‘and here we are today into a new period: the constituent 
phase of the socialised worker, of cognitive labour power’194 and therefore we 
witness an unprecedented rise and multiplicity of all artistic experiences and ways of 
producing art. Negri writes,  
 
‘Now, precisely at a time when labour power is cognitive, the desire for artistic 
expression presents itself in all places; when the mass of workers transforms itself 
into a multitude of singular workers, the artistic act invests the forms of life, and 
these forms of life become the flesh of the world’.195  
 
We should from now on consider art as a living free labour and therefore an 
invention of singularity and objects. However, these expressive acts can only 
achieve beauty when the signs and language it uses to express itself turn themselves 
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into a community. Negri states, ‘The common, which has developed in artistic 
forms, must now be incarnated in a collective decision, in a common government’.196  
 
What Negri appears to suggest is that art as artistic and cultural practices are no 
longer needed, since they have finally realised themselves into ‘the flesh of the 
world’ through the immaterialisation of labour. Furthermore, instead of separate 
spheres such as art or culture, economy or publics, we should view the world in 
terms of the ‘common’. This ‘common’, for Negri, would manifest itself as a 
different model of Kantian sublime: ‘The common as ethical sublime, the common 
as aesthetical sublime’.197 Negri writes, ‘The beautiful is not the act of imagining, 
but an imagination that has become action. Art, in this sense, is multitude’.198 Thus, 
Negri’s reference to Kant’s doctrine of the beautiful manifests not the idea of a 
happy community to come, but the entirety of living labour beyond any community, 
‘…because the experience of the common expresses precisely, against any illusion 
of community, forms of life which are rich and free’.199 
 
Thus, Hardt and Negri appear to incorporate Deleuze and Guattari’s idea of history 
as articulated in the two volumes of Anti-Oedipus: Capitalism and Schizophrenia, as 
a congealing and regimentation of ‘desiring-production’ – a concept combining the 
features of Freudian drives and Marxist labour into the modern neurotic and 
repressed individual. The essence of the problem lies, according to Deleuze and 
Guattari, within the misrecognition of a creative process, which drives the social, 
instead emphasising the forces of production, which are envisaged as the 
transformation of a process into a concrete object, thus overlooking the latter. As 
Deleuze and Guattari argue, every mode of social production faces the perennial 
dilemma of how to code or regulate the flows of desiring production, how to contain 
the creative energies that underlie any social formation in a structured and controlled 
form. Therefore the real task of a revolutionary consists of grasping a creative 
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process, what Deleuze calls the ‘virtual’, which underlies every constructed object 
and subject. This process cannot take a particular direction, it cannot be envisaged as 
a theory; instead, it can be only actualised through the interaction of the ‘senses’, 
which do not derive from existing social structures. What is at issue here is not to 
become trapped in any political or social theory (someone else’s desire must not be 
blocked by Deleuze’s one and vice versa), but to escape the ‘structure of situations’ 
by engaging with the ‘virtual’ realm. However, unlike Hardt and Negri, Deleuze and 
Guattari assert that capitalism is creative in itself. Following Marx, Deleuze 
welcomes capitalism's destruction of traditional social hierarchies as liberating, but 
inveighs against its subordination of all values to the aims of the market. Similarly to 
the schizophrenic, capitalism can insert itself anywhere and everywhere as a decoder 
and scrambler. Hence what is at issue is to destroy the ‘code’ entirely. The virtuality 
of countless, non-coordinated and conflict-free mutually co-producing impulses of 
desire, described by Deleuze and Guattari as ‘smooth space,’ can penetrate the 
‘stratified’ or coded form of organisation of language, body and subjectivity. When 
this subjective flow of desire or a ‘smooth’ space enters the ‘stratified’ one, the 
social structure itself becomes movable and mutable. It would become, as Deleuze 
and Guattari argue, an ‘assemblage’ of lines of decoding, of ‘re-territorialisation’ 
and ‘de-territorialisation’ – an immanent connection between structures belonging to 
‘smooth’ and ‘coded’ spaces at the same time. Thus the place of the state with its 
‘stratified’ space should be taken by, in Guattari’s words, a ‘multitude of goals that 
are within the immediate reach of the most different social contexts’.200 In short, the 
goal is to keep away from any consolidation of power, to keep moving, ‘smoothing 
out’ the ‘stratified’ space, to produce a world in which the rule of the game does not 
exist, since the latter is constantly unfolding.  
 
For Deleuze and Guattari it is the art scene, not labour, that actually remains the 
realm of central speculation in terms of the actualisation of the flows of desire. The 
concept of immaterial labour would be too closely related to the conditions of 
production and not schizophrenic enough for Deleuze and Guattari. However, 
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despite the differences, Hardt, Negri, Deleuze and Guattari appear to share the 
vitalist view of the world whereby life itself becomes an active force of the thought 
and hence of emancipation. This view is a repetition, albeit with a different 
vocabulary, of Marx’s idea of communism as an aesthetic state modeled in artwork. 
Marx’s recovery of living labour from capital as dead one reinforces Schiller’s 
conception of the beautiful as a living, active form as opposed to the ‘dead’ form of 
‘modern man’. Furthermore, is this not Marx’s argument against Hegel, that he takes 
one kind of human labour – intellectual labour – and makes the mistake of thinking 
that it stands for all labour, so that the idea becomes the independent subject. 
Statistically, the case could not be more clear – creative labour is a small part of the 
total labour of society and not a ‘universal class’ at all.  
 
Therefore, according to Hardt and Negri, we can theorise immaterial labour and 
general intellect as a creative communism – just follow your desires and your 
dreams will come true. Another post-Operaist thinker, Paolo Virno, however, prefers 
to see post-Fordism as a ‘communism of capital’ rather than a spontaneous one.  
 
‘Communism of Capital’ 
 
In his A Grammar of the Multitude Virno argues that this new ‘life form’ has more 
features derived from capitalism than from labour. While for Hardt and Negri 
capitalism can only be reactive since it is the proletariat that ‘actually invents the 
social and productive forms that capital will be forced to adopt in the future’,201 
Virno argues that Post-Fordism was an answer to workers’ failed struggle against 
wage labour. He writes,  
 
‘Well, I believe that during the 1960s and 1970s there was, in the West, a defeated 
revolution – the first revolution aimed not against poverty and backwardness, but 
specifically against the means of capitalistic production, thus, against the Ford 
assembly-line and wage labour. Post-Fordism, the hybrid forms of life 
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characteristics of the contemporary multitude, is the answer to this defeated 
revolution. Dismissing both Keynesianism and socialist work ethic, post-Fordist 
capitalism puts forth in its own way typical demands of communism: abolition of 
work, dissolution of the State, etc. Post-Fordism is the communism of capital’.202  
 
Virno argues that the social struggles of the 1960s and 1970s have expressed 
non-socialist demands such as refusal of work, abolition of the State, taste for 
differences and emphasis on the individual, and thus capital has came up with its 
own solution: as the Operai (workerists) stood up against the reduction of life to 
work, Post-Fordism has made life and work interchangeable. The surplus value in 
cognitive capitalism is no longer extracted from labour materialised in a product, but 
locates itself in the discrepancy between paid and unpaid work – ‘the idle’ time of 
the mind, which keeps enriching the fruits of immaterial labour. Virno states that 
‘This means that the capitalistic initiative orchestrates for its own benefit precisely 
those material and cultural conditions which would guarantee a calm version of 
realism for the potential communist’.203  
 
While Hardt and Negri understand the multitude as the constitutive agent of today’s 
global, post-territorial world, Paolo Virno’s theorising of the multitude reflects 
instead the crisis of the traditional state form in terms of the plurality and 
incommensurability of political experiences – that is, the lack of political 
engagement and critique. Virno’s take on the multitude is far from considering it a 
virtue, as the progress made by productive forces, considering it instead a new 
problematic way of being where it is impossible to say where collective experience 
ends and the individual begins. Hence Virno’s understanding of the multitude is far 
from the celebratory tone of Hardt and Negri. Virno shows that the communication 
networks, increased connectivity and cooperative virtuosity needed for post-Fordist 
production have some potential, but behind the back, as it were, of capitalists’ and 
not workers’ power.  
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Disappointed with the multitude as a revolutionary subject, Virno puts his hopes 
within its ‘grammar’. Of particular interest here is Virno's reflection on the 
'virtuosity' of post-industrial labour. His argument is that post-Fordist capitalism 
relies on forms of labour that are not orientated primarily to producing a product, but 
rather to producing cooperation and organisation based on social and linguistic 
faculties. The contention here is that this reorientation of labour dissolves the 
traditional separation of labour from political action. The virtuoso artist is the model 
for this transformation insofar as he focuses on performance and the social space it 
produces, rather than a separable product. Labour, intellectual activity and political 
action, according to Virno, are now merged into one inter-connected ethical space of 
infinite publicity without a public sphere. Virno states, ‘…when production is no 
longer in any way the specific locus of the formation of identity, …it projects itself 
into every aspect of experience, subsuming linguistic differences, ethical 
propensities and the nuances of subjectivity’.204 What follows is that language, 
communication, criticism, debates and contestations are not antidotes or weapons 
against this new condition but are themselves part of the ‘field of conflict’.  
 
Virno’s radical thesis consists of suggesting that symbolic or political acts of 
resistance are not a matter of individual or collective action and choice, but rather a 
model of being, a ‘form of life’ of the multitude, which is already political. 
Therefore, the existing power structures should be ignored and instead we should 
concentrate on the inventive production of radical public spheres outside current 
institutions, which eventually could be linked in a single global public sphere in 
which the multitude can share its desires and aims. Virno’s exit would involve not a 
withdrawal into inactivity or passivity, but an intensification of creative activities 
and self-organising practices outside the existing power structures.  
 
In his recent article ‘Three Remarks Regarding the Multitude’s Subjectivity and its 
Aesthetic Component’, Virno focuses precisely on the role of the aesthetic 
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dimension, which he calls aesthesis, in the multitude’s subjectivity. In Virno’s view, 
it is essential to analyse this dimension  
 
‘…not because it is concerning a single and specific sector of production 
(that is concerned with the commodification of the intellect), but because it 
provides an universal model, that is to say it concerns even the work in a car 
factory or a steel mill’.205  
 
According to Virno, the artistic communicative model now plays the role that 
has traditionally been played by the means of production. While in the age of the 
factory, work and workers are silent, today, as labour is situated outside the 
machinery, it must keep communicating. Virno states, ‘I am convinced that the 
multitude’s subjectivities as well as the precondition of contemporary artistic 
activity comprises a metabolism of the productive role of spoken language or rather 
a search for an uniqueness that does not reject repetition but finds its chances 
precisely in this latter’.206  
 
According to Virno, activities that are not based on the creation of new products or 
objects but on the discovery and interpretation of existing things through the process 
of repetition of performances provides a new political model. When Virno says that 
‘everything has become performative’, he is stating precisely that the linguistic-
virtuoso qualities of artist and labour coincide today. A condition of repetition 
permits the process of the product’s objectification into an ‘end product’ without a 
‘finishing’ product; that is to say, this virtuosic form of labour demands a space that 
is structured precisely as the public or political sphere. Virno writes, ‘The 
distinguishing characteristic of the contemporary metropolis isn’t the criss-cross of 
jargons, but the complete identity of material production and linguistic 
communication. This identity explains and causes this criss-cross’.207 This new 
identity, or what Virno calls the ‘‘communicative body’ of the multitude, implies not 
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only the centrality of linguistic communication but also, most importantly, its 
radically new quality of having a unitary sensual composition. At the core of the 
multitude’s navigation through the ‘unspeakable metropolis’ is what Virno calls 
‘second-order sensualism’ – ‘a sensualism concerning acoustic, visual, and tactile 
perceptions that mark a final point, a final result of a theoretical, hypothetical, 
calculating, technical, sophisticated practice’.208 We can see that Virno’s view 
corresponds to an understanding of an aesthetic state that is not reduced to the 
knowledge or production of objects, and is rather free and self-determining. Virno's 
focus on productivity without product ostensibly reintroduces the separation of 
subjectivity from objectivity that the idea of absolute art was introduced to resolve. 
Indeed, there is a certain subjective idealism to Virno's investment in the 'general 
intellect' or language as a medium divorced from the medium of producing products. 
Yet Virno is convinced that this aesthetic component corresponds to the idea of a 
new type of critique that exists outside or apart from its objects – that of capitalist 
products – and might eventually overturn capitalism.  
Despite their differences, Hardt, Negri and Virno consider post-Fordism a new 
paradigm where traditional approaches to capitalism, labour and culture are no 
longer valid. The rise of the general intellect and performative labour dissolved the 
former structures of exploitation and alienation. What is at issue, they say, is the 
biopolitical model of social being where power is located in the reproduction of 
forms of life. There is no longer the traditional cultural sphere, since subjectivity 
itself, as Virno emphasises, is embedded in the processes of creative capitalism.  
This paradigm corresponds to what Luc Boltanski describes as a shift of the Left, 
which used to identify itself with the critique of capitalist exploitation and 
alienation, to a position of approval. In his article ‘The Present Left and the Longing 
for Revolution’, Boltanski argues that ‘…the longing for total revolution becomes 
displaced from the domain of the production of material goods to that of the 
reproduction of human beings’.209 Consequently, the new social movements, in 
Boltanski’s view, are concerned with the regulation of human life, which in the 
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current condition is taken for granted. He states, ‘They demand the existing rights to 
be respected and, although in rather discreet terms, the recognition of new rights – 
often presented as derivatives of human rights – but do not put the existing 
institutions as a whole in question’.210 Such demands, Boltanski argues, are no 
longer in opposition to capitalism, but rather in agreement with it. He writes, 
‘…there is a left which aspires to total revolution but on a different terrain, that of 
the generation and the reproduction of human beings and of kinship relations; this is 
a Left that is no longer anti-capitalist’.211 Furthermore, this is a Left that is also anti-
cultural in the sense that, despite their differences, Negri and Virno do not believe 
that artistic practices can play a particular role in intervening in the social. For them, 
culture is either already won – art is multitude – or has become completely 
redundant.  
‘Production of the Self’   
In his recently published book The Immaterial (L’immateriel, 2003), Gorz deals with 
the causes and consequences of the emergence of a globalised neo-liberal post-
Fordist system of cognitive capitalism. Responding to the crisis of the Fordist 
regime when the enormous production facilities did not have enough buyers, 
capitalists understood that while needs are limited by nature, their desires are not. 
Gorz writes, ‘To expand these desires, all that was needed was to get rid of the idea 
that an individual’s purchases corresponded to practical needs and rational 
considerations. It was unconscious and irrational motivations that had to be appealed 
to – fantasies and unavowed desires’.212 This is how the immaterial dimension came 
about. It is not that labour has become immaterial – but ‘the heart of value-creation 
is immaterial work’213 or, as Gorz prefers to puts it, ‘immaterial dimension’, which 
sells material products and services.  
This move was accompanied by the transformation of work. Gorz writes, ‘The 
production process can now no longer be mistaken for a ‘labour process’; rather, the 
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‘work’ has become ‘to produce oneself’’. Post-Fordist workers have to come to 
work with all their cultural and social baggage and skills – what Gorz calls a 
‘vernacular’ knowledge, since an individual cannot produce himself on his own. 
Gorz states, ‘The production of self does not happen out of nothing. It takes place on 
the basis of a shared culture transmitted by primary socialisation and common forms 
of experiential knowledge’214. What was at issue was to turn this knowledge into 
‘personal subjects’.  
Negri, for example, argues that value today is produced en masse, and thus 
immaterial labour has the ability to create new types of products that do not divide 
but unite and mobilise the most universal aspects of human beings such as intellect, 
senses, language, emotions etc. According to Gorz, value is produced by taking from 
what belongs to all and personalising it in such a way as to make it appeal not to 
everyone collectively, but to each private individual. Gorz writes,  
‘The advertising industry constantly fulfilled a dual economic and political function 
by appealing not to imagination and desires of all, but to the imagination and desire 
of each as a private person. It does not promise potential buyers an improvement in 
their shared condition. It promises, rather, that each person can escape the common 
condition by becoming the “happy privileged individual” who is able to buy herself 
some new, scarce, improved, distinctive item’.215  
Contrary to Hardt and Negri, who view immaterial labour as the opening of 
new forms of sociability and unity of intellect and senses, Gorz understands it as ‘an 
antisocial socialization’ that promotes the pursuit of individual solutions to 
collective problems and a shared condition.  
Rather than envisaging post-Fordism as spontaneous communism, Gorz thinks about 
it in terms of the paradigm of prostitution. Workers who sell their imaginations and 
personalities cannot be paid the ‘market rate,’ since what they offer is beyond 
comparison and evaluation. The most valued forms of knowledge in the cognitive 
economy cannot be systematically taught, but are the product of a rich lifestyle and 
culture. As Gorz has argued in his earlier work, Critique of Economic Reason 
(1989), the purchasing of sexual services is the purest form of a master-servant 
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relationship, which is becoming ubiquitous in post-Fordist capitalist society. The 
physical nature of the sexual device always makes the simulation of personal 
involvement. The enjoyment cannot be sold to anyone else without giving of herself 
into the bargain. The conventional argument that prostitution is exploitative, Gorz 
argues, misses the point. It is not that prostitutes are paid less than the value of what 
they give, but that they give something that cannot be paid for, since it is already 
observed. A better payment cannot therefore settle the ‘account,’ but only cheapen 
and mystify what is already a relationship of servility.216  
Thus, applied to the paradigm of immaterial labour, this giving of oneself and the 
transmission of meaning mystifies the relations of servility between the capitalist 
and the so-called immaterial worker, not radically changing it, as Negri argues, in 
favour of open, radically new forms of life. Instead, Gorz maintains, capitalists 
incorporate cultural forms of life in order to make them suitable to the monetary 
exchange-value.  
In fact, Gorz considers the emergence of post-Fordism as capital’s move to eliminate 
its dependency on living labour. Rather than a response to the more materialist 
challenge posed by mainstream labour unions in search of expanded social benefits, 
shorter hours and higher wages, capitalists have started to transform knowledge into 
immaterial capital. What has really become immaterial, Gorz says, is not labour, but 
capital. Gorz writes, ‘The major part of profits is achieved on the basis of the 
intangible dimension of commodities. Their ‘materialisation’ becomes secondary 
from the economic point of view’.217 For example, individuals take up various 
investments or insurance policies because symbolically they represent the ‘good life’ 
– attributes that are advertised through artistic devices. In cognitive capitalism, its 
main productive source – knowledge – is the outcome of the unpaid collective 
activity of a ‘self-production’ or ‘production of subjectivity’. ‘It is’, Gorz writes,  
 
‘...to a large extent, “general intelligence”, shared culture, lived and lived practical 
knowledge. It has no exchange value, which means that it can, in theory, be shared 
at will, as anyone and everyone sees fit, at no charge, particularly on the Internet’.218  
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However, while capitalists cannot appropriate natural riches and common 
goods, they can create artificial barriers such as rights of access. Gorz writes, 
‘Control of access is, we shall see, a preferential form for the conversion of 
immaterial wealth into capital’.219 For example, brands function precisely through 
restricting immaterial or symbolic capital to a monopoly. Gorz states, ‘It 
appropriates cultural life, first, by using artistic works to promote brands and then, 
reversing the procedure, by putting commercial brand names on presentations of art 
works’.220 The brand name always claims to be the symbol of excellence and the 
source knowledge, but ‘…it has its source in the monopoly of knowledge, in the 
exclusiveness of the qualities which that knowledge confers on the commodity that 
embody it…’221 
 
A true knowledge economy, Gorz argues, would be an economy based on zero-cost 
exchange and pooled resources, where the knowledge would be treated as a common 
property. To exploit knowledge and turn it into capital, the capitalist enterprise must 
privatise it and ensure its scarcity with all manner of private licences and copyrights. 
However, this transformation to a post-Fordist knowledge economy in which profits 
extracted through ‘the production of self’ does not, according to Gorz, lead either to 
a ‘spontaneous communism’ or to the end of humanity and culture. In fact, Gorz 
argues, today capitalism generates a crisis that is shaking society to its roots. The 
new form of wealth creation is almost impossible to measure in monetary terms and, 
as a consequence, traditional notions of economics have begun to crumble. Gorz 
writes,  
‘Formalized knowledge opens up the prospect, then, of the economy evolving 
towards affluence, which means also an economy in which production, requiring 
less and less immediate labour, distributes fewer and fewer means of payment. The 
exchange-value of products tends to diminish and to lead, sooner or later, to a 
decrease in the monetary value of total wealth produced, alongside a decrease in the 
volume of profits’.222  
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Meanwhile, capitalism can function only if there are spheres of activity free 
from capitalist logic, but in this knowledge economy this other space and the 
immaterial production are indistinguishable, and capitalism therefore begins to look 
suspicious.  
Gorz writes, ‘Experimentation with other ways of life and other social relations in 
the interstices of a society that is falling apart attacks the control capital experts on 
mind and bodies and delegitimates it. The constraints and values of capitalist society 
are no longer perceived as natural, and this liberated the powers of imagination’.223 
What follows is that post-Fordist capitalism should be considered as causing crisis in 
all areas – from economy to culture – rather than being a matrix of culture or 
economic necessities. Gorz maintains that the stakes in the conflict are not cultural – 
or even economic, for that matter – but rather ‘…mask some profoundly political 
issues’.224  
The Neo-liberal Political Project 
That is why David Harvey prefers to speak of the post-Fordist economic 
restructuring in terms of the neo-liberal political project, the ultimate aim of which 
was to reassert the power of capital over the refusal of the capitalist work discipline 
and ethics. ‘Fordist’ assembly lines and ‘brick and mortar’ factories were replaced 
with de-spatialised networks of ‘just-in-time’ manufacturing that responded quickly 
to an ever-shifting world market for goods and services. Heavy manufacturing was 
shifted to lower-cost places. This transformation was in fact a neo-liberal counter-
revolution on the back of a free-market revolution. Resistance to market discipline 
was becoming widespread in the 1960s and 1970s, and not just among university 
students. In the United States, for example, unauthorised wildcat strikes reached a 
post-war high between 1962 and 1973, and work refusals among public service 
employees grew nine-fold. According to the American `Social History Project’, such 
confrontations were linked with a growing democratic spirit that not only inspired a 
counter-culture, but also ‘surged through the nation’s factories’.225 As Harvey 
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argues, New York in the late 1970s represents the first application of Milton 
Freidman’s ultra-free-market or neo-liberal policies. Its long-term agenda redirected 
public resources away from social services into the private business sector while 
effectively draining support from housing activists and other community-based 
groups.226 According to Harvey, New York’s restructuring was a test-drive for a 
‘neo-liberal’ answer to post-war economic problems, over-accumulation of capital, 
falling profits, competition from emerging markets around the globe and, most 
importantly, the doubting of a capitalist structure and discipline. From now on, the 
interests of capital and of the nation states must dovetail. Markets must become free, 
since, connected to the state, they were challenged. Capitalist elites have managed to 
‘emancipate’ themselves from political power and global corporations became 
independent of labour, class and politics.  
According to Harvey, neo-liberalism, presented as a permanent solution to the 
instability of capitalism, has in fact been built on over-accumulation and 
dangerously uneven development across the world. Since the 1990s, there has been 
massive financialisation – the expansion of capital way beyond the functionality of 
trade and investment. For most workers, the post-Fordist economic restructuring 
brought with it lower pay, far longer work hours, weaker unions and no safety. With 
emphasis on cognitive as opposed to manual labour, a few were allowed to be 
productive: one has either to succeed or fail miserably. Hence Harvey maintains that 
neo-liberalism does not serve a practical function in actually pursuing strategies of 
‘accumulations by dispossession’.227 It is mainly, he argues, ‘a benevolent mask full 
of wonderful-sounding words like freedom, liberty, choice, and rights, to hide the 
grim realities of the restoration of reconstitution of naked class power’.228  
However, many individuals who did not necessarily belong to the so-called upper or 
middle classes have in fact become wealthy and powerful under neo-liberalism, 
which, rather than being, as Harvey, argues, ‘a benevolent mask’, does indeed 
provide freedom, liberty, choice and rights, but according to its own interpretation.  
The ongoing debate and confusion regarding what actually constitutes the core of 
post-Fordist transformation – culture, labour, capital, technology or a class theory – 
manifests the fact that contemporary capitalism cannot be reduced to a single, self-
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defining mechanism, and that it would be more productive to understand capitalism 
as a complex process in which cultural, economic, political and other 
determinations, which all have their own logic, come together as the determination 
of the phenomenon as a whole. Under the condition of globalisation, the potential 
space for such a determination becomes wider and more sophisticated. Ernesto Laclu 
writes that   
‘…the coherence of capitalism as a social formation cannot be derived from the 
mere logical analysis of the contradictions implicit in the commodity form, for the 
social affectivity of capitalism depends on its relation to a heterogeneous outside 
that it can control through unstable power relations, but which cannot be derived 
from its own endogenous logic.’229  
The answer to the capitalist ‘problem,’ then, is power relations. If capitalist 
determination is not self-determined, then it consists of an overdetermination of 
heterogeneous elements – hegemony. For that reason, a Gramscian ‘war of position’ 
exists in society. In fact, Boltanski refers to this ongoing hegemonic struggle when 
he speaks of the relationship between capitalism and critiques.  
 
Dwelling on the relationship between capitalism and the Left, which he identifies 
with critiques – the critique of exploitation, or ‘social critique’, developed 
traditionally by the worker's movement, and the critique of alienation, or ‘artistic 
critique’ – Boltanski argues that capitalism and critiques mutually require each other 
in two different aspects: on the one hand, the revolutionary tendency of capitalism 
depends on its ability to integrate different critiques in order to adapt models of 
production to changing historical conditions. Boltanski writes,  
 
‘As we demonstrated in The New Spirit of Capitalism, whole sections of artistic 
critique of capitalism were integrated into the management rhetoric. This rhetoric, 
itself denouncing Taylorism and standardization, in the 1980s recognized the 
validity of the producers’ aspirations for autonomy and creativity, and the 
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justification of the consumers’ hope to find goods and services on the market that 
are both of a higher quality and more unique’.230 
 
 On the other hand, Boltanski maintains, the political Left itself depends on the very 
models of production that are at the same time the targets of its social criticism.  
 
According to Boltanski, capitalism on its own is an absurd system in which 
capitalists are chained to endless processes; however, capitalist accumulation and 
networks always manage to mobilise even those who are hostile to its practices. This 
happens, in Boltanski’s view, because capitalism is constantly justified. He states, 
‘We shall call the spirit of capitalism the ideology that justifies the engagement in 
capitalism…It is precisely because it is the object of critique that capitalism is led to 
being justified. In the absence of critique, justification would be needless’.231  
 
What Boltanski shows is that capitalism is responsive to critiques; however, a 
possibility of change depends on widening the horizon of these critiques beyond just 
the ‘anti-capitalist’ dimension. The way to challenge capitalism does not lie in 
narrowing or withholding critiques, but widening and deepening them in all 
directions.  
 
Back to the Hegemonic Struggle   
Chantal Mouffe argues that the transition from the Fordist to the post-Fordist regime 
is better understood in terms of hegemony: it is not culture or economy that is the 
matrix of post-Fordism, but the rearticulation of some demands in a way that 
neutralises their critical potentials. Potentials are always there, but their realisation 
depends on the re-articulation of critiques. Following Boltanski and Chiapello, who 
have demonstrated how the demands for autonomy, authenticity and flexibility of 
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what they call an ‘artistic critique’ were implemented in the development of the 
post-Fordist conditions, Mouffe argues that this transition was a Gramscian ‘passive 
revolution’ when challenging the existing structure demands was re-articulated into 
the institutional framework. People wanted to be free and authentic and this is what 
they achieved. It is only that their open demands for a different life were not 
substantiated by any institutional change, and therefore the previous hegemonic 
structure absorbed and modified it in a way it could understand and use it.  
Mouffe writes, ‘My problem with Operaist and post-Operaist views is that…they 
tend to see this transition as if it was exclusively moved by one single logic, the 
workers’ resistances to the process of exploitation forcing the capitalists to 
reorganise the process of production, and to move to the post-Fordist era of 
immaterial labour’.232 Instead, Mouffe argues, capital has also played a creative and 
constructive role in this process. What is at issue is that the demands for autonomy 
of the 1960s movements were rearticulated in a new configuration suitable for 
capitalist logic. Mouffe writes, ‘Nowadays artistic and cultural production play a 
central role in the process of capital valorisation and it has become an important 
element of capitalist productivity’.233 
It was an ‘artistic critique’ that was not articulated together with other demands, and 
then was easily re-articulated in the way that suited capitalism. In fact, this ‘artistic 
critique’ has became the next logic, the heart of capitalism, which otherwise lacks 
any meaning. Capitalism has become ‘art-friendly’ not because human creativity has 
won, but because the uniqness of the goods, achieved though what Gorz calls an 
‘immaterial dimension,’ could make everyone authentic. It is not that all sorts of 
artistic practices are welcomed by post-Fordism, but only that these ideas and 
concepts can be transformed in the mechanism of branding and the production of 
uniqness. The financialised era of sign production has moved art from the margins to 
the central position. Many artists today have adopted concepts such as networking or 
niche marketing from business. In the era of ‘self-production’, other artistic 
activities that do not stem from the commercial culture also appear as an extension 
of capital.  
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The production of subjectivity today is more important then ever. Therefore, we 
must engage with this terrain. However, this engagement cannot be considered in 
terms of exodus as constructing some future space for advanced, open and 
autonomous forms of life outside existing institutions, but as the disarticulation and 
re-articulation of existing practices and discourses. Mouffe states, ‘The strategy of 
exodus, based on ontology of immanence, supposes the possibility of a redemptive 
leap into a society, beyond politics and sovereignty, where the multitude would be 
able to immediately rule itself and act in concert without the need of law or the state 
and where antagonism would have disappeared. The hegemonic strategy, in contrast, 
recognises that antagonism is irreducible and that as a consequence social objectivity 
can never be fully constituted and that, as a consequence, a fully inclusive consensus 
and an absolute democracy are never available’.234  
Mouffe points out that the post-Operaist conception of the multitude as a new 
privileged agent repeats the one of Marx’s proletariat, only the problem – capitalism 
– is now envisaged as a solution: the idea is that individuals should follow their 
desires and create more, thus their ‘life’ form would prevail over the ‘dead labour’ 
of capital. However, Mouffe reminds us that ‘There is no unique privileged position 
from which a uniform continuity of effects will follow, concluding with the 
transformation of society as a whole’.235 What follows is that labour or the relations 
of production are not the only site for the emergence of antagonisms; all institutions, 
systems and discourses are the surfaces where antagonisms and social protests 
emerge. Social agents lack any essence. If there is such a thing as political agency, it 
must take place within a social ‘text’ that consists of different, differing, multiple 
and conflicting social positions. No privileged signifier such as the economy or class 
structure could possibly affect all of these positions, because capitalism is not a 
totality but a ‘text’ with a multiplicity of interpretive possibilities that generate 
temporal moments of subjectivity. Mouffe states, 
‘Every order is the temporary and precarious articulation of contingent practices. 
Society is not to be seen as the unfolding logic exterior to itself, whatever the source 
of this logic could be: forces of production, development of the Spirit, laws of 
history, etc. The frontier between the social and the political is essentially unstable 
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and requires constant displacements and renegotiations between social agents’.236  
Instead of a ‘unified discourse’, Mouffe invites us to concentrate on ‘the de-
centering’, on maximum autonomisation of the different discourses, and not their 
linking and connectivity.  She states,  
‘As far as politics is concerned, this means the need to envisage it in terms of a 
hegemonic struggle between conflicting hegemonic projects attempting to incarnate 
the universal and to define the symbolic parameters of social life. Hegemony is 
obtained through the construction of nodal points, which discursively fix the 
meaning of institutions and social practices and articulate the “common sense” 
through which a given conception of reality is established.’237  
It is these ‘nodal points’ of power, the fixed sites of discourses and practices, that 
need to be questioned and re-articulated, not general terms such as ‘capitalism’ or 
‘culture’. According to the hegemonic approach, it is the political that has a central 
structuring role, since social agents lack essence and their identities are not 
predetermined. Mouffe writes, ‘What is at stake in the transformation of political 
identities is not a rationalist appeal to the true interests of the subject but the 
inscription of the social agent in practices that will mobilize its effects in a way that 
disarticulates the framework in which the dominant process of identification is 
taking place, so as to bring about other forms of identifications’.238  
Post-Fordism: Consequences and New Strategies  
Coming from the hegemonic perspective, we can now understand the post-Fordist 
consequences for artistic practices in a different way to that of Negri or Virno, and 
outline the possible critical trajectory.  
The aesthetic strategies of counter-culture that the Frankfurt school has thought of as 
emancipatory in themselves are now used to promote the production of desires: self-
production and self-exploitation. This happens because disarticulated elements of the 
critique of the ‘consumer society’ that supposedly deprives individuals of their true 
consciousness were later re-articulated through the post-Fordist transition. While 
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capital has restored its challenged legitimacy through hegemonic appropriation, it 
had corrosive effects on artists and art institutions. Today, artistic activity appears as 
a mere extension of capital, which led many thinkers to conclude that the cultural 
sphere is no longer sustainable or, on the contrary, that it is everywhere. Therefore 
individuals practice art in such a way that it is either socially minded – divorced 
from aesthetic and therefore preserved as art from capitalism – or they think that just 
to be creative is enough on its own – any artistic action is intrinsically political. 
Benjamin Buchloh, for example, branded the return of figuration in the 1980s as a 
politically regressive slip, and British critic John Walker went further and implicated 
artistic producers in the right-wing shift, stating that ‘some curators who had 
supported political art in the 1970s welcomed a resurgence of traditional art 
forms’239 and that the 1981 Royal Academy’s exhibition in London entitled New 
Spirit of Painting was an all-male affair that treated the feminist art movement as if 
it had never happened. The artistic history and medium were replaced with an 
interpretive artistic vocabulary based on social history, cultural identity and a value 
to a specific community. Gregory Sholette argues that the rise of socially aware 
artistic practices corresponded to the lack of authority such as the status of the state, 
culture etc. He writes,  
‘Indeed, it is impossible to imagine this level of social hacking taking place prior to 
the collapse of the Keynesian paradigm of an administered society whose 
intellectual and artistic banalities Adorno resolutely railed against. Prior to the rise 
of post-Fordist enterprise culture the notion of a broader public good was drilled 
into the population from birth to old age. Today every individual is in a constant 
state of warfare with every other individual. Only a radically failed society could 
give birth to fantasies of triumphant communality such as relational aesthetics or to 
the hyperbolic pragmatism of self-organised mock-institutions. It might also be 
giving birth, circumstances permitting, to a new conception of the political party or 
even the state’.240  
However, it was not art or artistic practices that caused the post-Fordist 
transformation. The defeat of the Left and re-articulation of the artistic critique in the 
way that suited capital is what led to a condition in which it seems that there is no 
longer any space for art to intervene critically. Meanwhile, this space can always be 
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constructed of art to engage with social reality hegemonically. The artist emerges as 
a social figure, as both the product of society and the agent of political interests. 
From this point of view, the status of object, the status of the ‘artwork,’ is not the 
expression of a circumscribed meaning, but a tool to construct subject.   
Artistic practices need to resume their cultural authority instead of providing the 
mock institutions to which Sholette refers. The current imaginary can be undermined 
only if artists act in both places: they are visible as art and present in the art world 
and at the same time intervene in the multiplicity of social spaces. Instead of 
promoting a total creativity in the style of the immaterial labour or the case of 
political activism where art is no longer aesthetically visible, what is needed is a new 
understanding of artistic production where subject and object are perceived as 
meaning written into actions. Art here is envisaged as a model of thinking about the 
world, it is not a claim about reality but also an act of changing this reality. To be 
able to act as what Gramsci once articulated as ‘organic intellectual’ – meaning that 
the intellectual action follows the historically created and not individually endowed 
connection and reflection of the individual to the group – one must come to terms 
with a hegemonic structure of any social order, but also grasp the specificity of 
artistic visibility, since it plays such a strategic role in the reproduction of capitalism. 
What has changed is not the paradigm of power, but the way subjectivity is 
produced today through ‘self-production’ and by invoking various desires.  
The post-Fordist transformation allows us to understand that any critique could be 
successfully neutralised if it does not become meaningful through institutional 
conditions and infused into the popular identities. There are many artists who are 
desperately trying to oppose the given imaginary environment, but they find it 
difficult to do so. Partly this happens because many artists still perceive artistic 
practice as a problem of an individual reflection and judgement – and this is the 
legacy of the Frankfurt school, which has attempted to fix the problem of the 
political in the aesthetic realm – but this situation also reflects on the way our 
understanding and perception of culture has changed as a result of artistic practices 
having coincided with capitalism on the terrain of production of unique goods and 
uniqueness. For the Russian thinker and artist Dmitriy Prigov (1934-2007) an 
immanent criticality begins in the constant awareness of the local cultural context 
and its limits. In the era of global capitalism, this awareness becomes increasingly 
problematic and thus increasingly artificial. As Prigov notes, ‘People simply cannot 
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comprehend what kind of political and cultural situation they are in’.241 Since the 
objective structures of society are no longer clearly distinguishable, the aesthetic 
dimension as a ‘space’ between the latter and the individual tends to vanish. As a 
result, what we are dealing with is not a radically new human being or subjectivity, 
but ‘a completely alien conception of arts and culture’ that must be scrutinised. 
Prigov writes, ‘Culture and arts would presuppose a completely new framework, 
where elements would be brought together in a different way. The artist in this new 
situation could look like a ‘flying machine’…and this is what we must question’.242 
According to Prigov, at times of ‘over-communication’, the value of the word is lost. 
He states, ‘for example, the verbal zone used to be the one where all values and 
systems were formulated. In contemporary capitalism the radical literature, poetry 
has become completely redundant. The zone of influence and actuality has moved 
from the verbal to the visual. Verbalism does not have the necessary speed, form 
(inclusiveness) and methodology, which are needed at the age of over-
communication. If in the recent past the process of identification with particular 
social group/classes consisted of the quotation of authors, today the identification is 
about quotations from TV series or advertisement or singing the latest hits’. 243 In a 
similar way, Prigov contends, the value of the visual in times of extra-visuality is 
also becoming redundant, and this is what artists can fight with their ‘permanent 
presence’ so that ‘…the aesthetic dimension does not appear to be a mere reflection 
of the capital’s powers.244  
Conclusion  
We should approach post-Fordist transformation neither optimistically, as the 
victory of the immaterial labour and general intellect, nor pessimistically where 
there is no longer any space for artistic practices to provide critique, but 
hegemonically. Envisaged from the hegemonic point of view, the new forms of 
production relying heavily on semiotic techniques to produce desirable models of 
subjectivity, open up a new battleground for emancipatory politics and artistic 
practices can make a valuable contribution through intervening in this terrain with 
aim to show that there is a political dimension in social relations, which today 
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appear as capital’s extensions. The strategic importance of artistic techniques is not a 
solution or a problem standing in the way of transforming given social order but a 
form in which the strategic intervention should take place in a multiplicity of social 
spaces. Instead of Shelley’s hope that the artists are the unacknowledged legislators 
of mankind or, for that matter, Stalin’s engineers of the human soul, what is at stake 
is to question the myth of art as a specific world capable of being taking over or, on 
the contrary, to overcome given social order.  
Envisaging what artistic critical intervention means requires not only an adequate 
grasp of what democratic politics entail and a political understanding of the nature of 
post-Fordist transition but also a different approach to aesthetics. There is a 
democratic paradox and there is also an aesthetical paradox – the questioning of the 
aesthetical judgment that reveals, through the ongoing practice of art, a conceptual 




















To be able to approach current hegemony politically, artistic practices should not 
only address the complex nature of the construction of political identities, but also 
regain the specificity of art, the necessity of an aesthetical judgment that produces 
controversy and dissent. The transformation of politics and capitalism has resulted in 
the current situation, characterised, on one side, as the triumph of aestheticism, and 
art’s tendency to abandon the realm of aesthetical judgments on the other. Many 
today contend that art theory and practice no longer needs aesthetics, since the 
ethical significance of aesthetic judgments pertaining to nature has disappeared. 
However, we have never judged nature, and prior to what Jacques Rancière refers to 
as the modern ‘aesthetic regime’ of art, there was also no ‘critique’ of art. Following 
a long history of various aesthetic regimes’ identification with politics, what Boris 
Groys defines as a ‘commandeering of politics by a will to art’, it is believed that 
there must be no shared aesthetic attitude as a utopian supposition of a human 
universality. Rather, art today should appeal to everybody, there should be a 
‘democracy of aesthetical experiences’. We must therefore, as Deleuze says, ‘have 
done with judgement’.245 However, why and how do we judge aesthetical objects? 
What does an aesthetical judgement mean? Do we have to have to choose between 
aesthetics without art or art without aesthetics? Aesthetics do not need art – there is 
little point in judging nature or beauty – but what is at issue in the aesthetical 
judgement is the aesthetic critique of the latter, which does not judge but rather 
demonstrates the structural impossibility of any judgements. Today, indeed, 
aesthetic beauty has triumphed, invading everything; meanwhile, aesthetic critique is 
missing, since it is not a judgement about something aesthetic – nature, for example 
– it means judgement, which is aesthetically enacted.   
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We will begin our discussion of aesthetic critique with Yves Michaud’s account of 
‘aesthetics without art,’ followed by Boris Groys’ consideration of the current 
situation as a progressive ‘art atheism’, where the true autonomy of art can only be 
guaranteed by the absence of aesthetic judgments. Groys suggests that the only way 
out of both postmodernist malaise and aesthetical – ‘beautiful and impressive’ – 
spaces of power, is to ‘design ourselves’. We will then turn to Jacques Rancière, 
who connects the idea of a sensus communis with the egalitarian disagreement with 
the partition of the sensible. Rancière explores the paradoxical nature of aesthetic 
judgement to suggest that the artwork is not a judgement, but rather an actualisation 
of a structural impossibility of any judgements. The essence of artistic critique lies 
not within drawing a distinction of value but within a paradoxical practice of 
questioning the judgement per se. Thus, Rancière’s vision of aesthetics corresponds 
to ‘scenes of dissensus’246 – an understanding of aesthetics that reorganise the 
sensible, which neither proposes the existence of ‘a reality concealed behind 
apparatuses’ or market, nor a ‘single regime of presentation and interpretation,’ but 
rather a sensible one that demonstrates, through the practice of its judgements on art, 
how one can judge in general.  
 
Rancière argues that what is needed today is a shift in approach to aesthetics, the one 
that aims to uncouple its relation to politics and economics, between the spectators 
and artists.  Aesthetical experience for Rancière is the experience of a break, a 
disconnection from one sensory world to the other. Similarly to Rancière, Russian 
thinker Dmitriy Prigov views aesthetics as a ‘third eye’ through which the ‘power of 
the gaze can disrupt the gaze of the power’. Rancière and Prigov both maintain that 
there is a fundamental connection between aesthetical critique and emancipatory 
logic. According to them, artistic practices need to broaden aesthetical strategies. 
The beautiful is not the reactionary and impressive, but the impossible. Aesthetics 
for them challenge both individualistic and rational perspectives of the social reality, 
since aesthetic critique runs deeper than any social fluctuations and show, through 
the artistic performance of the judgment, that societal systems, relations and subjects 
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lack any essence, and that the only agreement we can have is the aesthetical 
‘agreement’, which exposes and constructed of the flawed nature of any agreements.  
 
Aesthetics Without Art?  
 
French Professor of Philosophy Yves Michaud argues that in a globalised society of 
consumerism, art is demanded like any other product and aesthetic beauty has 
triumphed, invading everything. We consume beauty; there is a huge demand for it 
and hence for artists, but art appears to dissolve, becoming the ‘air we breathe’ – our 
aesthetic atmosphere. In his book Art in a Gaseous State (L’art à l’état gazeux. 
Essai sur le triomphe de l’esthétique, 2003), Michaud argues that air-soluble works 
are reduced to single aesthetic experience, which makes everyone an ultimate 
spectator. This aesthetic experience is the only thing that remains when one neglects 
the stage object in favour of its mode of reception. What is true for the arts is also 
true for the mise en scène, which is made up of objects that are even more fragile 
and that disappear as time goes by: the works, Michaud writes, ‘no longer aim to 
represent nor to signify. They do not refer to anything beyond themselves: they no 
longer symbolise. They no longer even count as objects made sacred but aim to 
directly produce intense or specific experiences’.247 We are then in a paradoxical 
situation facing, or rather inside, the work: it is material, sensitive and physical; 
meanwhile what really matters is no longer this materiality, but an experience. In 
this way, the work seems to dematerialise itself, it becomes virtual and thus prevents 
us from being able to distinguish its properties or significations. Michaud states, 
‘this aura, this halo, this perfume, this gas whatever you want to call it, expresses 
through fashion the identity of the time’.248 Michaud speaks of the ‘new regime of 
attention which privileges scanning over reading and deciphering of meanings. The 
image is fluid and mobile, less a spectacle or a datum than an element of a chain of 
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action’. 249 Having cut itself loose from the referential sequence of which it was a 
part, the image is ‘free’ to be harnessed in any direction.  
 
For Michaud, contemporary art represents aesthetics without art – that is, without 
making any aesthetic judgments. All criteria, according to Michaud, have 
evaporated: ‘…The judgment involved in aesthetic appreciation is identified with a 
judgment based on criteria and norms recognized by a particular community, and, 
potentially, by the whole of humanity. The triumph of ‘anything goes’ thus marks 
the end of aesthetics and even of art itself’.250 ‘Beauty rules;’ meanwhile, the world 
is not becoming a more beautiful place. Aesthetics won through the trivialisation of 
beauty, by shaping the status of the ‘works of art’ as ‘precious and rare’, invested 
with aura and magic qualities. Michaud states, ‘The ‘aesthetic’ is cultivated, diffused 
and consumed in a world emptied of the works of art’.251 It is jumpers in a shop that 
are as beautiful as the works of art, which, according to Michaud, have become, in 
the present hedonistic environment, yet another brand252, universally accessible as a 
result of the process of mass production and mass quest for authenticity. There 
seems to be a growing tendency of demanding that cultural institutions appeal to a 
broad public not only to earn revenue, but also to satisfy all needs for art. Art should 
not be ‘elitist,’ but pluralistic – it should be free from a tyranny of an aesthetical 
judgment about what art looks like. Since the statement ‘this is art’ presupposes an 
aesthetical judgment without making one, art schools today prefer to be called 
‘visual culture departments,’ and instead of the word ‘art’, the phrase ‘cultural 
practice’ is often used.  
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Dwelling on Michaud’s reflections regarding the ‘gaseous state of art’ where ‘a great 
seriousness in the aesthetic attitude’ has been replaced by ‘hedonism, spectacle and 
emotions’, it appears that he is making two main points: the first is that various 
products and discourses have a very strong aesthetic impact, which actually 
emphasises how crucial, compared to all sorts of values, aesthetics are; and the 
second one is that the excess of this ‘aesthetical perfume’ manifests the ‘death of a 
certain form of art’. He states, ‘from this point onwards we must imagine that we are 
dealing with non-objective aesthetics, with experiences. There is, therefore, no 
transmission of ideas, but only of experiences, of ways to feel, of breaths of 
sensations, of emotions’. Michaud points out the ‘loneliness of the artist’ in the 
aesthetical world, the artist who seeks a direct relationship with the market, 
audiences or nature, ‘skipping the mediation of the critic’.253  
 
While in designer capitalism it has become imperative to put aesthetical strategies to 
use – marketing employs the surface aesthetics of the avant-garde or conceptual art 
to imbue brands with an egalitarian feel – these aesthetical values are not necessarily 
about art. For example, for Kant, pure aesthetic judgements are never about art, but 
about nature. What seems to be at issue here is the assumed connection between art 
and aesthetics when art is understood as a system, characterised by a particular 
aesthetical strategy, which should maintain a separate sphere of ‘free play’ outside 
of ideology or market. There is an implication that art must have its own aesthetics, 
where image cannot be ‘harnessed in any direction,’ but must contain a particular 
meaning. However, is there such a thing as a ‘free image’? Who or what decides on 
its freedom?  
 
Michaud appears to be nostalgic about the unity of art and aesthetics that are often 
seen as being interchangeable, with ‘aesthetics’ generally bearing the weight of 
criticism and judgment. Aesthetics, Michaud argues, should belong to art. In fact, we 
make aesthetical judgments every day and these values represent ‘aesthetics of 
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politics’ as the symbolic order aestheticised in a particular way. While today many 
activities share aesthetical features, they still lack essential aesthetic qualities. For 
example, Ruth Lorand, an academic, critic and the author of Aesthetic Theory, a 
Theory of Order, Beauty and Art (2000), points out that the difference between 
aesthetics and an aesthetic point of view resembles the difference between gossip 
and a fictional story. While gossip focuses on the individual, its beginning is random 
and so is its ending – it has no general bearing; a fictional story always has some 
general bearing or insight that extends beyond the particular case. Thus, while gossip 
has many aesthetic features, it does not posses any aesthetics, in the sense that it 
does not create beauty as a type of order that provides a new understanding of 
materials taken from experience. For Lorand, aesthetics are always about beauty, in 
the sense that it has an internal necessity that provides new insights, while everyday 
aesthetics – whether TV or fashion – belong to another world, which has different 
objectives. In fact, Lorand argues, aesthetics are not about objectives, but about 
beauty, and the latter is always unpredictable, since it involves a new twist, a new 
understanding of a given situation.254 While, as Michaud says, ‘aesthetic beauty has 
triumphed invading everything…we consume beauty’, the latter does not belong to 
aesthetics, since this ‘beauty’ is predictable – anything with some aesthetic features 
such as uniqueness or novelty is considered beautiful – but beauty is not unique; on 
the contrary, it must have some general bearing.  
 
Kant saw a glimmer of hope in the fact that all human beings are inclined to see 
beauty in nature and, while he knew that the one universal constant in human history 
remains war, Kant maintained that we cannot renounce the mere idea of humans 
being endowed with sensus communis without renouncing our own humanity, and 
that judgements about beauty are the terrain where we automatically make this 
postulate. When one makes an aesthetic judgement such as ‘this rose is beautiful’, 
what is at issue here is making a claim that my feelings are shareable by all. 
According to Kant, what is concerned in an aesthetic judgement is neither the rose’s 
beauty nor the feelings it produces, but the agreement, the community of sense as the 
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anticipated, imagined reality of people to come and share the idea that they are able 
to live in peace with each other precisely because there is no such thing as sensus 
communis. The latter does not exist and therefore must be constructed.  
 
For Kant, pure aesthetic judgements are never about art, but about nature, and some 
theorists contend that art today no longer needs aesthetics, because contemporary art 
is no longer concerned with the representation of nature. However, while the ethical 
dimension of aesthetic judgements corresponding to nature has become irrelevant, it 
was regained by being transferred to the realm of art. The pairing of art and 
aesthetics has become a primary model for aesthetic theory, and this is where the 
problem appears to lie. While the subject of aesthetics is not necessarily art, the 
latter must be about aesthetics, since it involves the judgment of what is beautiful. 
Hence, today’s aesthetics cannot really ‘triumph over its own object’ as Michaud 
argues; art is not its object - aesthetics are the object of art, of what is beautiful.  
 
What Michaud perceives as ‘the end of autonomy of art’ and as aesthetics ‘cutting 
lose from the referential sequence of which it was a part’ so that ‘the image is ‘free’ 
to be harnessed in any direction’, could be considered in a different light, depending 
on our understanding on aesthetics and its connection to artistic practices. Perhaps 
what has ended is not art’s autonomy, which it never had, but the exclusive 
interchangeability of art and aesthetics. Michaud’s considerations invite us to rethink 
this relationship and to ask: do we have to choose between art and aesthetics? What 
is aesthetics and how the beautiful is decided?  
 
Kant teaches us that we have to attach a value to the word ‘art’ other than an 
economic or political one – to make an aesthetic judgement, to draw a line between 
the things we deem worthy of the name of beauty. However, can these judgments 
still be made or shall we abandon the idea of the beautiful and celebrate art without 
aesthetics? Can stories still be told given that there is so much ‘gossip’?  
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Many think that art today no longer needs aesthetics because contemporary art is no 
longer concerned with representations, but with direct interaction with reality. When 
the art world seems totally privatised by the market and the spectacle is everywhere, 
many think that we can no longer speak of disinterested contemplation but rather, as 
distinguished theoretician Boris Groys suggests, of self-design, of self-positioning in 
the aesthetic field. We must, Groys contends, ‘design ourselves,’ and this is the only 
way out of the postmodernist malaise and out of aesthetical – ‘beautiful and 
impressive’ – spaces of power.  
 
Art Without Aesthetics?   
 
What Michaud describes as ‘aesthetics without art’, Boris Groys envisages as a 
progressive ‘art atheism’, where the true autonomy of art can only be guaranteed by 
the absence of aesthetic judgments. In his recent book Art Power, Boris Groys 
examines modern and contemporary art according to its political or, as Groys 
describes it, ‘ideological’ function. From the outset, Groys makes a rough division 
of modern art as a commodity created under market conditions, and art as a tool of 
political propaganda, which he exclusively connects with art produced under 
totalitarian regimes such as the Soviet Union and Nazi Germany. Groys writes, ‘By 
contrast [to the art under the market conditions], the power of an ideology is 
ultimately the power of a vision. And this means that by serving any political or 
religious ideology an artist ultimately serves art.’255 Dwelling on Futurism as the 
aesthetics of Fascism or Russian avant-garde as the Stalinist aesthetics256, Groys 
connects the notion of aesthetics exclusively with the project of aesthetisation of the 
political, which inevitably transforms ‘the mausoleum into museum’257 and vice 
versa. He states,  
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‘For the functioning of the art system is based on certain aesthetic value 
judgements, on certain criteria of choice, rules of inclusion and exclusion, and the 
like. All these value judgements, criteria, and rules are, of course, not autonomous. 
Rather, they reflect the dominant social conventions and power structures. We can 
safely say: there is no such thing as a purely aesthetic, art-immanent, autonomous 
value system that could regulate the art world in its entirety.’258  
 
Aesthetics, to this extent, are understood here as a power of vision or 
aesthetical power that cannot rise beyond a particular ideology. Groys continues, ‘In 
the best case art could be used merely for designing, for aestheticizing the already 
existent oppositional, emancipatory political movements – that is, it could be at best 
merely a supplement to politics. This seems to me to be the crucial question: does art 
hold any power on its own, or it is only able to decorate external powers – whether 
these powers of oppression or liberation?’259  
 
Having being challenged with two, according to Groys, possible scenarios of either 
aesthetisation of the social, where aesthetic norms are generated by the market or 
aesthetisation of the political, where aesthetic judgements merely reflect the existing 
hegemony, Groys suggests that the only strategy that can guarantee the total 
autonomy of art is the absence of any immanent, purely aesthetic judgements. Groys 
writes, ‘The territory of art is organised around the lack or, rather, the rejection of 
any aesthetic judgement. Thus the autonomy of art implies not an autonomous 
hierarchy of taste – but abolishing every such hierarchy and establishing the regime 
of equal aesthetic rights for all artworks’.260 This regime means the presupposition 
that all visual forms and media on the aesthetic level are equal and there is no 
aesthetical censorship or aesthetical values that could lead to a statement such as 
‘this is art’. Today, according to Groys, art functions in the gap between the ‘formal 
equality of all images’ while, in fact, there is a de facto inequality caused by the 
contemporary mass media producing far more effective and extensive images than 
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the art system. Groys writes, ‘We are constantly fed images… of all kinds, at a level 
of production with which the artist…cannot compete’.261 Therefore, Groys contends, 
it is essential to support the museums and art institutions so that mass media images 
can be critically compared to artistic visions, pointing out that contemporary 
aesthetic taste is not the only one and that there is a fundamental aesthetic equality 
of all images. Groys writes, ‘By criticising the socially, culturally, politically or 
economically imposed hierarchies of values, art affirms aesthetic equality as a 
guarantee of its true autonomy’.262  
 
While it is vital to keep museums to resist the commercially minded flow of images, 
it seems that artistic critique can do better than just sustaining the balance between 
all images. The problem here is that Groy’s understanding of equality is rather 
passive. For him, equality is about recognition. Politics and art are connected, 
according to Groys, in the aspect of struggling to be accepted as socially legitimate. 
Rather than questioning the whole system of social legitimacy and creating your 
own way of looking at things, artistic practices, in terms of their aesthetical values, 
should strive to be equally accepted – to demonstrate, in other words, that no 
particular image, whether it is a masterpiece as ‘the ultimate visualization of the 
abstract ideas of truth and beauty’ or contemporary provocation and authentic mass 
media visual range, in fact, can pretend to have a stronger impact or greater 
influence – no particular image can stand on its own right. Having achieved such a 
balance, for Groys, the art system would then project aesthetic equality in a political 
way, revealing the equality of all subject matters or indifference regarding models of 
expression or looking at something. First, the political equality that Groys has in 
mind rather resembles an idea of democracy as a system of indifference where one 
vote is equal to another. Secondly, the equality of aesthetics in the way it destroys 
the hierarchical system of art does not directly correspond with the idea of political 
equality, which also cannot be understood as a general level; are politics based on 
equality in the sense that people attempt to find a middle ground, a general human 
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predisposition for doing politics? Equality, art or politics can exist separately; there 
is no necessary connection between them.  
 
While we will return to the subject of equality in terms of its implications for 
aesthetics when we consider Jacques Rancière’s view of aesthetics and its 
connection to politics, what could be said is that the proposed ‘regime of equal 
aesthetic rights’ seems to manifest a passive, indifferent model, reducing both 
equality and aesthetics to some normative frames, ideas of exchange or hierarchical 
systems. The museum can stand in opposition to the images produced by the global 
media, to produce its own pattern of subjectivisation and not, as Groys suggests, to 
manifest indifference to all visual forms.  
 
Considering Groys’ conceptualisation of ‘equal aesthetic rights’, it seems that his 
emphasis on equality stems from his negative understanding of aesthetics as 
superficial values imposed by economical or political regimes – it is always ‘the 
effect of pressure exercised by external forces and powers’.263 Aesthetics, for Groys, 
are about censorship and authority; they stand in the way of the emancipatory 
‘struggle for inclusion’ reflecting on ‘social, political or economical inequalities’. 264 
What such an understanding of aesthetics leads to is that to realise ‘art’s power on its 
own’, the art system should aim to dissolve power relations, as they are represented 
in the factual inequality of all images. In other words, we should abandon our 
understanding of art as an aesthetical regime, as the dictatorship of taste and 
judgement and, instead, look at it as the system that is responsible for maintaining 
equality.  
 
‘Obligation to Self-Design’  
 
Such a proposition does not seek to dismantle aesthetics in general, but only certain 
value judgments associated with artistic practices. Aesthetics have already, 
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according to Groys, become a matter of self-design in the aesthetic field – we no 
longer delegate our aesthetic decisions to others, but make them ourselves and thus 
we make ourselves. In his recent publication The Obligation to Self-Design, Groys 
argues that ‘design took on an ethical dimension it had not had previously. In design, 
ethics become aesthetics; it become form’.265 Considering the common 
understanding of design interpreted as an epiphany of the society of the spectacle, 
Groys contends that ‘the ultimate form of design is, however, the design of the 
subject’.266 With the disappearance of the idea of God, the site of the design of the 
soul gas shifted to the human body. While in the past the body was considered to be 
the prison of the soul, now the latter is the ‘clothing’ of the body, its aesthetic 
appearance. This aesthetical design ultimately manifests the subject’s political and 
social views. Groys writes, ‘By designing one’s self and one’s environment in a 
certain way, one declares one’s faith in certain values, attitudes, programs and 
ideologies’. Modern design, Groys claims, has transformed the whole of social space 
into an art space, in which individuals are at the same time artists and works of art. 
For example, Groys argues, the current debate over headscarves manifests the 
political nature of design. If Prada or any other brands were to design headscarves, 
distinguishing between the latter as a political symbol and fashion would be 
impossible. Under the regime of modern design, it is the visual positioning of 
politicians that constitutes their politics. Hence, Groys writes, ‘the public is by no 
means wrong to judge its politicians according to their appearance…to their 
aesthetic creed, and not according to the content they support’.267 When design has 
become total, we can longer speak of Kantian ‘disinterested contemplation’, an 
aesthetical contemplation superior to a practical attitude, but of self-positioning in 
the aesthetic field. Groys quotes Beuys’ iconic statement that everyone has the right 
to be an artist and concludes that today this right becomes an obligation: the 
obligation to design ourselves as ‘an aesthetic presentation as ethical subject’.  
 
                                                




Hence, Groys’ thinking navigates out of the aesthetical – ‘beautiful and impressive’ 
spaces of power’ as he puts it. When the art system no longer represents aesthetical 
values but equalises all values, Groys argues, people no longer need to look at the 
‘master pieces’; instead, they will become the latter themselves. Following this 
proposed liberation of art from the obligation to produce better images than the rest 
of the world, people then are obliged to ‘design themselves’. Design, as a synthesis 
of ethics and aesthetics, then will save us from all inequalities – aesthetical and 
political. To be fair to Groys, his thinking corresponds to the description of how 
things are today rather than reflecting on some kind of wishful or utopian 
trajectories. It is not that Groys is against critical aesthetics, but because aesthetics in 
general have acquired a ‘bad name’, being associated with the various political 
regimes, Groys prefers to think instead of ‘equal aesthetic rights’ as if there was a 
straightforward connection between art and politics. However, there is never a clear-
cut or static connection, but a complex articulation between different discourses. 
Neither art nor politics can achieve an ultimate equality. Ignoring the continuous and 
unavoidable interpretations between the processes of inclusion and exclusion leads 
Groys to reject the possibility of any critical aesthetics today. However, this thinking 
only insists that there is a direct connection between politics and aesthetics. Any 
critical gestures and heroic revolutionary moments are equally incapable of 
exorcising the forces of institutionalisation and even banalisation. Sooner or later, a 
co-optation of a radical act occurs, and transformative orientation then needs to be 
re-directed, as the frontiers of antagonism have been displaced to a new position. 
Any struggle can only be impure, ongoing and unpredictable. In this way, aesthetical 
judgements are also impure – they reflect ongoing and conflicting interpretations of 
what art is about. There is no ‘truly political art’ – all art participates in supporting 
or questioning any given hegemonic order, so it has its own politics. There is the 






Rancière’s Aesthetical Cut  
 
In contrast with the two previously outlined views, Jacques Rancière suggests that 
the current predicament – described by Michaud as ‘an aesthetic vapour’ where 
‘advertising is more effective than art’ and by Groys, who proposes ‘self-design’, 
‘an aesthetical presentation as ethical subject’ as the way to avoid the tyranny of 
aesthetical judgements, which he exclusively connects with the ‘power of vision’ or 
ideological power – is, in fact, a false dilemma. It is impossible for artistic practices 
not to be political. It is also unproductive to condemn the market – ‘you need money 
to do art’, says Rancière. Rather, Rancière argues that what is needed is a shift in the 
approach to aesthetics, the one that aims to uncouple its relation to politics and 
economics. There are ‘…no fatal mechanisms transforming reality into image’, no 
‘lost community to be restored,’ but ‘simply scenes of dissensus’268 – an 
understanding of aesthetics that reorganises the sensible and that proposes neither 
the existence of ‘a reality concealed behind apparatuses’ or market nor a ‘single 
regime of presentation and interpretation,’ but rather a sensible one that aims to open 
every situation ‘from the inside, reconfigured in a different regime of perception and 
signification’.269 Aesthetical experience for Rancière is the experience of a break, a 
disconnection from one sensory world to another, which ‘defines different capacities 
and incapacities, different forms of tolerance and intolerance’.270  
 
There is, Rancière insists, apart from all other figures of authority, an authority of 
the image. This authority cracks ‘the unity of the given and the obviousness of the 
visible’.271 Thus, a different understanding of aesthetics leads to a different 
understanding of emancipation, where the latter does not imply grasping a total 
process of subjection or denying it, but rather the capacity of anyone to be involved 
in scenes of dissensus.  
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In his The Politics of Aesthetics, Jacques Rancière rethinks the relationship between 
art and politics outside the models established by the Marxist tradition and the 
Frankfurt School. Reclaiming aesthetics from the narrow confines to which it is 
often reduced, Rancière reveals its intrinsic link to politics by analysing what they 
both have in common: the delimitation of the visible and the invisible, the thinkable 
and the unthinkable, the possible and impossible. According to Rancière, art is not 
political, by virtue of the fact that it communicates and fulfils the social and political 
into issues. It is not political enough to shape the invisible forms to visibility. Art 
should not occupy the space left by politics; instead art should ‘reshape it, at the risk 
of testing the limits of its own politics’.272 In fact, there is a ‘politics of the 
aesthetics’, Rancière says. 
 
He states, in contrast with Groys, that ‘Aesthetics should not be understood as the 
perverse commandeering of politics by a will to art, by a consideration of the people 
qua work of art…[they] can be understood in a Kantian sense – re-examined perhaps 
by Foucault – as the system of a priori forms determining what presents itself to 
sense experience. It is a delimitation of spaces and times, of the visible and the 
invisible, of speech and noise’. 273 Rancière speaks of aesthetics in two ways: in its 
broad sense, he refers to it as a kind of order, a regime, which focuses on le partage 
du sensible, variously translated as the distribution, partition, division or sharing of 
the sensible that reveals the contingency of the entire perceptual and conceptual 
order in which such arrangements are embedded, determining a mode of articulation 
between forms of action, production, perception and thought. He states,  
 
‘I call the distribution of the sensible the system of self-evident facts of sense 
perception that simultaneously discloses the existence of something in common…a 
distribution of the sensible therefore establishes at one and the same time something 
common that is shared and exclusive parts’.274  
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Following Kant, for Rancière, a sensus communis is a community of sense. 
The idea of the beautiful for Kant implies the glimpse of hope that at least all human 
beings agree that nature is beautiful. This human and ethical significance of aesthetic 
judgments pertaining to nature has been almost exclusively transferred to the domain 
of art. However, for Rancière, an aesthetic revolution happened long ago, such that 
the discord between matter and that to which is opposed, between the sensible and 
the thought, imagination and the understanding, is a rupture always already at the 
heart of aesthetic experience, including that of the beautiful, and not just in the 
experience of the sublime. Any agreement between form and matter, between 
understanding and imagination, is inherently a disagreement; consensus is a shared 
dissensus.  
 
While aesthetical judgements are not automatically about art, when it comes to 
artistic practices, they are aesthetic judgements that create forms of visibility that 
disclose artistic practices, the place they occupy, what they ‘do’ or ‘make’ from the 
standpoint of what is common to the community. Here Rancière begins to reflect on 
aesthetics as ‘a specific regime for identifying and reflecting on the arts: a mode of 
articulation between ways of doing and making, their corresponding forms of 
visibility…’275  
 
According to Rancière, aesthetics is not a reference term for art as a whole, but 
rather for a particular regime of artistic practice, a regime in which ‘the field of 
experience, severed from its traditional reference points, is therefore open for new 
restructuring through the ‘free play’ of aestheticization’.276 This free play is one that 
reveals the contingency of a particular partition of the sensible by constructing 
another one, based not upon the hierarchy of the current partition, but upon certain 
‘equalities;’ for example, for the equal aesthetic worthiness of all subjects, activities, 
and objects. For example, one of Rancière’s favourite examples is the subject of 
Madame Bovary, where the adultery of a bourgeois woman is considered as 
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aesthetically worthy of treatment as the exploits of a heroic character. An aesthetic 
practice, then, like politics, is a dissensus from a given partition of the sensible. 
Rancière states, ‘Art and politics each define a form of dissensus, a dissensual re-
configuration of the common experience of the sensible’.277 Thus, aesthetics 
challenge a particular partition of the sensible, but in a different way to politics.  
 
The difference between politics and aesthetics lies in the character of the dissensual 
movements they produce. While the aesthetic movement of politics, according to 
Rancière, consists of the creation of a ‘we’ that disrupts the distribution of social 
parts, the political character of aesthetics, by contrast, ‘does not give a collective 
voice to the anonymous. Instead, it re-frames the world of common experience as 
the world of a shared impersonal experience. In this way, it aids to help create the 
fabric of a common experience in which new modes of constructing common objects 
and new possibilities of subjective enunciation may be developed’.278 
 
The sensible is partitioned into various regimes and therefore delimits forms of 
inclusion and exclusion in a community. Immediate aesthetic practices (aesthetics in 
the sense of ‘art’) both establish and contest the ways in which a given society 
distributes the ‘conditions of possibility’ for what can and what cannot be sensed, 
felt and spoken about. However, this ‘distribution of the sensible’ is only a 
condition, a way in which the politics of art work, not the goal or politics in itself 
and for itself. Contrary to Boris Groys, Rancière introduces an interesting reversal:  
 
‘…the arts only ever lend to projects of domination or emancipation what they are 
able to lend to them […] what they have in common with them: bodily positions and 
movements, functions of speech, the parceling out of the visible and the invisible’.279  
 
Aesthetic politics, for Rancière, always ‘defines itself by a certain recasting 
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of the distribution of the sensible, a reconfiguration of the given perceptual forms’.280 
 
This particular regime of artistic practices that Rancière refers to distributes what is 
sensible in ways different to the social realm from which they draw their material, a 
sensibility at odds with the social and yet common to all. It is this particular partition 
of the sensible, as Rancière puts it, that makes of art the primary way in which it is 
possible to intervene in the material world.  
 
What defines the aesthetic, for Rancière, is that everything is material. ‘Aesthetic 
revolution’ for Rancière implies ‘the idea that everything is material for art, so that 
art is no longer governed by its subject, by what it speaks of: art can show and speak 
of everything in the same manner’281. Rancière points out that the specific sphere of 
aesthetic experience has emerged when the boundary separating art’s objects from 
those of other experiences was blurred, making art’s objects available to everyone 
equally – what Rancière calls, borrowing from Schiller, an ‘equality of indifference’. 
Only when “sensible” has become foreign to itself, and made coincident with a 
‘power of thought outside itself’, can the social or the political be thought. What 
Rancière calls the fictionalising of the real, its acting out social space, the place 
where beings are ‘as if’ together, will be a common place safeguarded as the space 
of art, where its material intervention will begin as a displacement foreign from the 
matter to which it addresses itself everywhere and all the time. The political partition 
is made apparent by the materiality of art, which ‘foreign’ to itself, exceeds or falls 
short of the social matter from which it originates itself. What is visible is 
aesthetical, not social. At the same time, the aesthetic regime, according to Rancière, 
welcomes any material whatsoever into the field of art. Thus, in aesthetics, there is 
no particular border that separates art from life, but art is not the same thing as life 
either, and this is its paradox.  
 
‘Being Together Apart’  
                                                




In Rancière’s view, the aesthetical regime is constituted by paradoxes, and the 
project of art in this regime is to navigate these paradoxes without reducing one side 
of the paradox to the other. In his latest book The Emancipated Spectator, Rancière 
states from the outset that ‘Many contemporary artists no longer set out to create 
works of art. Instead, they want to get out of the museum and induce alterations in 
the space of every-day life, generating new forms of relations’.282 The challenge 
confronting contemporary artists, then, is how to keep alive the dissensus of art 
without simply reducing it to the reality from which it dissents or claiming that 
reality is nothing other than art.  
 
One of The Emancipated Spectator’s chapters, ‘Aesthetic Separation, Aesthetic 
Community’ begins with a reflection on a line ‘Apart, we are together’ from ‘The 
White Water Lily’ poem by Mallarme. The paradox of the poet’s decision to 
preserve the mystery of the lady and the secret of their ‘being together’ inviolate, by 
silently leaving without being seen, invites Rancière to reflect on the challenges of 
contemporary art’s self-image and the possibility of creating a ‘new political 
people’. Living in times, Rancière notes, when artists do not care for water lilies, it 
is precisely here that the issue of being together apart acquires a new dimension. 
Considering the French artistic collective Urban Encampment’s project ‘I and Us’, 
which is dedicated to the construction of a place of solitude, an ‘aesthetic place’, 
Rancière says, there is something in common between Mallarme’s poem and the 
contemporary committed art that attempts to create new forms of community in 
‘bad’ Parisian suburbs. The construction of ‘empty places’ seems to be equally 
required in the poor suburbs as it is in the case of the poet’s taste for loneliness. 
What these cases have in common, Rancière argues, is that the connection between 
the solitude of the artwork and community is a matter of ‘transformed sensation’. 
Rancière explains, ‘What the artist does is to weave together a new sensory fabric by 
wresting percepts and affects from the perceptions and affections that make up the 
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fabric of ordinary experience’.283 The construction of the solitary place aims to 
create new forms of community. Rancière states, ‘The paradoxical relationship 
between the apart’ and the ‘together’ is also a paradoxical relation between the 
present and the future. The artwork is the people to come and it is the monument of 
its expectation, the monument of its absence. The artistic ‘dissensual community’ 
has a double body: it is a combination of means for producing an effect out of itself: 
creating a new community between human beings, a new political people… To the 
extent that it is a dissensual community, an aesthetic community is a community 
structured by disconnection’.284  
 
Understanding what is at issue in this disconnection, Rancière argues, is vital to 
interpreting what ‘aesthetics’ and the ‘politics of aesthetics’ imply. Dwelling on the 
canonical interpretations of aesthetics in terms of ‘being together apart’ – from the 
modernist view, which connects the work of art’s ‘being apart’ with the ‘being 
together’ of a future community to the postmodernist position, which makes ‘being 
apart’ a mere illusion aimed at rejecting the real laws of humans being together – 
Rancière contends that none of these interpretations identifies what aesthetic 
disconnection or break means.  Aesthetic break for Rancière means a shift from a 
given sensible world, from a ‘sensation’ that is common to a different ‘sensation’ 
that occurs under the condition of an original effect, which suspends any direct 
relationship between cause and effect. The aesthetic effect initially is an effect of 
dis-identification. Rancière writes, ‘What occurs are processes of dissociation: a 
break in a relationship between sense and sense – between what is seen and what is 
thought, what is thought and what is felt’.285 Aesthetic break is not a break with the 
regime of representation, but the rupture of the harmony that ensures correspondence 
between the texture of the work and its efficacy. Rancière states, ‘‘Aesthetic 
efficacy’ means a paradoxical kind of efficacy that is produced by the very rupturing 
of any determinate link between cause and effect’.286 Such rupture, Rancière argues, 
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could be witnessed, for example, in the Greek masterpiece Belvedere Torso. Why, 
asks Rancière, is the body of a crippled and beheaded statue with no face to express 
any feelings, no arms or legs to command any action, understood as the supreme 
expression of liberty and beauty? It is because the very paradigm of classical beauty 
encapsulates the collapse of the logic of representation. Beauty has nothing to 
express. The whole logic of this regime is overturned by the powers of disconnection 
of the statue. While it starts with the very idea of perfection, and this is what Kant 
conceptualised as ‘the beautiful’ – an object of universal appreciation ‘apart from 
any concept’ – it then loses its destination, substituting for ‘…the work that realizes 
the law of the medium or the law of pure sensation’.287 Hence, Rancière states, ‘The 
Torso may have been mutilated for entirely incidental reasons. But what is not 
incidental, what marks a historical watershed, is the identification between the 
product of that mutilation and the perfection of art’.288 What characterises the 
aesthetic regime of art is not the Deleuzian ‘pure sensation’ or the modernist idea of 
‘truth to the medium,’ but the set of transformations that creates the work of art the 
‘as if’ it had a different texture to the sensations of everyday experience, reinventing 
its shape. Rancière explains, ‘The aesthetic effect is in fact a relationship between 
two ‘separations’. The aesthetic sensorium is the sensorium marked by that loss of 
destination’.289 What is lost is one sensible world but what is gained is the 
suspension of any direct relationship between cause and effect, which provokes a 
rapture in the ways of seeing and examining the causes of this sensory oddity. This 
is where, according to Rancière, ‘‘as if” of aesthetic experience meets the “as if” in 
the realm of social emancipation.’  
 
Rancière writes,  
 
‘Aesthetic experience has a political effect to the extent that the loss of destination it 
presupposes disrupts the way in which bodies fit their functions and destinations. 
What it produces is not rhetorical persuasion about what must be done. Nor is it the 
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framing of a collective body. It is a multiplication of connections and disconnections 
that reframe the relation between bodies, the world they live in and the way in 
which they are “equipped” to adapt to it. It is a multiplicity of folds and gaps in the 
fabric of common experience that change the cartography of the perceptible, the 
thinkable and the feasible’.290  
 
This aesthetic experience, at the core of which is the aesthetic break, does not create 
a ‘private paradise;’ rather, it shows that such a thing is impossible, since the works 
are disconnected from any specific community, destination: there is no boundary 
separating the elements of art from those of everyday life. That is why the aesthetic 
effect cannot identify with the happy dream of a community united by the 
contemplation of eternal beauty but, rather, with the tension between the ‘being 
apart’ of the artwork and the ‘being together’ of a new community. This tension, this 
specific mediation is what Rancière envisages at the core of the critical model of 
artistic practices. Unfortunately, he argues, many contemporary artists think that no 
mediation is needed, that the work could be the direct presentation of a different 
form of community and new social bonds. They still believe in the ‘critique of the 
spectacle’ and the idea that art should provide us with much more than the latter, that 
it is supposed to ‘unite people’, that ‘aesthetic disconnection’ should be overcome. 
For instance, Rancière considers the works of a Cuban artist, Rene Francisco, as a 
typical example of the current tendency to replace critical mediation with direct 
anticipation of ‘being together’ in ‘being apart’. Exploring the poor suburbs of 
Havana, Francisco selected an old woman to refurbish her home. His final work 
shows a cloth screen printed with the image of the women, hung in such a way that it 
appears to be looking at the ‘real’ screen of the monitor where the video showed the 
group of artists working as plumbers and painters in the woman’s home. Speaking 
about many ‘extra-artistic’ outcomes, activities and strategies of contemporary art, 
which aim at directly framing new senses of and in community, Rancière suggests 
that the constant anticipating of the effect, when art is practiced in the place of some 
other social cause, manifest a world where new forms of domination make equality 
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Having mentioned equality, it is important to clarify how Rancière understands 
equality. Contrary to Groys, for Rancière equality is not political in itself, and only 
can generate politics when it is present in the specific form of a particular case of 
dissensus. Rancière writes, ‘I do not set down equality as a kind of transcendental 
governing every sphere of activity, and thus art in particular.’291 While the aesthetic 
regime of art implements certain equality as negation of the hierarchical system of 
the fine arts, this equality is not equivalent to political equality. There is an equality 
of ‘the communicated’, of all subject matters, but this is not what Rancière holds as 
equality of ‘communicators’ and their capacities for being involved in the 
organisation of the sensible. Rancière states, ‘It is the capacity of anonymous people, 
the capacity that makes everyone equal to everyone else’. 292  
 
According to Groys’ understanding, equality corresponds to the egalitarian system 
of indifference between all images – that is to say, what is at issue here is the 
‘communicated’. However, for Rancière, the term involves the equal capacities of 
the ‘communicators’. Groys wants artistic practices to resist the mass media claim of 
confronting spectators with different and authentic images; meanwhile, for Rancière 
equality does not concern differences between images, but spectators’ capacities 
‘…exercised by an unpredictable interplay of associations and dissociations’.293 
Rancière does not draw the line between spectators and actors in the way Groys 
does. Rancière says, ‘…viewing is also an action that confirms or transforms this 
distribution of positions. The spectator also acts…observes, selects, compares, 
interprets’.294 Being a spectator is not a passive condition; there is no need to 
transform them into actors: every spectator is already an actor of her or his 
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relationship with the distribution of the sensible. Rancière states,  
 
‘Democratic individuals want equality. But the equality they want is that which 
obtains between the seller and the buyer of a commodity. Consequently, what they 
want is the triumph of the market in all human relations. And the more enamored 
they are of equality, the more passionately they help bring about that triumph’.295  
 
Today there are too many thoughts and images, too many stimuli; and the critique of 
‘consumer society’ took the form of solicitude for people incapable of mastering this 
complexity. ‘In other words’, Rancière writes, ‘the capacity to reinvent lives was 
transformed into an inability to judge situations’.296 It is presumed that there are 
incapacities of people to become aware of their condition hidden behind the images. 
Rancière continues, ‘In effect, the procedures of social critique have as their goal 
treating the incapable: those who do not know how to see, who do not understand 
the meaning of what they see, who do not know how to transform acquired 
knowledge into activist energy’.297 The call to ‘design ourselves’ is also about 
incapacities: to see, to feel, to be a spectator or an artist.  However, for Rancière, 
there are no ‘doctors’ and ‘patients’ to begin with. Instead of starting with equality 
of images and trying to reach for equality of spectators, Rancière invites us to start 
with equality of spectators and equality of ‘dissensus’ as re-distribution of the 
sensible. He states ‘…there was a lot of concern about how we can educate the 
people, slowly, progressively: but that was not the point, the idea of starting from 
inequality to reach quality; it’s impossible because in the very process, you 
ceaselessly recycle practices of inequality. You must not go towards equality, but 
must start from equality. Starting from equality does not presuppose that everyone in 
the world has equal opportunities to learn, to express their capacities. That’s not the 
point. The point is that you have to start from the minimum equality that is given’298 
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– equality of capacities.  
 
What Groys seems to aim at is the establishment of a certain balance of power of 
images, a somewhat ‘harmonious’ relationship between the mass media and art 
institutions, between an occupation and capacity, image and image, sense and sense. 
There is no need, Rancière argues, to ‘transform representation into presence, 
passivity into activity’, to restore the power of some images to an equal footing with 
others. What is involved in aesthetic experiences is ‘linking what one knows with 
what one does not know’299 and the effect of such linking cannot be anticipated. At 
the heart of aesthetics is the break, not a balance. Rancière reminds us that  
 
‘…all forms of art can rework the frame of our perceptions and the dynamism of our 
affects. They can open up new passages towards new forms of political 
subjectivation. But none of them can avoid the aesthetic cut that separates outcomes 
from intentions and precludes any direct path towards an “other side” of words and 
images’.300  
 
What Rancière teaches us is that there is an equal undertaking by artist and audience 
that is involved in the distribution of the sensible and it is the aesthetical cut that 
defines capacities and incapacities, tolerance and intolerance. There is, apart from 
the spectators or actors, another figure of ‘authority’ that challenges the latter – the 
figure of the image, which sometimes poses the problem of the ‘common sense’ to 
which it holds its voice of authority. When the image doubts its voice of authority to 
show and reveal, it takes us from what is intolerable to the intolerability of the 
image. Such an image enables the ‘aesthetic cut’ to produce different forms of 
common sense, new configurations of what can be seen, said and thought. The 
intolerable image constructs a new “sensible” that resists the visible, and this tension 
lies at the heart of critical aesthetics.  
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Critical Aesthetics – Intolerability of the Image 
 
The image is not a mere reproduction of the sensible but a ‘set of relations between 
the visible and invisible, the visible and speech, the said and the unsaid’.301 
Therefore an image never acts on its own but ‘belongs to a system of visibility’ that 
polices a connection between the verbal and the visual. This verbal, this voice is not 
a manifestation of the invisible but is itself involved in a process of ‘imagining’. 
Rancière states, ‘It is the voice of a body that transforms one sensible event into 
another, by striving to make us ‘see’ what it has seen, to make us see what it tells 
us’.302 This relationship might try to eliminate from it anything that exceeds the 
illustration of its meaning: ‘The power of the voice opposed to images must be 
expressed in images. The refusal to speak, and the obedience to the voice that 
commands, must therefore be made visible’.303  
 
Asking what makes an image intolerable, Rancière is speaking of images of action, 
which show us that we are spectators, making us guilty of witnessing the images, for 
example, of dead children and not doing anything about it. The spectator views the 
images of pain rather than acting against the powers responsible for it. ‘It is here’, 
argues Rancière, ‘that the voice which formulates the illusion of guilt assumes its 
true importance’.304 This voice tells us that we will always remain spectators and that 
the only way to respond to evil is to act. Rancière writes, ‘The virtue of activity, 
counter-posed to the evil of the image, is thus absorbed by the authority of the 
sovereign voice that stigmatizes the false existence which it knows us to be 
condemned to wallow in’.305 This intolerable image cannot criticise its subject, since, 
according to Rancière, it belongs to the same regime of visibility. Meanwhile, the 
real content of the critique of the image could be the ‘assertion of the authority of the 
voice’ and this is where the shift from the intolerable to the ‘intolerability of the 
image’ occurs. When it happens, ‘it counter-poses the authority of the voice that 
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alternatively renders one silent and makes one speak. The power of the voice 
opposed to images must be expressed in images’.306 This image would not be in tune 
with the functioning system. Instead of illustrating the regime of visibility, it would 
construct a different system altogether. Rancière explains, ‘The problem is not 
counter-posing words to visible images. It is overturning the dominant logic that 
makes the visual the lot of multitudes and the verbal [the voice] the privilege of a 
few’.307 
 
The images of art are not ‘truths’ but fictions that pose the problem of the common 
sense to which they hold a voice of authority. Such a transformation from the 
intolerable in the image to its intolerability is what Rancière places at the heart of the 
tensions of what he understands as critical aesthetics.   
 
Contrary to Groys’ notion of ‘recognition’, where the aim is to be accepted, to be 
recognised as ‘art’ by removing aesthetical judgments, Rancière holds critical 
aesthetics as the act of non-recognition, questioning to whom the given sensible 
images belong, even though they are indented to be critical of the reality they 
represent. With his idea of ‘equal aesthetic rights’, Groys wants everybody to be 
capable of producing art, for a system to be inclusive of all images, while Rancière’s 
intolerability of the image is about constructing a relation between the verbal and the 
visual, between the system and images in the way that disrupts the regime of that 
connection. What is at issue here is not to include more images in a common 
sensible space, but to make an image speak for itself. What the politics of aesthetics 
resists is the anticipation of its effect, and therefore it cannot be part of the system.  
 
Prigov: Power of the Gaze Destroys the Gaze of the Power 
 
This relation between the voice and image, verbal and visual is what Russian artist 
and critic Dmitry Prigov [1940-2007] places in the centre of his aesthetical 
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investigation. As Russian art historian Vitaly Patsyukov notices, ‘Prigov turned 
words into objects’.308  According to Prigov, the problem today is not to get rid of 
aesthetics, but to make them speak. ‘There is this matter of aesthetics’, says Prigov, 
and ‘it does not necessarily deal with works of art or with establishing legitimacy of 
judgments concerning works of art, of what is aesthetically valid at a given time and 
place. This matter concerns more profound problems of form of relations with the 
given sensible world, of human behavior of ugly and beautiful, aesthetical or 
artistic’.309 The common ground shared by the aesthetical regime and the ethical one 
is the issue of order, of the visible configuration of the given. This configuration is 
about already verbalised images, images that reflect on words, on voices that call 
images to materialise their presence. However, the visible phenomena in aesthetics 
are related to an invisible dimension of meaning, of power, to the process of 
unsettling the sense of a given meaning, and not about refining it.  
 
For Prigov, although both ethics and aesthetics express order, ethics concern 
principles that can be discussed separately from the particular cases, while aesthetics 
does not.  Aesthetical order does not have external, a priori principles; it develops 
from the disordered materials. Everything is material and that is why aesthetics can 
interfere with the sensible world given in structured relations between worlds and 
images, visual and invisible. Aesthetics for Prigov is an investigation of one’s 
conditions of perception and understanding, which goes further than any other 
investigations. Aesthetics is like an order without laws, which can challenge the laws 
– the particular relation between what is said and shown and how and what is not 
said and not shown and how.  
 
Prigov says,  
 
‘And art can do with aesthetics what ethics cannot do to politics. Politics cannot go 
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very far, otherwise there would no society – we need rules and norms. Aesthetical 
investigation, however, can go further without threatening society with collapse. 
Aesthetics needs ethics because it needs rules to break; meanwhile, it does not 
create new rules, but rather shows that all rules are flawed, that there always will be 
something invisible in any regime of visibility’.310  
 
Where aesthetics and social emancipation meet is a broken relation between 
words and objects, between what Prigov calls ‘gaze of power’ and ‘power of 
gaze’,311 and this is the territory of art. According to Prigov, the artist is here not to 
represent ideas of democracy and equality, to show the world what is wrong with it, 
not to help it directly or cure it, but to broaden the limits of aesthetic strategies and 
thus broaden the territory of the sensible so that more relations can be looked at in a 
different regime. Art can transfer established distances and scales of relations into a 
different dimension.  
 
All forms of life for Prigov are aesthetical, but what concerns aesthetical experience 
is the transformation of the spectator who looks at or sees the image into a ‘third 
eye.’ It is not about, paraphrasing Michael Foucault, ‘what we see or what looks at 
us,’312 but what lies in between. This transformation corresponds to what Prigov 
describes as a ‘transformation of the artist’s mythological image’.313 Perhaps the 
most recurrent content in Prigov’s works is the eye. He places this eye at the centre 
of the aesthetic faculty, since the latter does not identify with the body it belongs to, 
but with the object of its contemplation. Prigov takes an eye, symbolically 
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interpreted as the ‘eye of power’, what Orwell refers as ‘the big brother,’ and 
broadens the concept of the eye to the concept of the gaze. It is no longer the tool to 
perceive reality or consider the subject constructed under the influence of other 
people’s looks. In Prigov’s works, the eye looks you in the eye and becomes the 
object of vision, coming in and out of the image. Russian artist Ilja Kabakov 
decribes this fluctuation as ‘trio as work of art, author, the viewer – and we can see 
that in the gaze they shimmer, exchanging the roles between themselves’.314 This 
configuration enters into a conflict with the model of looking, which insists on the 
singular logic of the gaze at the particular object of vision. The viewer is subjected 
to the power of the gaze but at the same time the fluctuation of the positions gives 
the viewer power, which disrupts this gaze. The disappearance and appearance of the 
eye becomes constitutive of this ‘third eye’. This is what Prigov termed ‘shimmering 
aesthetics’, which is born of the mutual relation established between the voice of the 
author and the used material.  
 
We will consider Prigov’s works in detail when we discuss his understanding of 
what ‘critical art’ attempts to criticise, but for the time being let us touch upon one 
of Prigov’s works, entitled ‘Third Eye’ (1996-1997), as an image of his 
understanding of how the power of the gaze can destroy the gaze of power. At the 
beginning we see the photographic portrait of a face, which then appears again as an 
enlarged copy and with another pair of eyes on the human face. At this stage, the 
enlarged portrait is returned to a normal two-eyed face. The connection between the 
viewer’s eye and that of the face in the portrait is problematised by positioning 
another set of eyes. Who or what is looking at the viewer: the human, the monster or 
just the eye of the camera? In the image of the directly looking human eye, Prigov 
recreates the notion of the gaze of power, of this straightforward connection, but as a 
result of positioning the eye’s images as the subject of others’ looks, what opens is 
the logic of multiple looks where the power of this gaze counters the gaze of power.  
 
Thus, for Prigov aesthetics not only challenge a particular partition of the sensible, 
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but creates other sensible and senses, which cannot be easily partitioned or 
distributed, something that cannot be included in the gaze of power. It is not just 
about what is already sensible, but what could be sensed. Aesthetics, then, for Prigov 
is the model of interaction with the given with unlimited capacities. Sensible is 
always distributed in a particular way, but aesthetics can point to the limits of this 
distribution. In some way, Prigov uses the aesthetical to lure the viewer into his 
‘aesthetical trap,’ where instead of clarifying and confirming the relationship 
between the visual and the verbal, it exposes its flaws and inconsistencies. This 
‘aesthetical trap’ for Prigov is the space where the gaze of power and the power of 
gaze counter each other, producing a type of subjectivity that is neither purely 
‘political’ nor purely ‘aesthetical’.  
 
The Visual Language of Capitalism  
 
Prigov, akin to Rancière, is critical about the recent attacks on aesthetical values as a 
system of judgements when artistic practices are sought to bring people together or 
propose ‘non-hierarchical’ organisation. Such an impulse, according to Prigov, is not 
dictated by artists’ wishes to contribute to society but because their influence on 
society is waning. In contrast with, for example, the aesthetical system of Stalinism, 
capitalist aestheticisation has very little to do with aesthetics per se. The Soviet 
ideological culture was a culture of texts, manifestos and slogans. Decorated with 
ideological symbols, the insignia of political power and influence, the metropolis of 
Moscow was the center of pompous mass spectacles. This ideology was so strong 
that it did not require art to produce objects in order to convey political meaning. 
Rather, Prigov maintains, it was a matter of staging an action that developed on the 
border between art and life. In other words, politics were not mediated through 
aesthetics, but through the latter politicised.  
 
Today, Prigov argues, the realm of literature has been made redundant. Nobody 
reads; individuals identify with TV programmes and not with quotes from particular 
authors. Following Deleuze and Guattari’s argument presented in Anti-Oedipus that 
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‘Writing has never been capitalism’s thing. Capitalism is profoundly illiterate’315, 
Prigov suggests that capitalism needs something that absorbs the verbal, a plastic 
operation that cannot convey linguistically structured meanings. Because it is 
illiterate, it needs the language, which cannot speak. Therefore, the language of 
capitalism is primarily visual. Capitalism is interested in creating more objects rather 
than mediation. Prigov writes, ‘Capitalism and art correspond because consumers 
today hope to find goods and services on the market that are both of a higher quality 
and more unique’.316 The images are the objects par excellence, since they constantly 
change. The only good idea in contemporary art is a new idea. This striving for 
newness, creating their own contexts (following the model of conceptual art, which 
does not work with texts, but with contexts) in which ideas appear to be new while 
in fact history often shows that these new ideas are not really new, corresponds to 
contemporary capitalism’s self-belief that it is an absolutely new stage in history 
while in fact it is not. These ‘new’ ideas are the ‘new’ perfect commodities, which 
do not look and act like the latter. The visual language is the new language of capital 
because constantly changing images do not speak. Rather than putting social 
relations into words, pausing and reflecting on them, we are no longer required to 
think about them, only to watch. The production of the artist himself is an important 
part of the project of ‘objectification’ where images replace words. ‘What is the 
artist today?’, asks Prigov, and he answers, the ‘Contemporary artist does 
everything, however, the main factor here is the artist himself. The main event in an 
artist’s creative life is his projects. Endless numbers of institutions around visual art 
today are mere structures to legitimize the signature, the essence of artistic spirit of 
his or her model of communicating’. What is the subject of artistic work? Prigov 
writes, ‘There is an enormous distance between material objects, human passions, 
multiplicity of operations, which take place in the virtual zone, which barely retain 
some traces of reality. It is in this area that the most influential artistic events take 
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place’.317  In other words, what is at issue today is not the subject of artistic works, 
but the artist as the object of speech without speaking himself. According to Prigov, 
aesthetics are banalised not because we see too many images, but ‘because images 
are commodities, which do not articulate, therefore, they have different objectives 
from art and they are part of another world, not the one of aesthetics which describes 




Following Rancière and Prigov, we can envisage aesthetics in a different way. While 
the history of aesthetics has often been confined to political regimes or economic 
necessities, there is another ‘authority’ – the one of the ‘image’, which functions 
differently to politics. What we can learn from Rancière and Prigov is that aesthetics 
is not a tool for conveying the ideas, not the value to be assigned, but the 
fundamental disagreement with the possibility of any agreement. Thus aesthetic 
critique is better understood not in terms of a judgement per se, but in terms of how 
these judgements are performed. Aesthetic critique of judgement is the judgement 
enacted aesthetically and the one that challenges the latter itself. For Nietzsche, at 
the core of criticality lies an ability to suspend judgement. For Rancière, this ability 
is what constitutes the aesthetic agreement on the disagreement – the necessary 
limitation, fragmentation and a conceptual impossibility of any universal agreement. 
This aesthetic critique shows, through the praxis of art, how we should judge 
generally. The aesthetic cut runs deeper than any other social fluctuations and 
challenges, since it doubts its voice of authority to show and tell. Exposing it own 
inability to reveal all, it suggests that societal systems and relations are also lacking 
essence.  
 
The central thrust of The Emancipated Spectator is a reassessment of the aesthetical 
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paradox – an unfolding of a difference between the judgment as an effect of 
aesthetical force and on the other hand, as a result of rational and individualistically 
oriented procedures – the aesthetical agency that exists in the absence of any 
credible political narratives to act as a guarantor of ‘political’ meanings. This is 
where art’s power lies – in the fact that through performing how we should judge – a 
renegotiation of subjectivity – there could be a potential renegotiation of a wider 
social order.  
 
For Chantal Mouffe, there is a democratic paradox, the one in which the ethical 
forever interrogates the political. It always questions the logic of 
inclusion/exclusion. This opposition between ‘the political’ and ‘politics’ creates 
antagonistic relations between those who wish to create unity in one way and those 
who want to create it in a different way. This is the opposition between ‘us and 
them’. What is at issue in democratic politics is not to eliminate exclusion, but to 
construct them as an ‘adversary’ rather than the enemy and this is, as Mouffe states, 
‘…the real meaning of liberal-democratic tolerance…’319 There is also an aesthetical 
paradox, where the praxis of aesthetics questions the aesthetical judgment and 
reveals through the ongoing practice of art a conceptual hopelessness of judgment 
per se.  
 
Following Prigov, the territory where these two paradoxes meet is the space for the 
formation of a new subjectivity – the one that is neither purely ‘political’ nor purely 
‘aesthetical’. The aesthetical can interrogate the ethical, which, in turn, questions the 
political in a different way. For instance, Groys’ example with designing 
headscarves in order to erase differences between headscarves being a political 
symbol of oppression and liberating fashion misses the point. The consumer-
motivated command to everyone to wear headscarves does not eliminate 
antagonism, but masks it. Using the relationship of oppression to sell clothes does 
not liberate the excluded, but humiliates them. What is at issue is aesthetically to 
mediate the symbolic power of headscarves in the social or political realm and, by 
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transposing it onto the aesthetic realm, to question it from ‘inside’. Through 
showing, for example, that a headscarf or a burka is beautiful, that something is 
hidden behind its appearance and a given sensibility, might weaken the relationship 
of the image connection to the social structures. What is at issue here is aesthetically 
to mediate, to reveal something that contradicts the image’s own legitimacy and 
grounding. For example, Dmitry Prigov’s painting of a woman’s conversation with 
her burka indicates that a common sensibility of a burka as an oppressive symbol in 
fact exceeds itself. An image then becomes intolerable to itself. In contrast to Groys’ 
invitation to design ourselves as ‘an aesthetic presentation as ethical subject’, critical 
aesthetics demonstrate that this ‘ethical subject’ is impossible and that her or his 
ethics correspond to the regime of questioning in the condition of contingency. 
There is only ethical subjectivity rather than a ‘subject’.  
 
It appears that Groys’ position of an ‘aesthetical subject’ looks for some kind of 
resolution, a guaranteed way of overcoming existing antagonisms. In its intention for 
the masses to design themselves, for everyone to be the artist, this position masks a 
troubling mistrust of the possibility of an intellectual engagement. If we only exhibit 
political symbols as passive art that evokes a maximum popular response, we will 
then have a form of democratic aesthetic presentation or discussion. However, the 
mindless consumption of images and symbols in question do not cause dissensus, 
but only a consensus in the commercial sphere. After all, as democratic as the 
market can be, there are limits to what it can inhabit – whilst Prada can design 
headscarves and, perhaps, even stripy inmate pyjamas in the style of Auschwitz or a 
gas chamber bed, the aesthetical dimension cannot and should not overcome the 
ethical. Groys’ approach appears to champion the view of aesthetics that is beyond 
the discursive, beyond signification, but art is not some kind of elevated space of 
immediacy, as Rancière would argue. Rather, what is at issue is that in the absence 
of any credible political narrative, an artwork presents a condition of possibility 
through a renegotiation of subjectivity, and does not make it something actual in 
human experience.  
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We need political symbols, structures, judgments – the question that is posed 
through an aesthetic critique refers to how we judge in general. In this way, the 
praxis of art could be understood as creating one’s own path not based on aesthetics 
as an ideal, but through aesthetics as a way to make sense of an otherwise senseless 
world. However, what is at issue is to do it in a way that it is not just opposing the 
totalising images of society, but also the totalisation of the sensible. Hence our next 
chapter looks at the way in which Chilean artist Alfredo Jaar practises art as the 
regime of visibility, which reminds us that the present society is always lacking 
something without filling in the ‘gaps’. We will argue that Jaar’s interventions are 
counter-hegemonic in a double sense: first, it engages with nodal moments of power 
and shows that there is never a full image of reality, positive or negative; second, his 
work is centred around the ‘inability to show everything’ in the work of art, thus 
working against the very system to which the image belongs. Unlike Pascal Gielen, 
who is concerned with the preservation of art’s own dynamics, freedom and 
autonomy, for Jaar, the artist always emerges as a political figure, the product and 
the producer of a society. Intervening in both the social and aesthetical realms, Jaar’s 

















Critical Art in the Post-Political Era:  
Self-Preservation or Counter-Hegemonic Intervention? 
 
We will now examine different conceptions of how the political role of artistic 
practices is envisaged in a post-political society. Shall we focus on the preservation 
of art’s autonomy, which, some believe, is the precondition for the possibility of 
social critique or, thinking in terms of the democratic and aesthetical paradoxes, 
shall we accept the lack as critique’s precondition, which the artwork can never 
replace or fully show? 
 
The first position, embodied in the works of sociologist Pascal Gielen and, perhaps, 
the most popular one, follows Paolo Virno’s view that in times of post-Fordism, art 
has dissolved in society like an effervescent tablet in water. Gielen is critical of the 
globalised art scene, which, he postulates, has become a mere production entity for 
the new type of economic exploitation. The Dutch thinker disabuses any possibility 
of art’s meaningful political intervention, but only in preserving its own dynamic 
and autonomy by moving to places of intimacy and slowability. For Gielen, through 
post-Fordism, art lost its autonomy, which, for him is the precondition for the 
possibility of social critique. The second position, represented by Alfredo Jaar, 
contends that artistic intervention is especially crucial at times when images are 
generally anaesthetised through their constant use by the post-Fordist economic 
engine and harnessed to maintain the grasp of neoliberalism. Jaar does not belive 
that the political potentials of art should be considered through the prism of post-
Fordism; rather he connects them with the exposure to the flawed nature of any 
societal systems. Akin to Jacques Rancière’s notion of ‘the intolerability of the 
image’, which he places at the heart of the tensions affecting political art, and 
Chantal Mouffe’s argument that democratic politics require ‘…coming to terms with 
the lack of a final ground and the undecidability which pervades every order…’320, 
                                                
320 Mouffe, Chantal, ‘Artistic Activism and Agonistic Spaces’, Art & Research, Volume 1, No.2 
Summer 2007, http://www.artandresearch.org.uk/v1n2/mouffe.html  
 172 
Jaar envisages critical art as the regime of visibility, which reminds us that the 
present society, as any other social order, is always lacking something. There is 
always something missing, hidden or unsaid, and while the artist cannot fulfil these 
gaps, he certainly can show that they exist. 
 
Jaar’s position appears to consolidate around artists’ ‘inability to show everything’, 
since power is blind to itself and artistic practice can only expose the lacking 
elements on which the ‘fullness’ of society is based and also expose the weakness of 
the artwork as an ‘individual’ construction. For Jaar, the status of the ‘individual art 
work’ is not the expression of a circumscribed meaning, but a subject-formation 
instrument. The artist here emerges as a political figure, the product and the 
producer of a society.   
 
‘Murmuring of the Artistic Multitude’  
 
In The Murmuring of the Artistic Multitude, Pascal Gielen presents the gloomy 
picture of the contemporary art world, which cannot escape the new machinery of 
post-Fordism, the monster of its own creation. Following Hardt’s and Negri’s claim 
that immaterial labour began to constitute the hegemony for all forms of production, 
Gielen draws a parallel between artistic practices and immaterial labour. For him, 
examples such as Marcel Duchamp manifest the fact that modern art served as a 
social laboratory for immaterial labour and thus for post-Fordism. Today, Gielen 
states, ‘…the social logic of the artistic world has reached the heart of society’.321  
 
Gielen argues that, despite the fact that around 80% of artistic visual works are 
material objects and museums do have rigid working hours, specialisation and 
structure, what is important is the immaterial, discursive value, which biennales and 
art fairs bring. The work of art as the material object, as an image, simply does not 
matter, since it only functions within the ‘rhizomes’, ‘networks’, ‘nomadism’, 
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‘escape routes’, ‘non-hierarchical forms of organisations’ etc. The emphasis, Gielen 
says, ‘shifted from displaying material works to immaterial labour’.322 He writes, 
‘Even the museum – certainly if it is a contemporary art museum – has been infected 
by the biennale virus. Even a museum is displaying post-institutional characteristics, 
for it too has become a post-Fordian enterprise’.323  
 
However, in his analysis of ‘artistic multitude’, Gielen tends to agree with the 
pessimistic prognosis of Paolo Virno rather than with Hardt and Negri, who assume 
that an amorphous, elusive and creative multitude creates Empire’s gravediggers. 
Like Paolo Virno, Gielen believes that it was culture that forced the transition from 
Fordist to post-Fordist economy and thus made the artist – a good performer of ideas 
– the pivot of economic vitality. However, attaining the privileged position within 
the post-Fordist framework, art has become an ideal production unit for a new type 
of economic exploitation. The contemporary globalised art scene, with its 
‘…inability’ and ‘‘tactical refusal’ to speak out or have meaning’,324 according to 
Gielen, ‘…murmurs quietly from the sidelines’325 while the global neo-liberal 
market economy takes the ‘blood and flesh’ out of art, stripping it bare of its 
autonomy. Following Paolo Virno’s view that art has dissolved in society like an 
effervescent tablet in water and his understanding of political engagement as exodus 
and creation of a radically new non-state public sphere, Gielen envisages art’s 
autonomy as the only remaining precondition for social critique and suggests that in 
order to preserve and re-create its own dynamic and freedom, art needs to go to 
places of ‘intimacy’ and ‘slowability’. Instead of participating in creative cities or 
making their work popular with the mass-media, artists, Gielen argues, should ‘think 
about the world in a personal way and throughout their work’.326 Thus, criticising 
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contemporary art for the ‘murmuring’, Gielen suggests that the solution lies in 
withdrawing into art’s own sub-system, where it would somehow be able to speak 
out and have a meaning. 
 
Gielen speaks little of politics and appears not to seek any political explanation of 
the post-Fordist situation. Rather, he accepts claims that the economy has become 
immaterial despite the fact that for most people in the world questions of material 
security have a priority over questions of personal identity and performing their 
ideas. According to Gielen, politics and economics have already merged into one 
post-Fordist framework driven only by economic issues. He states from the outset, 
‘First of all, let us be clear: this book is not a plea against liberal or neo-liberal 
politics. As long as an ideological programme is defended in the political arena, it 
explicitly admits to being an ideology, which people can be for or against. No good 
democrat can have anything against that. What is more, let us not forget that both 
liberalism and neoliberalism prize individual freedom and autonomy very highly. 
And these are critical values which modern art and artists could hardly survive 
without’.327 Rather, Gielen envisages a post-Fordist framework as an ideological 
vacuum, since ‘…the neoliberlism [as an ideology] has left the political area and, 
just like Virno’s soluble tablet, had dissolved into society to permeate it.’328 Instead, 
what we are dealing with is a different type of ‘non-ideological’ neoliberalism, 
which really believes that the current situation presents a completely new 
configuration where market forces and a blind logic of accumulation act as a 
tsunami we can longer do anything about. Gielen also speaks of globalisation as a 
phenomenon related to the unstoppable tsunami of free-market capitalism. Thus, the 
position in which artistic practices find themselves today corresponds to almost an 
apocalyptic scenario where politics no longer exist, presenting artistic practices as 
the outpost of meaningful engagement in times of post-Fordism as a new paradigm 
of power, which organises society directly, without any political mediation. Thus, 
the ‘political’ question for Gielen is ‘How can art or the artist still have meaning 
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within the hegemony of the market economy?’329  
 
What Gielen overlooks is the political dimension behind the importance of art and 
creativity in post-Fordist society. As we have discussed in the previous chapters, the 
transition from Fordism to post-Fordism was dictated by re-articulation of various 
strategies such as the search for authenticity, flexibility and novelty largely 
associated with the world of counter-culture, what Boltanski calls an ‘artistic 
critique’. It is not that ‘art criticism has been absorbed by the capitalist ideology’330, 
as Gielen argues, and today post-Fordism ‘accepts [it] with open arms’331; rather, 
certain strategies have been put to use to stabilise the capitalist framework, which 
has not changed in its content but only in its form. Post-Fordism is not an artistic 
phenomenon that has resulted in a purely economical outcome of transforming art 
into a new exploitative machine. It was a complex hegemonic intervention, and the 
central position of artistic and cultural practices was not of artists’ choice and 
making, but of that of capital. Furthermore, politics have not simply evaporated from 
post-Fordist capitalist society – there are many forms of contemporary politics 
engaging in different ways of being political such as publicity stunts, direct action, 
‘transversal’ alliances, individual protests, etc.; however, most of them are not 
necessarily progressive. Across the world, political movements and groups adopt 
religious fundamentalism, racism, xenophobia, environmental elitism or 
sectarianism. Globalisation was not an abstract overpowering spread of capitalism, 
but a political transformation driven by the most powerful states in the international 
system, which produced various institutions such as the International Monetary Fund 
or the World Bank to deregulate domestic labour and financial markets. 
Furthermore, despite the new challenges and problematics of globalisation, most 
people still look to the state, not to the artistic realm, as the last resort for providing 
economic security and political stability.  
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In his recent book co-edited together with Paul De Bruyne Being an Artist in Post-
Fordist Times, Gielen argues that ‘today more than ever before, I think, the decision 
to make art, and to make a certain kind of art, is an ideological decision precisely 
because of the central position that both art and creativity have ‘attained’ in our 
society’.332 According to Gielen, artists’ choices of areas of participation in the post-
Fordist economy can actually mould it. He writes,  
 
‘Modern artists do not represent the world – no mimesis – but present the world 
though themselves, though Pistoletto’s Signe Arte or through De Keersmaeker’s 
body. When singularity and collectivity join in a work of art, it immediately 
uncovers the political nature of artworks as well – whether they do or do not 
explicitly spread a political message. Politics mould coexistence’.333  
 
Completely overlooking the issue of contemporary political movements, Gielen 
compares the realms of art and sport in search of a possible source of political 
vitality. He contends that while in sport one has to excel by the rules, in arts one has 
to ‘argue, to legitimize yourself’. He writes, ‘I think this activity is of crucial 
importance in a democratic society and is in many ways comparable to the concept 
of ideal politics. After all, public accountability and performative arguing are also 
central to that concept. That is why sports cannot be a model of democracy,  
whereas art can’.334 The way Gielen envisages this legitimisation corresponds  
almost exclusively to artistic practices slowing and narrowing themselves  
to their own vision of alternative to the post-Fordism economy as a new political 
movement.  
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Cittadellarte as a Political Movement of an Alternative Economy 
 
Gielen’s suggestion regarding the political role of art in the age of post-Fordism 
appears to consist of bringing art into the centre of the economic system not by 
resisting it but by creating an alternative space for societal praxes inside it in almost 
a premodern manner. One of Gielen’s preferred examples of such new politics is the 
artistic practice of Michelangelo Pistoletto, who in 1996 launched the Cittadellarte 
organisation that involves an investigation into alternatives to the post-Fordism 
economic system in which art is placed at the centre of local industry and ‘socially 
sound transformation’. Coming from the point of view that, due to the current 
economic framework, the autonomy of the artist and of art is shrinking, the goal of 
Cittadellarte is to create its own economy, to be the first company of this kind of 
economy, which follows the biological system. According to Pistoletto, today’s 
society is lacking direct relations between concrete human values and the abstract 
value of the financial system; therefore, what is at issue is to restore the balance, 
which, as a model of such, could be seen in a balanced body of a human being. 
Following this belief, Cittadellarte has created the Human Values Bank and the 
Third Paradise project, which consists of reshaping the artificial – technology, art, 
culture and politics – in order to restore the balance between what Pistoletto calls the 
‘first paradise,’ when life is governed by nature, and the second, manufactured by 
humans.  
 
According to Pistoletto, what we most need today is conservation. He states, ‘…I 
think we have to go back to Fordism, but certainly in a completely different way 
with respect to the past. What was positive in the Fordist system was the direct 
relationship between production and consumption – the workers themselves bought 
the product’.335 Hence, the question for politics is how to bring production closer to 
real needs. Pistoletto explains, ‘This is why, here at Cittadellarte, for instance, our 
restaurant Cafeteria, uses the zero kilometre concept – keeping production on  
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a short leash by offering food that comes from local producers, and only when  
it is in season’.336  
 
Thus, the way Pistoletto perceives art’s involvement in the economy lies in escaping 
the consumer aesthetics and instead looking towards nature. He states, ‘We have a 
lot to learn from the way ancient tribes painted their bodies, danced together ritually, 
and exchanged a common aesthetic’.337 This ‘common aesthetic’ can only be based 
on this new ethical dimension of following the human body as an example of 
interconnected but perfectly balanced parts.  
 
According to Gielen, Cittadellarte’s type of collaboration, which takes place not 
between the artists but with a very diverse group of social actors, creates a new type 
of work of art, which makes real differences in the economy and thus in politics. 
Gielen states,  
 
‘By attempting to bring art into the centre of the economic system and by describing 
the artist as an actor who has to take his responsibility in this system, Cittadellarte 
wants to break open the contemporary dominant neoliberal capitalist system, not by 
working against this system, but by creating an open space for artistic contingency 
inside it’.338  
 
It appears that Gielen’s vision corresponds to the post-Fordist predicament, 
which strives in the ‘open’ space of artistic contingency. Insofar as this space is 
situated within the economic system, it ensures its growth and stability.  
 
Pistolletto’s Cittadellarte poses itself as something of a translation centre between 
the art world and other societal subsystems in order to become an alternative 
economy. Only when this new system, free of post-Fordism, is constructed, when art 
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becomes a central company, can all relations be re-constructed under a new artistic 
economic logic. Pistoletto’s work is not social in the sense that it enables 
interactivity in the existing system, which he believes is flawed and unsustainable, 
but provides a new system of artistic economy, in which true sociability would be 
possible – art can only be ‘common’ when we all share the same ethical framework 
of a balanced body of a human being.  
 
According to Gielen, artistic practices such as Cittadellarte, in which ‘An artistic 
concept is being transformed into a political movement of alternative economies, 
and vice versa: politics and economics become a work of art’339 provide the 
opportunity for a meaningful engagement in times when art’s ability and autonomy 
is severely paralysed by post-Fordist exploitation. What is suggested is that art can 
rescue its autonomy by becoming an alternative economy.   
 
Why is this realm of an alternative economy, which can be constructed through art, 
important for Gielen? It appears that the main reason behind it, apart from the vital 
role that artistic practices play in post-Fordism, lies within Gielen’s understanding of 
what politics are about. Politics for him could only be cultural because the problem 
with today’s ‘crypto-ideology’ is that it ‘denies the distinction between nature and 
culture’.340 He quotes Pistoletto, whose understanding of democratic politics appears 
to be shared by Gielen: ‘In the universe there is no central point, every heavenly 
body is the centre. From this standpoint every individual can accept differences of 
religion, culture, social background and age. Such is democracy. And speaking of 
democracy, if one is in touch with oneself, one is in touch with the community. If we 
realize that the universe and the individual are the same thing, we have nothing to 
fear from the unknown’.341  
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Although Gielen’s argument in The Murmuring of the Artistic Multitude does not 
directly consider the political potential of art – his book focuses on the role of art in 
the economic phenomenon of post-Fordism, which he understands in terms of a 
labour model – it suggests that the political trajectory of art today could only be 
envisaged as escaping the prison of the post-Fordist economy by concentrating on 
creating alternative structures where art would produce its own social relations. 
Gielen appears to support Virno’s account that critical art could only be considered 
within the range of possible attitudes towards post-Fordism, which allegedly asks for 
a radically new conception of politics and political subject. Similarly to Virno, who 
argues for exodus as mass defection from traditional politics, Gielen believes that it 
is art that is capable of constituting new forms of politics. He explains, ‘The 
experiment of Cittadellarte is part of a broad aim: not to import new energy from the 
outside world into art but to let art become an integral part of that outside world 
again, not under the conditions of the industrial world, but under those of the artistic 
logic. And finally, de-instrumentalise the use of art in society, and enable to exploit 
its fullest possibilities in each of its domains. This is the target of Cittadellarte: to 
make as many passage points as possible all over the whole of the globe, starting 
from its heterotopic space, in order to reorder society and transmute its crypto-
utopia’.342 Thus, while Virno, due to the post-Fordist paradigm, calls the existence of 
the state and representational politics into question, Gielen suggests that the idea of 
art and artists must also be radically altered. Art must become practical again and 
thus political in the otherwise de-politicised post-Fordist universe.  
 
Hence Gielen’s position appears to amount to the refusal and withdrawal from the 
post-Fordist situation, economic in character and devoid of politics. Art, according 
to him, was a laboratory of post-Fordism and now it can also become a laboratory 
for a new type of alternative political economy. What is at issue is to rescue art’s 
autonomy and therefore artists must move to the personal places of ‘slowablity’ and 
organise sub-systems such as Pistoletto’s. To be a political artist, for Gielen, means 
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speaking outside the context. Artistic production for him is already critical and 
political, what is needed is to ‘de-instrumentalize the use of art in society’,343 the 
construction of alternative venues representing the art world, which can then reform 
the relationships with other societal subsystems according to the artistic logic.  
 
There is, however, another understanding of a ‘post-political’ situation as ‘post-
democratic’ moment in the neoliberal order. There are also artists who do not 
envisage post-Fordism as a unique condition that radically alters the nature of the 
political order, politics and artistic practices. In fact, these artists do not think that 
artistic practices are something separate from politics and deserve a special status. 
One of these artists is Chilean-born architect, filmmaker by profession and artist by 
vocation Alfredo Jaar. Jaar, unlike Pistoletto, does not believe that either the culture 
has become the matrix of post-Fordism or that artistic practices should be capable of 
constructing an isolated space for alternative social praxis. Instead, because of the 
central role of art in the support of the neo-liberal hegemony, Jaar contends that 
artistic practice should act in both places: the world of art and intervening directly in 
the multiplicity of public spaces. For Jaar, because of its privileged position within 
the post-Fordist logic, art can open possibilities rather than close them down by 
narrowing and slowing artistic practices to their own field. However, this should not 
be understood as a way of assigning to the artist the role of the universal historical 
subject of the post-Fordist age. Rather, artists should resume their public role, but 
equipped with the understanding of what democratic politics entail and also with 
view that aesthetics is not a practice of judgments but the judgment performed 
aesthetically, and the one that challenges any judgment. Jaar’s understanding of the 
political role of art corresponds to Chantal Mouffe’s understanding of democratic 
politics as engagement with rather than withdrawal from the existing state of affairs 
and Jacques Ranciére’s notion of the ‘intolerability of the image’, which he places at 
the heart of the tensions that constitute art’s critical dimension. 
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‘Life is More Important that Art’ 
For Alfredo Jaar, the narrative that we construct as a society always conceals the 
brutality, the horror of the ‘human creation’ as a consequence of the very exercise of 
power. For Jaar, the increasingly precarious state of global society where people live 
under the conditions of an uncertain, hostile and indifferent environment reveals just 
how secure, sure, strong and undoubted the existing power structures are. The post-
political condition of precariousness for Jaar is not based on innocence, on leaving 
behind the old ideological conflicts in order to concentrate on competent 
management and administration, but on dangerous complicity, against which no 
other action remains than to recover the courage of our minds and the individual 
sense of responsibility from which, through figures like Pier Paolo Pasolini and 
Antonio Gramsci, Jaar takes his inspiration.  
 
Today, when many artists believe that art constitutes a context deserving a special 
statute, a situation depicted by Ana Maria Risco in the ‘Conversations’ being ‘like 
people riding on exercise bike: puffing away, but getting nowhere’344, Jaar insists 
that ‘life is more important than art’ and ‘that’s what makes art important’.  
 
This approach does not sit comfortably with a number of attitudes in the 
contemporary art scene where, after more than half a century, the subject matter of 
art remains its own bankruptcy under the capitalist system and its own resignation 
from aesthetic engagement with real situations and real human experiences, which 
are often insidiously hidden from public view. Jaar argues, ‘As William Blake said, 
you have to invent your own system if you do not want to be enslaved by another’s 
man system. I have no illusions and like Gramsci, I am an intellectual pessimist. But 
also like him, I have an optimistic will’. 345 React to the dire unbalances surrounding 
us instead of merely replicating them, urges the artist. Jaar’s art is not a self-
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sufficient calling, exploring where the meaning of autonomy and freedom for the 
artist lies today; nor is it inspired by the avant-garde dream of producing 
emancipatory effects by desublimating a meaning or destructing a form. The 
problem of a form as such or the dilemma of its commodification is not Jaar’s 
concern. For him, artistic practice is never about object-making, but about models of 
thinking through which a new introspection, one that is not based on dormant 
actuality, anesthetised by hyperinformation of images, could be put forward. Jaar 
states, ‘…when we try to represent the world, we actually never succeed because 
reality cannot be represented. We can only create new realities. These realities are 
models of thinking the world. These models, the most successful ones, have a life of 
their own and…affect the way we see the world and the way we live the world. It is 
difficult. It is an almost impossible task. But I cannot imagine a greater privilege and 
a greater responsibility than this’. 346  
 
‘To me, art is either thinking, critical; or it is decoration’347, says Jaar. However, this 
thinking does not mean that there is any such thing as a place where power is 
liberated from its own blindness about itself. To think that we can abstract ourselves 
from the mechanisms of power, its supposed field of action, would be to conceive a 
realm beyond the forms of political functioning described by Gramsci as ‘consensus 
and coercion’. Meanwhile, critical art means more than just saying what people do 
not want to hear or showing what they do not want to see. The power of the 
articulated, in this case, transcends the use of criticism as a direct accusation. Rather, 
as Jaar argues, in the face of the blindness of power, critical art brings into play a 
way of visual thinking, which constructs recognition of the blind spots, identifying 
some of the zones of denial on which our image of the public realm is based. Such 
spots are always very uncomfortable places.  
 
Today critical art, insists Jaar, is especially crucial since the realm of culture, the 
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world of art, which insist on autonomy, in fact, have turned it into a prison. Jaar’s 
work entitled Infinite Cell, 2004 (see Appendix, fig. 1) speaks about the isolation of 
art and its attempt to have a direct influence. Jaar explains, ‘The Cell is about the 
role of culture today. A cell for the world of art… We have created a culture, which 
is an infinite cell. It’s a very negative, very pessimistic work. Sometimes, I think, 
here you are talking to me, and I’m talking to you, and the result is zero. Infinite 
Cell, in its countless reflections, shows the constraint that curtails every movement 
of freedom. We can go in and out, enjoying the release but then we look into the 
mirrors and the reflection of the cell, which represents nothing but the cell’s 
emptiness and this realisation, admits us to the confinement of the cell’.348 The 
mirrors, which are conventionally used to improve the clarity and visibility, appear 
here and in a number of Jaar’s works to be concealing and obstructing mechanisms, 
which reflect back not an image but rather the impossibility of reconstructing the 
image in its entirety. The mirrors carry our own image and the perspectives project 
the ‘panopticum’ of the human condition. This is not an imaginary prison, not part 
of an artist’s dream. 
 
Jaar insists that the cell of culture today calls for artists to intervene more, to re-
orientate ‘dead’ images, injecting them with a sense of possible change. Jaar says, ‘I 
take these images that exist in the world and have lost their power because of the 
way they have been decontextualized, and I create a new context for them, the 
context of my installation, where hopefully I help them recuperate the original 
essence that they were meant to say’.349 Making art for Jaar has always consisted of 
his courage in assuming a position, giving a new context for what exists but is far 
from our little art world.  
 
That is why Jaar does not create artificial micro-communities or imaginary spaces 
where individuals can be ‘framed’ into a beautiful picture; on the contrary, the artist 
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speaks about his art as a model of ‘unframing’, ‘visibilising’ and ‘recognising’ of 
what is the blind spot in the other’s field of vision. Jaar states, ‘I am an architect 
making art, and I use the methodology of the architect, meaning that I react to a 
certain space and a certain situation. My works are site-specific and react to a given 
community, a given space or a given situation. So I react not only to a physical 
space, as most artists do, but I see that space as a social space, as a political 
space’.350  
 
‘There is Nothing to See’ 
 
In the last 20 years Jaar has created some 60 visual interventions into specific 
situations and communities. These interventions suggest that there is always 
something more to see, especially in places where one is not supposed to look or ask 
questions.  
 
Jacques Ranciére’s statement ‘Move along! There is nothing to see here’351 
represents what he calls the ‘police order’. This term, however, does not directly 
refer to the police but rather to institutions, social positions, modes of 
communication, images and ways of speaking and showing – all operations that 
generate what Ranciére calls ‘the given’.  
 
According to the ‘police order’, there is always nothing else to see apart from the 
already established patterns and it is not that people are kept in the dark deliberately 
but that the order is blind, its ‘common sense’ does not allow the inclusion of all 
points of view, otherwise there would be no order. Any authorities allow only 
certain positions within social and institutional hierarchies and any changes are 
usually only open to certain people within these hierarchies. Disagreement occurs 
when people start looking where they are not supposed to look, when they see or 
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sense ‘the hidden’, suggesting that there is more to the world than the given. In one 
of his recent interviews Ranciére argues that this happened, for example, when 
workers during the 1830s began to write literature in their spare time while 
remaining workers. He observes: ‘I think the bourgeoisie felt that there was a danger 
when the worker entered the world of thought and culture. When workers are only 
struggling, then they are supposed to be in their world and in their place. But when 
workers attempt to write verses and try to become writers, philosophers, it means a 
displacement from their identity as workers. What I was trying to show was that 
there was no real opposition. I don’t mean that all workers who are attempting to 
write verses had entered the revolution or anything, but it was a kind of a general 
movement of people getting out of their condition…What they wanted was to 
become entirely human, with all the possibilities of a human being and not only 
having what is possible to do for workers.’ 352  
 
What this example shows is that the existing order is not unquestionable, that there 
are other possibilities and other things to be seen, other ways of looking, thinking 
and living. In The Emancipated Spectator Ranciére argues that emancipation ‘begins 
when we dismiss the opposition between looking and acting and understand that the 
distribution of the visible itself is part of the configuration of domination and 
subjection’.353 This is linked to this idea of the ‘distribution of the sensible’ – what it 
does and does not do, and about what is included and excluded from the field of 
vision. Ranciére suggests that looking ‘at places or questions that are not supposed 
to be your place or your questions’ creates spaces that weaken ‘…the bonds that 
enclose spectacles within a form of visibility … within the machine that makes the 
“state of things” seem evident, unquestionable.’354 Looking where one is not 
supposed to look does not mean showing true horrors and suffering, what Ranciére 
calls ‘the intolerable image’. However powerful the ‘intolerable’ image is, it never 
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acts on its own but always belongs to a particular system of visibility. Ranciére 
states, ‘The image is pronounced unsuitable for criticizing reality because it pertains 
to the same regime of visibility as that reality, which by turns displays its aspect of 
brilliant appearance and its other side of sordid truth, constituting a single 
spectacle’.355 What is at issue here is the regime of visibility itself, which does not 
anticipate the effects of the images. What is needed are different politics of the 
sensible based on the resistance of the visible where the ‘intolerable’ image does not 
constitute the other side of the spectacle. Ranciére says, ‘The shift from the 
intolerable in the image to the intolerability of the image has found itself at the heart 
of the tensions affecting political art’.356  
 
The strategies of different visibility are at the heart of Jaar’s artistic practice. 
According to the artist, seeing without looking is the most disturbing feature of our 
time. Blinded by the multitude of what Jaar calls ‘decontextualised’ or 
‘anesthetisised’ images, our jaded eyes are wide shut. By breaking the relationship 
between the image and its system, Jaar constructs a different regime of visibility 
where one can look without seeing, where the lack of images creates its own 
intolerability. Lament of the Images (2002, see Appendix, fig. 2) is, in many ways, a 
condensation of Jaar’s thinking about strategies of visibility. A metaphor for the 
absence and worthlessness of images, the impossibility to use them to represent the 
reality that they appear to stand for, Lament of the Images also searches for an 
ethical dimension, which, for Jaar, is always situated at the end of the aesthetics.  
 
Three texts glow upon the wall in the semi-obscure room. The first text tells the 
story of the two-fold blinding of Nelson Mandela: by the sun reflected on limestone 
in the mine where he served his sentence and by the daylight in the photograph of 
his release. The following text describes how millions of images, including the one 
of Mandela, bought by a Bill Gates company, were buried in a limestone mine. The 
third text states that the U.S. Defense Department acquired the rights to all satellite 
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imagery of the war in Afghanistan. ‘There is’, it declares, ‘nothing left to see’. Still 
dazzled by glowing texts, the viewer’s eyes are drawn towards a dim corridor and 
the faint glow at the end of it. As one walks through the corridor, the feelings of 
uncomfortable expectation arise – we want to see what is hidden. However, 
suddenly, we find ourselves facing a screen of white cold glare, which, instead of 
revealing, obscures and blinds our vision. It is not that the pictures are missing, or 
that they are excluded from our field of vision, but that the vision itself is 
problematic. The idea here is not about the missing images of Kabul’s bombardment 
– Jaar does not try to make ‘an invisible visible’. Rather, becoming involved in the 
narrative, we too, blinded like Mandela, are seeing nothing because there is no 
image left for us to see. The empty glare makes us imitate what we see and to 
recognise ourselves in the peering eye. It also forces us to acknowledge the artificial 
character of all images – they are elusive, inadequate and incomplete. The 
momentary loss of sight caused by the glare of a stroboscopic light somehow 
suggests that the ‘true’ visibility would be impossible to bear, that the only thing 
revealed here is the suppression and concealment of every record, of every image. 
While the original scene can never be documented, shown, reconstructed, the 
‘mental’ picture, which we create out of our own experience with this narrative, 
reveals not just what we think is hidden but also what we do not question – our 
visual system of perception, which only through the loss of sight allows us to restore 
the contemporary viewer’s jaded eye’s ability to look. The lament conveyed by our 
eyes stands in for the whole ‘lament of the images’ – images having long since been 
transformed into ‘agents of blindness’. Jaar’s question, in our view, concerns not so 
much the problems of making the ‘invisible visible’, what is included and what is 
not, but the problem of: what is visible? Jaar’s visible involves a relative non-
visibility, when one must look without seeing, constructing a narrative, which does 
not come from the images but from our experience of this narrative. Only the way 
we look can change how we see things. While there is always something to see, 
actually we cannot see anything unless we have this experience; we are involved and 
we look.  
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Lament of Images demands a perception that is based on equality rather than on 
including what is excluded from our field of vision. Jaar does not include the 
missing pictures of a suffering community to produce a feeling of a shared society 
where equality is understood as supplying equal visibility and progressively moving 
from the invisible oppressed to the visibility of guilt, sorrow and final satisfaction of 
our curiosity and need to identify with the other in order to feel secure and 
comforted. Why do we want to see these missing pictures? There is no specific 
strategy of visibility of the oppressed for Jaar because aesthetics for the artist are 
always about ethics – an ethical dimension of intellectual emancipation, which is the 
same for the oppressed and the ruling; for rich people and poor people. Here Jaar 
takes his lead from Gramsci’s argument that ‘All men are intellectuals, one could 
therefore say: but not all men have in society the function of intellectuals’357 i.e. all 
men are thinking actors and ‘non-intellectuals do not exist’358. This is an idea of 
intellectual emancipation, that there is always some point of equality. Gramsci 
argues that, contrary to the understanding of the role of the traditional intellectuals, 
‘The problem of creating a new stratum of intellectuals consists therefore in the 
critical elaboration of the intellectual activity that exists in everyone…’ in order to 
construct a ‘foundation of the new conception of the world’.359  This approach 
resonates with Ranciére’s understanding of equality. He states, ‘In the 1820s there 
was a lot of concern about how we can educate the people, slowly, progressively: 
but that was not the point, the idea of starting from inequality to reach quality; it’s 
impossible because in the very process, you ceaselessly recycle practices of 
inequality. You must not go towards equality, but must start from equality. Starting 
from equality does not presuppose that everyone in the world has equal opportunities 
to learn, to express their capacities. That’s not the point. The point is that you have 
to start from the minimum equality that is given’.360  
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This is where Jaar starts in Lament of the Image – from equality of impossibility of 
any such place where power is liberated from its own blindness about itself, that it is 
possible to progress from the realm of the oppressed and invisible into the realm of 
visible and therefore liberated. Your lament, says Jaar, cannot be satisfied; it can 
only be exchanged with another grief, the one that is common to all. There is no 
position of superiority: not for the viewers, nor for the artist. Jaar explains, ‘I put 
these images in your world, but always in a fragmented form, so that my inability to 
show everything becomes part of the work’.361 The installation mingles the themes 
of captivity, people and images. It stages the paradox of excessive visibility, which, 
by accumulation, means that we ultimately see nothing. ‘Progressing’ from missing 
pictures to the loss of sight, one can grasp that we can only move from equality of 
invisibility to equality of impossibility to see, of experience of the limits of what can 
be achieved, shown or said. One has to start with equality and not finish with it.  
 
Considering Jaar’s works, there is always something missing, fragmented, silenced, 
separated, imbalanced or destroyed. In Real Pictures (1995, see Appendix, fig. 3) 
images of the Rwandan genocide in 1994 have been supplanted by their descriptions 
on the black box; in the Skoghall Konstall (2000, Appendix, fig. 4) the wood and 
paper museum is inaugurated with the Swedish authorities in attendance only to be 
burned down the next day to illuminate the total absence of art in Skoghall; in 
Untitled (Water), (1990, Appendix, fig. 5), Jaar shows only fragments of the sea and 
people – some of the photos that that artist took on the ships used by the 
immigration authority. The combined use of the seductive tourist advertising format 
of imagery of the sea, which promises an exotic cruise and projection of a different 
kind of journey embodied in the images of ‘travelers’ behind the bars, reflects on the 
political problems of global dimensions: the stability on one side and uncertainty, 
confinement on the other. The borders are open to goods, but not to people. Untitled 
makes us suspicious of Hard and Negri’s hopes for mass global mobility as a 
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‘counter-empire’, as microphysics of resistance. The people behind the bars hardly 
look like new revolutionaries – they are smiling, they just want to be on this ship, to 
join in the ‘empire’, to stabilise their displaced lives. Again, Jaar does not address 
the ‘Other’ as the realm we have to be sympathetic to or identify with, but rather 
shows the visual imbalance of the picture, which appears to be full and promising 
but never is. In contrast with the mainstream of contemporary art, which has become 
a place to define the ‘Other’, Jaar allows it to identify or define the ‘Other’ itself as 
identities are never pre-given in the first place.  
 
Hence Jaar constrains normal visibility, revealing through the lacking fullness of 
image the lacking reality. There is never a full image, positive or negative; there is 
always something missing and the artist cannot fulfill these absences, silences, lack 
of visibility and inclusion. Jaar not only identifies the zones of denial, but also 
shows his inability to represent reality in its entirety; as the artist says, ‘his inability 
to show everything’ is his work of art.  
 
Following Jaar, the role of critical art could be understood as a regime of visibility, 
which reminds us of a lack, that the present society is always lacking something. The 
recognition of this lack is the precondition of social critique. An artwork can present 
itself as a witness, as an image of ‘intolerability’, which stands in opposition to itself 
and thus to the reality it is supposed to represent. This artwork can never replace the 
lack of a ‘true’ reality. Jaar’s art is never a solution to this lack but rather an image 
of it, which is also lacking its representational capacities. Such presentation opens up 
the lacking present to the future, which can never be the realm of certainty and 
positivity but only the realm of continuous articulation and therefore of hope.  
 
Thus we can see that Jaar’s artistic practices approach problems in our society in 
what Chantal Mouffe describes as a ‘political way’. Mouffe writes,  
 
‘To acknowledge the dimension of the political as the ever present possibility of 
antagonism requires coming to terms with the lack of a final ground and the 
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undecidability which pervades every order. It requires in other words recognizing 
the hegemonic nature of every kind of social order and the fact that every society is 
the product of a series of practices attempting to establishing order in a context of 
contingency. The political is linked to the acts of hegemonic institution… It is in 
that sense that it can be called “political” since it is the expression of a particular 
structure of power relations’.362  
 
Many today believe that once we abandon the great ‘ideological causes’ and accept 
that any alternative to the neoliberal hegemony could only be envisaged through use 
of force or other totalitarian means, then we can really agree that the only alternative 
left is to improve what is given with its main objective of the regulation of the safety 
and wellbeing of human life, known as biopolitics. In other words, when the basic 
level of politics is composed of depoliticised and socially objective activities 
performed by a competent administration and coordination of interests, the only way 
to introduce passion into this field actively to mobilise the people, is fear of the 
totalitarian regime, of potential persecution or attack, of excessive control by the 
State etc. This fear is often embodied in artistic strategies of avoidance, when artists 
prefer procedures composed of deviations, associations, labyrinths and shortcuts, 
anything that involves indirect thought processes, as if by deferring the meaning of 
the artwork by winning over time and space, somehow, this meaning would be more 
elaborate and less dogmatic or final. For example, British artist Liam Gillick’s 
artistic language of ‘screens’, ‘scenarios’ or ‘functional utopias’ aims to delay or 
obscure narration with jumps, pauses, flashbacks and flashforwards against its 
normal progression. Gillick’s aim is potentially to say more but not articulating 
anything in particular. Avoiding any images and structures of ‘totality’, the artist’s 
works, according to Marcus Verhagen, ‘…turn out to be largely paralyzing, as 
Gillick repeatedly tracks from radical to exploratory positions…Ultimately, Gillick’s 
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attitude to utopianism is so guarded that there is no telling it apart from a busy, 
garrulous resignation’.363  
 
Such an approach, based on fear, whether it is a fear of artwork becoming a 
commodity or a statement, of articulation of a position, stands in opposition to the 
hegemonic strategy, which, while not prescriptive, acknowledging a contingent 
nature of any position, nevertheless enjoins us to adopt a certain ‘disposition’, an act 
of disposing; a bestowal or transfer to another of the tendency to disagree that what 
is given should always be taken. Any social order is already contingent, so there is 
little point in fearing what it is lacking – the essence, the final ground – meanwhile, 
because of this, this order is politically structured through power relations that 
exclude and silence some voices so that society as such can exist.  
 
Public Space as a Memorial – Articulations That Did Not Occur 
 
While you cannot escape power relations, instead of mobilisation through fear, the 
process that cannot grasp the presence of the lack, the political dimension could be 
envisaged as mobilisation through lack and therefore the possibility of different 
articulation instead of the ‘given’.  
 
Chantal Mouffe writes,  
 
‘While there is no underlying principle of unity, no predetermined centre to this 
diversity of spaces, there always exist diverse forms of articulation among them and 
we are not faced with the kind of dispersion envisaged by some postmodernist 
thinkers. Nor are we dealing with the kind of “smooth” space found in Deleuze and 
his followers. Public spaces are always striated and hegemonically structured. A 
given hegemony results from a specific articulation of a diversity of spaces and this 
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means that the hegemonic struggle also consists in the attempt to create a different 
form of articulation among public spaces’.364  
 
Evidently, Jaar’s approach to a form of articulation compatible with a ‘political’ 
dimension is different to that of Liam Gillick or any other artists who avoid taking 
positions. In contrast to Gillick’s objective to obscure and detour the possibility of 
articulation through his notion of a ‘multiple scenarios’, Jaar’s vision of a public 
space activates a sense of mourning and warning of articulations that did not take 
place. For example, one of Jaar’s preferred techniques to create public space is 
through the image of a memorial or a monument (from the concept of monitus, 
which means ‘warning’) that stands as a substitute for many discourses that did not 
occur. For example, Jaar’s most recent installation, The Geometry of Conscience 
(2010, see Appendix, fig. 6), is the below-ground-level memorial for people who 
died or disappeared during Pinochet’s regime. As the room becomes fully and 
blindingly lit the viewer finally sees that on each side of hundreds of silhouettes 
there are mirrors, so the effect is that the wall of faces goes on into infinity. Then the 
lights are abruptly turned off.  The experience of the viewer is of the faces of the 
victims and survivors literally being burned onto their retina for several long 
moments. Similarly, Jaar’s memorials include earlier works such as The Cloud 
(2000, Appendix, fig. 7), an ephemeral monument in memory of those who lost their 
lives trying to cross the Mexico-U.S.A. border, where during 45 minutes viewers 
mourn more than three thousand people and then the balloons are released; or Lights 
in the City (1999, Appendix, fig. 8), where a ‘photograph’ is taken every time a 
human being asks for help – a light flashes as if a photograph is being taken and then 
a red light in the Cupola warns the city of Montreal of a condition that is clearly 
unacceptable within the context of one of the richest cities in North America: its 
endless homeless people passing by.  
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These memorials are speaking of something of which no one else wants to speak and 
no one can speak, since these voices were silenced, ignored or not capable of 
speaking as they were locked into amnesia or passed away. It is the most invisible 
and unheard who are offered here the opportunity to speak first and it becomes clear 
that if those people can say something, if the monument can speak, then perhaps the 
public in turn can also do something too. To envisage a public space as a memorial 
is to say that history will repeat itself, that bad things will happen again if we 
continue to forget and to prevent many articulations to be constructed and heard.  
 
When Gilick’s ‘screens’ and ‘labyrinths’ prevent many articulations from happening 
by insisting that ‘…the point of entry into the idea is multiple’, and that his work 
does not lead to ‘…a moment of consolidation…’365, Jaar’s monuments remind us of 
dangers of articulations not taking place. Such public spaces do not just denounce 
the passivity and total silence of society, but also announce a new public voice, 
constructed out of ‘speaking’ monuments, which interrupt and barricade this silence. 
While Gillick describes his position as ‘Separate but not marginal’, Jaar’s position is 
quite the opposite: taking his lead from that which is considered to be at a lower or 
outer limit, as of social acceptability, from marginals, people who live on the edge of 
society, Jaar takes them into the very centre of what society is about: it is because of 
these who cannot speak that society is so ‘pronounced’. Jaar’s question, perhaps, is 
about why, while there are multiple scenarios and multiple articulations, only one 
always wins – the one that eliminates marginality from the sphere of the public so 
that a rational consensus can be maintained. This consensus for Jaar is never based 
on innocence but on dangerous complicity to cover up the lack and to silence or 
ignore the irresolvable antagonisms that Chantal Mouffe has placed at the center of 
political life.  
 
Such ethics therefore refuse any transcendence of power and antagonism in the name 
of something higher, such as humanity; meanwhile also providing a different 
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solution to the problems of exclusion and lack. Chantal Mouffe has repeatedly 
pointed out that for agonistic pluralism the prime task of democratic politics is not to 
eliminate passion from this sphere of the public in order to render a consensus, even 
a critical one, possible, but to mobilise passions and voices towards democratic 
designs.  
 
In his public intervention ‘Questions Questions’ (2008, Appendix, fig. 9), Jaar’s 
questions about the role of art and culture in politics occupied every single space: 
from buses, subways, electronic screens, phone booths to websites and posters in 
resistance to the extraordinary control and oppression of the Italian public spaces by 
Berlusconi’s media and advertising empire and, most importantly, in an attempt to 
construct a new space for public voices instead of publicity and hope instead of 
surrender. Jaar explains,  
 
‘You can sadly declare that there is no public space in Italy, or almost none. So I 
decided to create little cracks in the system. I did not know what to expect. I had the 
fear that people had been completely anesthetized by the Berlusconi system. But 
reactions were overwhelmingly positive, and we received enormous amounts of 
answers…. This was the most Gramscian project so far, a clear demonstration of the 
capacity of art to effect change’.366 
 
Being an architect, ‘democratic design’ for Jaar does not mean that it is a more 
functional or useful appropriation of public spaces, but showing that there are never 
places that impose their law totally; that there are always several ways of occupying 
it, depending on what sort of world one has in mind. As the public is never asked 
how and where advertisers should advertise, Jaar does not ask their permission to 
place the work in strategic spaces. For example, at the Spring Street subway station 
in New York City, Jaar displayed eighty-one posters of men mining for gold. He 
then added text reflecting the price of gold from different world markets to the six or 
seven segments he displayed. As people used the subway, many traveling from 
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uptown New York to Wall Street, he wanted to connect the reality of the Amazon 
workers with the reality of people on Wall Street controlling the price of gold. Jaar 
offered no explanation or didactic text. He simply replaced the usual advertising 
images in the subway with other images that exist but are not advertised. In this way 
Jaar constantly challenges and breakes down capitalist monopolies of the public 
space, where the public voice is replaced by publicity by the legitimising process of 
those who have more power and access to speaking in that space at the expense of 
others.  
 
Such public interventions really question the idea that in contemporary capitalism all 
life is really framed within the capitalist organisation of time and of life. Of course 
the possibilities of life are different and the organisation of private and public life is 
quite different, but it is not as if public space cannot be constructed in different 
ways. Jaar’s positioning of the images clearly contradicts the existing picture of 
sleek advertising-led reality, making people feel that perhaps the capitalist machine 
is not eternal. Meanwhile, by showing the ‘other side’ of the market, men mining for 
gold, Jaar somehow states that while everything appears to have changed, nothing 
has changed.  
 
And this is what the idea of emancipation implies. This is not about emancipation 
from capitalism as such, but rather challenging this widespread belief that life today 
is fully subsumed by capitalism and that it is the same wherever you go. While post-
Fordism capitalism certainly occupies many symbolic parameters of our life, Jaar’s 
work is neither informed by nor aimed at resistance of capitalism per se. Jaar’s view 
rather is that the dominant paradigm of overwhelming post-Fordism attests to a 
rather narrow Western perspective and, even in the West, it does not constitute a 
single political space with which we should engage or escape from. 
 
Jaar’s political dimension in art concerns particular situations, particular discourses 
and not the context allegedly ‘written in stone’ by the post-Fordist mode of 
economy. The current economic regime certainly has a political dimension; 
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however, this is not the only dimension from which we should approach existing 
power relations. In fact, Jaar’s work appears to be ‘immune’ to the belief that critical 
art could only be considered within the range of possible attitudes towards post-
Fordism, which allegedly asks for a radically new conception of political and artistic 
practices. It is still power and not art that constructs social relations. The 
significance of the role that art plays in a post-Fordist world, according to Jaar, does 
not consist of the possibility of producing an entirely new set of social relations – 
such as, for example, the ambition for building so-called creative cities, the global 
booming of bienniales and other arts festivals and artistic ways of life, but in 
‘unframing’ and ‘re-framing’ existing paradigms, engaging with particular moments 
of power that do not fit within how neoliberalism presents itself as an inevitable, 
logical and positive fact of life that responds only to logical and natural market 
forces and thus vouchsafing their optimum effect. Post-Fordist capitalism for Jaar 
appears to be strong because nearly every political structure supports the same 
neoliberal perception and hence the need for a dispute based on ‘ideology’ on 
political grounds appears to be outdated.  
 
Hence Jaar’s attitude towards the capitalist mobilisation of society could be 
characterised by how Chantal Mouffe describes a political intervention. Mouffe 
states, ‘A properly political intervention is always one that engages with a certain 
aspect of the existing hegemony in order to disarticulate/re-articulate its constitutive 
elements. It can never be merely oppositional or conceived as desertion because it 
aims to re-articulate the situation in a new configuration’.367 In other words, a 
political intervention does not struggle against or escape from capitalism or any 
other general terms such as ‘poverty’, for example, but rather targets certain 
relations of power in order to produce, in Mouffe’s words, ‘a relation of 
equivalence’ between various re-articulations of power relations.  
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Alfredo Jaar’s works remind us that there is no such place where power is liberated 
from its own blindness about itself. His ‘inability to show everything’ corresponds to 
the regime of visibility, which is based on the premise that society is always lacking 
something. For Jaar, the recognition of this lack is the precondition of social critique 
and the power of the image lies in disturbing the regime of the connection between 
what is said, what is given and what is shown, because images for him are not 
anticipated by their meaning, which we have in mind. While the artwork can never 
replace the lack of a ‘true’ reality, it can, if based on the perspective of the lack, 
present itself as a witness, as an image of ‘intolerability’ that stands in opposition to 
itself and thus to the reality it is supposed to represent. This notion of the image 
standing in opposition to itself also corresponds to what Lacan terms the 
‘identification with the symptom’. Through Jaar’s ‘inability to show everything’, the 
artist thematises his own and the work’s attachment to the symbolic system. To say 
that the power is blind and so the image, which attempts to represent its components, 
is to acknowledge the limits of self-knowledge, of art’s capacities and thus to 
assume our own responsibility for our multiple accommodation of power structures 
on cognitive and affective levels. 
 
The image is not a representation of a thing or an object; rather, it belongs to its own 
system of visibility, which accepts that it cannot make everything visible, that there 
are articulations that did not occur, missing voices, and when there is ‘nothing to 
see’, there is always something to look for. Because Jaar’s art begins with its 
inability to show everything, it is capable of cracking open the unity of the given, the 
apparent harmony between what is articulated and the obviousness of the visible and 
what cannot be shown. This art shows that all societal systems are flawed and that 
there is never a full image, positive or negative; there is always something missing 
and the artist cannot fulfil these absences, silences, lack of visibility and inclusion. 
Jaar’s ‘inability to show everything’ that society wants to see reminds us that any 
unity is based on cracks, and ignoring this means repeating history and not the ‘end 
of it’. That is why, perhaps, Jaar’s utopia says: keep looking and keep articulating 





There is an increasing need to challenge the dangerous ‘post-political’ order, which, 
in the absence of any alternatives, silences the centrality of antagonism and prevents 
passions from assuming a role in the public sphere, only to produce more 
antagonisms. Chantal Mouffe constantly warns that only by lifting the present ‘post-
political’ repression of ignorance can we hope to ‘tame’ potentially destructive 
antagonisms. There is an ongoing discussion in the art world of whether and how 
artistic practices can contribute to the re-politicisation and, possibly, to the 
emergence of a new political field. Today’s mainstream approach appears to be 
concerned with the post-Fordist condition and disappearance of art’s autonomy due 
to artistic practices becoming a strategic point of the contemporary economy. This 
approach assigns art and politics to distinct sub-systems within the overall social 
system. According to such a view, society consists of separate areas such as politics, 
economy, culture, law etc. This structuring of society, as Gielen argues in The 
Murmuring of the Artistic Multitude, is viewed as something that may jeopardise the 
autonomy of each field. The artist is a practitioner of some sort of universal 
aesthetical field for Gielen, and therefore he perceives the post-Fordist situation as a 
threat to art’s autonomy, which he views as the precondition of social critique. 
Gielen appears to focus on the role of art in the economic phenomenon of post-
Fordism, which he understands in terms of a labour model – it suggests that the 
political trajectory of art today could only be envisaged as escaping the prison of the 
post-Fordist economy by concentrating on creating alternative structures where art 
would reproduce social relations under the artistic logic.  
 
In contrast to Gielen’s argument, Alfredo Jaar views artistic practice as a public 
intervention – for him post-Fordist conditions manifest that today, the artist, as never 
before, is a particularly vital figure in challenging what is accepted as the ‘common 
sense’. Corresponding to Jacques Rancière’s notion of ‘the intolerability of the 
image’, which he places at the heart of the tensions affecting political art and 
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Chantal Mouffe’s argument that democratic politics require ‘…coming to terms with 
the lack of a final ground and the undecidability which pervades every order…’368, 
Jaar envisages critical art as the regime of visibility, which reminds us that the 
present society, as any other social order, is always lacking something. There is 
always something missing, hidden or unsaid, and while the artist cannot fulfill these 
gaps, he can certainly show that they exist. While the artwork can never replace the 
lack of a ‘true’ reality, it can, if based on the perspective of the lack, present itself as 
a witness, as an image of ‘intolerability’, which stands in opposition to itself and 
thus to the reality it is supposed to represent. Jaar’s works tend to witness the limits 
of things, to expose the flawed character of any consensus, which is never based on 
innocence but on dangerous complicity to cover up the lack and to silence or ignore 
the irresolvable antagonisms that Chantal Mouffe has placed at the center of political 
life. The mainstream of contemporary art has become a place to define the ‘Other’ 
while Jaar considers art a place where it dissolves.   
 
Jaar’s works give voices to many individuals who are hidden from view in the neo-
liberal hegemonic order. However, they do it in a way that not only opposes the 
totalising images of society but also the totalisation of the sensible. In this way, the 
condition of lack is what is shared by both regimes: the social and the aesthetic one. 
The regimes prevent each other from closure and this is how the link between artistic 
practices and political theory could be envisaged. Democratic politics are about 
making the traces of power and exclusion visible and critical artistic practices can 
create spaces that question the dominant hegemony; however, they challenge it in a 
way that, through the aesthetic paradox, resists all determinisms.  
 
While thinking starting with ‘inability’, ‘incapacity’, ‘intolerability’ and lack is a 
powerful tool with which to approach society in a critical way, there are other 
approaches that attempt, despite the fact that society is always lacking something 
and all societal systems are flawed, to construct a collective will, to engage 
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positively with the context where works are produced. In other words, can art also 
act as an optical tool through which ‘fragments’ can be brought together, producing 
an aesthetic model, different from the political or economic type of globalisation? In 
his recent book The Radicant Nicolas Bourriaud invites us, after the era of the avant-
garde, to envisage art as re-editing the existing components of life into alternative 
possibilities. While Bourriaud seems to agree with Alfredo Jaar that art is not able to 
rediscover its essence and reboot the world from a single master principle – it can 
never show ‘everything’ but can expose the lacking elements on which the ‘fullness’ 
of society is based – he opts for ‘other’ criteria when it comes to envisaging what 
political possibilities artistic contemporary artistic practices can open and how. What 
Bourriaud has in mind is not the idea of a ‘negative’ aesthetic experience as a claim 
about the brutal nature of a social reality, but rather a ‘positive’ vision of a new 
cultural era where artistic practices do not just resist all kinds of determinism but 






















While we conceive of the works of Alfredo Jaar as a counter-hegemonic intervention 
that aims to act against the position of supremacy of any hegemonic order, could 
there be other ways to weaken the ‘centre’ in a more positive way? Are we just 
doomed to proliferate the void of meaning or can this void become a new opening, a 
beginning, which does not correspond to building a completely new society from 
scratch but, meanwhile, able to bring changes in power relationships? In this way, 
the idea to pluralise modernism in the era of globalisation can help us to redefine the 
project of modern democracy in the post-political era. There is this tortuous question 
of the destiny of the project of modern democracy, which is intrinsically connected 
to the question of the ways in which artistic and cultural practices can envisage our 
present otherwise. We are told that there is no alternative to the actual liberal 
democracy and capitalist pluralism, the dilemma that in the artistic realm is 
sometimes articulated as the opposition between modernism and postmodernism. 
However, if we accept that the alternative is not revolutionary politics, what happens 
to modernism? How can art make sense of our present in the absence of any credible 
political narrative – how can it be modern and democratic? Can we pluralise 
modernism and thus pluralise democracy?  
 
For Rancière, aesthetics does not provide us with a privileged starting point per se; 
rather, we should attempt to reassess the relations between seeing, doing and 
speaking. Emancipation for him means blurring these boundaries. What he proposes 
is that contemporary image making is an evolution rather than a revolutionary break 
from traditional aesthetics. He perceives different distributions of the sensible as 
opening onto the reason rather than acting against it. Rancière argues that art should 
not be subordinate to ethics or critical discourse and the tradition of the critical art of 
doing, generally called “postmodern.” The central argument of the Emancipated 
spectator is a reassessment of aesthetic agency in artworks that exists in the absence 
of any credible political narrative. Developing Rancière’s understanding, in his latest 
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work The Radicant, Nicolas Bourriaud emphasises ‘the ontological precariousness 
that is the foundation of contemporary aesthetics’. What Bourriaud argues for when 
he speaks about the ‘new modernity’ of altermodernity is the renewal of modernist 
aesthetics when the void of meaning becomes an opening, what he calls an ‘editing 
table’ for making sense of our being in common. This aesthetics invokes taking the 
precariousness and ungrounding of things as a source of positivity, seeking to take 
up the modernist ethos of creation from a constitutively inauthentic position. What is 
at issue is not to reject or accept modernism, but to pluralise it.  
 
Towards the Markers of Uncertainty  
 
As Claude Lefort pointed out, what characterises modernity is the ‘dissolution of the 
markers of certainty’.369 To be modern is to belong to the present, to have a 
subjectivity of wandering and contingency inspired by the ‘attitude of modernity’, 
which Michael Foucault associates with Charles Baudelaire: this attitude respects the 
present but at the same time has a will to imagine how these realities could be 
otherwise. Bourriaud explains this attitude: ‘modern art has led to a creative ethics, 
rebellious to the norm, whose first imperative can be formulated as follows: make 
your life a work of art’.370 For Bourriaud, as indeed for Rancière, aesthetic is what 
remains as a positive mark of the modernist model after the dreams of progress and 
the essentialist vision of humankind destiny have passed away. If the attitude of 
modernity is to envisage our present otherwise, then Bourriaud’s new line of 
thinking, which he terms altermodern, conceptualises such an attitude. Within the 
complex lines of thinking that have made up modernism, there is an aesthetic of 
working the uncertain and ruptured world in order to create a meaning out of it. 
While purity and destiny do not longer make any sense for us, this sense can be 
made out of precariousness and displacements.  
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While postmodernism has rejected totality, manifestations of essentialism have 
found their way back into the postmodern logic in the form of a proliferation of 
essences through the ethics of multiculturalism. Dismissing both modernism with its 
concepts born of Enlightenment philosophy such as emancipation, resistance or 
alienation and postmodernism, the pluralist logic of which is presupposed by the 
market, Bourriaud proposes a concept of an ‘altermodernity’, the first truly 
worldwide culture, which neither corresponds to the modernist politics nor is it 
dictated by postmodernist market logic. This ‘altermodernity’ could develop a 
specific imagination in which differences would come into being by creating their 
own context without subscribing to the capitalist globalisation and, at the same time, 
reducing or ‘modernising’ cultural and social reality to Western political formats. 
Opposing all radicalism, Bourriuad suggests thinking along the lines of radicantism. 
He explains,  
 
‘To be radicant means setting one’s roots in motion, staging them in heterogeneous 
contexts and formats, denying them the power to completely define one’s identity, 
translating ideas, transcoding images, transplanting behaviors, exchanging rather than 
imposing’.371 
 
What Bourriaud has in mind is not the idea of a ‘negative’ aesthetic experience as a 
claim about a brutal nature of a social reality, but rather a ‘positive’ vision of a new 
cultural era where thinking about the visual is free from all kind of determinism. 
Bourriaud writes, ‘Alter-modernism is that moment when it become possible for us 
to produce something that made sense starting from an assumed heterochrony…from 
a view of human history as constituted of multiple temporalities, disdaining a 
nostalgia for the avant-garde and indeed for any era – a positive vision of chaos and 
complexity’.372  
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In a contrast to postmodernist relativism, which defines and values artworks solely 
in the context in which they were created or the cultural origins of the artist, the 
radicant artist is free to travel the world and create works that come as the result of 
his encounters with the various cultures of the world. While this global aesthetics 
bears certain similarities to modernist universalism, this is a ‘strategic universalism’ 
– a renewal of the modernist trajectory after the multiculturally oriented 
postmodernism on the basis of different ‘modernisms’ – a global and inter-cultural. 
Bourriaud writes, ‘Translation is the keyword for a new altermodern universalism, 
which is not based on norms, but on displacements’.373  
 
What is at issue in Bourriaud’s project is, perhaps, to think about the destiny of the 
universal, of aesthetic modernism without reducing art to the vehicle of ethical 
demands or the cipher of a transcendent truth. The question is to discover the current 
places of contemporary practices – of what we view as art.  
 
What Bourriaud attempts to envisage is how, in times of a globalised world and 
shifting identities, a new altermodern universalism, based on these displacements 
and not on norms, could be created. According to Bourriaud, globalisation is 
discussed from political and economic points of view but almost never from an 
aesthetic perspective. What is at issue here is the creation of new collective symbols 
that are based on destabilisation and displacement ideas of origins, cultural roots and 
centres of production, using ‘global art’ as their ‘starting point’ at the same time. 
Some critics pointed out that if the displacement of nationalism and ethnicity is 
issued against globalisation, then artists will have nothing to fall back on as a 
position of resistance. The question they ask is: what is the difference between 
globalisation and a new global culture? Bourriaud argues that today art merely 
follows the contours of globalisation, which is above all economic in character and 
turns diversity of all forms into the inverted reflection of uniformity. However, 
Bourriaud points out that ‘within the global art world there is a fracture, for the most 
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part unmentioned, that stems less from cultural difference than from degrees of 
economic development. The gap that still exists between the center and the 
periphery does not separate traditional cultures from cultures reformed by 
modernism, but economic systems at different stages of evolution toward global 
capitalism’.374 It would be naïve to think, continues Bourriaud, that a contemporary 
work of art is the natural expression of the culture its author comes from. An 
alternative to ‘art of capitalism’ is the affirmation that ‘…there are no pure cultural 
habitats, but rather cultural traditions and specifications cut across by this 
globalization of the economy’.375 The way to reclaim ‘global art’ from ‘art of 
capitalism’ is to abandon multiculturalism and re-read the modernist matrix in the 
light of artists’ specific visual and intellectual environment. Bouirriaud states, ‘One 
of the virtual properties of the image is its power of linkage… flags, logos, icons, 
signs, all produce empathy and sharing, and all generate bonds.’376 Interculturalism, 
unlike multiculturalism, is a type of linkage that does not operate though an origin as 
a type of revealer, but as a new ‘modern moment based on generalized translation, 
the form of wandering, an ethics of precariousness and a heterochronic vision of 
history’.377  It groups together all the local oppositions to the economic globalisation 
where diversity does not result in totalisation itself. Culture here is envisaged not as 
a shared value but as a composition of fragments – something like an ‘archipelago’ – 
one of Bourriaud’s metaphors for the era’s stance against determinism, as a 
particular visuality that empties ‘names’ and ‘symbols’ of their original significance.  
 
What Bourriaud points out is that there is no single modernity essentially connected 
to the development of Western capitalism and imperialism. Contrary to, for example, 
Frederic Jameson, who envisages modernity as exclusively connected to capitalism 
with globalisation as the current feature of this modernity’s development, Bourriaud 
argues that the current habitations of contemporary art practice cannot be reduced to 
locating the different experiences of modernity that constitute the basis of global art 
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production. The Indian historian Dipesh Chakrabarty has provided helpful insights 
about the view of time and modernity by pointing out the difficulties of 
understanding the Indian past through a lens constructed by Hegel and Marx. He 
argues that such models relegate India to the margins of world history since the ideas 
of progressive modernity and capitalism did not constitute the core of Indian society. 
Chakrabarty suggests that we need other understandings of history and time if we 
are not to perpetuate the dominance of European traditions. He states,  
 
‘The project of provincializing “Europe” cannot therefore be a project of ‘cultural 
relativism’. It cannot originate from the stance that the reason/science/universals 
which help define Europe as the modern are simply “culture-specific” and therefore 
only belong to European cultures. For the point is not that Enlightenment 
rationalism is always unreasonable in itself but rather a matter of documenting how 
– through what historical process – its ‘reason’, which was not always self-evident 
to everyone, has been made to look “obvious” far beyond the ground where it 
originated’.378  
 
What Chakrabarty points out is that the ‘heterotemporal history of 
modernity’ shows that modernity is translated into the diverse models of social 
identity in the local contexts rather than being applied. In his Provincializing 
Europe: Post-colonial Thought and Historical Difference, Chakrabarty argues that 
there is no universalism in historical experiences but rather a process of 
‘provincialising’,379 de-centering the idea of the ‘centre’ and one single modernity. 
Applying Chakrabarty’s thinking to Bourriaud’s question of the destiny of the 
aesthetic principle of the universal, influential curator and thinker Okwui Enwezor 
suggests that the idea of altermodernity in contemporary art refers to provincialising 
contemporary art – to reject the rigid structures of modernity and its ideal of artistic 
autonomy and instead construct a different, de-centered modernity. Enwezor writes, 
‘If there is anything that marks the path of the altermodern, it would be the 
                                                
378 Chakrabarty, Dipesh, ‘Postcoloniality and the Artifice of History: Who Speaks for the Indian 
Pasts?’, Representations No. 37, 1992: 20-21 
379 Chakrabarty, Dipesh, Provincializing Europe: Post-colonial Thought and Historical Difference, 
Princeton, 2007: xvii 
 209 
provincialities of contemporary art practice today – that is, the degree to which these 
practices, however globalized they may appear, are also informed by specific 
epistemological models and aesthetical conditions’.380 In this way, the project of 
altermodernity could be understood as the coming together of various multiple fields 
of artistic practices that have been disturbed by globalisation and are measured 
against the single principle of modernity. Enwezor argues that the altermodern 
project is neither a rejection of modernity and modernism nor its acceptance. He 
writes,  
 
‘In this way, rather than being the decentring of the universal, or the relocation of 
the centre of contemporary art, as the notion of the offshore suggests, it becomes 
instead, the emergence of multiplicity, the breakdown of cultural or locational 
hierarchies, the absence of a singular locus or a limited number of centers’.381 
 
 Hence the idea of altermodernity could be understood as a project for the 
pluralisation of modernism – its universal aspect comes into life from the common 
lack of a center – meaning is created through various encounters with other 
modernities.  
 
According to Bourriaud, the altermodern state of mind presupposed going against 
the grain on both sides: on the one hand against cultural standartisation and on the 
other against nationalisms and cultural relativism. However, this altermodernism is 
still a modernism, since the role of contemporary art was always to refuse and 
question orthodoxies, including modernism itself, but unlike the latter, 
altermodernism positions itself within the ‘world cultural gaps’ – culture-crossing 
and linking signs that belong to distant cultural habitats is what is at the centre of 
contemporary art production. What follows is this understanding of art as dynamic 
forces that seek out multiple relations and meanings; art is not a universal sign, 
frozen in time and space.  
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Certainly, Bourriaud’s and Enwezor’s argument strives to deepen and institutionalise 
the position against any uniform view of artistic practice today and the non-universal 
nature of modernity itself, and it is through different locales of practices and 
experiences that we can learn about the contingent character of modernity rather 
than its universalism. This attitude, the state of mind that comes alive through 
altermodern artistic practice of linking different fragments, translating, wandering 
and culture-crossing, is how the ethical thrust of modernism – the will to make sense 
of contingent fleeting modernity – can be continued. Enwezor captures this ethos 
rather well:  
 
‘It strikes me that the idea of altermodern, as it deviates from the limits placed on 
life and subjectivity by the instrumental violence of modernity, cannot be captured 
by focusing alone on shifts in locales of practice or by strategies of resistance 
against domination. The altermodern is to be found in the work of art itself; the 
work of art as a manifestation of pure difference in all social, cultural and political 
signs it wields to elaborate that difference. It is the space in which to fulfill the 
radical gesture of refusal and disobedience, not in the formal space, but in the 
ethical and epistemological sense’.382 
 
New Modernity or Modernities?  
 
Many critics have argued that altermodernity is just another repetition of the 
modernist dream and that Bourriuad’s idea of ‘mobile identities and meanings’ is 
reminiscent of post-Fordist ‘flexible identities’. Some critics pointed out that if 
displacement of nationalism and ethnicity is issued against globalisation, then artists 
will have nothing to fall back on as a position of resistance. The question they ask is: 
what is the difference between globalisation and a new global culture? For example, 
David Cunningham effectively summarises the position, which questions 
                                                
382 Enwezor, Okwui, ‘Modernity and Postcolonial Ambivalence’, Altermodern: Tate Triennial, 
Catalogue, London, Tate Britain, 2009 
 211 
Bourriuad’s ‘…brandname, for some vaguely identified feature of contemporary 
artistic culture as a whole’.383  
 
Cunningham argues that the concept of altermodernism reflects not a ‘new 
modernity’ but a tendency to overlook the real issue – ‘the internally changing forms 
of capitalist modernity itself’.384 ‘The modern is back in fashion, in the artworld as 
elsewhere’385, because, according to Cunningham, we constantly need to declare the 
arrival of whole new epochs to grasp the present, which is escaping, and fleeting 
away – this is the ‘fundamental dynamic of the modern itself’. Cunningham writes, 
‘For as Marx foresaw, more than a century and a half ago, it is, above all, 
capitalism’s compulsion to ‘nestle everywhere, settle everywhere, establish 
connexions everywhere’386 – powered by the universalization of the exchange value 
form – that underpins the ‘circuits of globalization’; not least, of course, within the 
contemporary artworld’. However, if the cultural characteristics of our time are 
economically determined, as Frederic Jameson and other historical materialists 
argue, then we live in a kind of eternal present. Far from proliferating difference, the 
capitalist market ensures an ever-lasting homogeneity. Indeed, the capitalist 
modernity is at large; however, as Bruno Latour’s points out, ‘the world has never 
been modern’387 – meaning that there is a much more complex picture of the world – 
multiple modernities. For Bourriaud, via Chakrabarty, examining various artistic 
locales, what we can understand about modernity is precisely the lack of its 
universalism. The purpose of Bourriaud’s theory is to discover the current 
habitations of contemporary art, to challenge the modernist ideal of artistic 
autonomy and practice, to deconstruct false legitimacies of modernity’s supposedly 
universalising effects, since art’s global appearance is not the entire story. It would 
be naïve to think, argues Bourriuad, that a contemporary work of art is the natural 
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expression of the culture its author comes from. An alternative to ‘art of capitalism’ 
is the affirmation that ‘…there are no pure cultural habitats, but rather cultural 
traditions and specifications cut across by this globalization of the economy’.388 
There is no one lineage of contemporary art, and in order to reveal its various 
trajectories, we need to pluralise modernism. Enwezor argues that  
 
‘Looking for an equivalent of Andy Warhol in Mao’s China is to be seriously blind 
to the fact that China of the Pop art era had neither a consumer society nor a 
capitalist structure, two things that were instrumentalised in Warhol’s critique and 
usage of its images. In that sense, Pop art would be anathema to the revolutionary 
program – and, one might even claim, to the avant-garde imagination…’389 
 
According to Cunningham, the concept of altermodernity is the same old scenario: 
‘Crucially, rather than unpack the problems that were always already attendant on 
the very idea of a postmodern, the ‘concept’ of the altermodern merely compounds 
and extends them, insofar as it can only repeat the fundamental conceptual 
confusions about the nature of the modern as a structure of time – rather than a 
‘period’ per se – from which the former notion derived’.390 However, as Bourriaud 
points out, ‘Postmodern multiculturalism has failed to invent an alternative to 
modernist universalism, for everywhere it has been applied it has recreated cultural 
anchorages or ethnic enrootedness’.391 Bourriaud’s argument is that the choice 
between modernism and postmodernism is, in fact, a false dilemma – both are forms 
of totalisation, symbolic and empirical at the same time. In the style of Rancière, 
who does not engage with the conceptions of the modern and postmodern but 
instead has drawn up his schemata of ‘regimes of the sensible’ from which he places 
the modern period within the aesthetic regime that derive from Schiller and Kant, 
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Bourriaud’s question is instead: ‘To what are we faithful?’392 Bourriaud points out 
that the works of, for example, Kazimir Malevich or Marcel Duchamp, are not 
products of history, nor the results of some socio-political determinisms, but rather 
they construct history.  
 
The question Bourriaud asks is: how can it be possible to free ourselves of all kinds 
of ‘roots’? Is it possible to envisage individuals who are not dependant on the visual 
and mental reflexes and programming of the social group we came from, from 
cultural determinism, from other forms of order? ‘Nothing could be less certain’, 
says Bourriaud; however, for him, the issue of radicantism is not a matter of 
rejecting one’s heritage, but the willingness to be ‘the tenant of existing forms’.393 It 
is not a matter of rejecting one’s identity, but of multiplying it, thus weakening its 
particular grip and, at the same time, possibly, constructing new collective symbols 
that do not derive from ethnic, national or global capitalist representation. 
Altermodernity then can be understood as a continuous encounter of ‘a multitude of 
cultural semes and through ongoing translation of singularities’.394 It is not that the 
old ‘…modernism is apparently ‘reloaded’ after postmodernism, as a form of return 
that is also, all-too familiarly, a new beginning: a reloading of the very ‘possibility 
of producing singularities’…but both trajectories are rejected through pluralizing 
modernism – there are multiple ‘regimes of the sensible’, capable of producing their 
own history. To be altermodern is like having faith without religion. For example, 
Enwezor points out that ‘The position of political Islam is in remarkable accord with 
the idea of the altermodern’.395  
 
One of Cunningham’s main objections is that the ‘theoretical hypothesis’ behind the 
artworks functions as ‘…the alibi for discussing all manner of things…which may 
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not have anything to do with the actual art displayed, or indeed with art in general’. 
He states,  
‘In an important sense, the kinds of art-theoretical concerns that Altermodern 
reflects are less focused on the critical potentials of the individual artwork than on 
various broader networks of cultural translation, communication and exchange 
internal to the institutional operations of the artworld itself’.396  
 
However, the individuality of the work of art is a problematic in itself, and it cannot 
escape ‘theoretical hypothesis’. Who is the author and producer or Damien Hirst’s 
shark or Ai Weiwei’s seeds? In the early modern period, the idea of the fine artist 
referred to the position of the ‘creator’. Historically, the difference between art and 
craft appears to have been defined by usage: artists, mostly male, created things that 
were primarily displayed, while craft workers, mostly female, made things that were 
used. Art was seen as belonging to a higher plane, something unique that only the 
creator could materialise. Duchamp, for example, has challenged the conception of 
the creator, which was largely associated with the uniqueness of the artwork. Having 
drawn a distinction between the work of art and the labour of manufacture, 
Duchamp has introduced strategies that removed the hand of the artist from the 
production of the physical object. Since then, contemporary artists have understood 
that one does not have to make things – one can use existing materials or have a 
whole factory making things for you, as in the case of Damien Hirst. For example, 
Chinese artist Ai Weiwei’s work, which is mostly made by traditional artisans, raises 
the ‘culture problem’ – who decides what is precious and of enduring value to 
society, and for what reasons? Similarly, following Duchamp’s line of thinking, 
Subodh Gupta (exhibited at Altermodern: Tate Triennial, London, Tate Britain, 
2009) argues that art is about the transformation of everyday objects, signs into 
different signs. He says that he never creates anything as such, but transforms; that 
an individual work of art is a conceptual impossibility and that art is instead a 
manner of thinking in which the artist navigates through the existing cultural stock 
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of signs to displace them. Art for Gupta is an aesthetic of displacement – a matter of 
translating signs into a different visual experience until another artist re-translates it. 
According to Gupta, a notion of the individual work of art only matters in terms of 
ownership of art and not in terms of its position within other practices and discourses 
in society.  
 
It is not that an individual artwork must be translated into a wider symbolic network 
or a particular culture into a wider cultural framework of understanding and relating, 
but rather the altermodern is located in the work of art and not outside it, and this 
means taking translation as the opening, de-centering of any master narratives. There 
is no true language, only translation as impossibility of a final, original meaning or a 
root. For Bourriaud the ethics of translation serves as a model of subjectivity, which 
does not ‘…seek an ideal state of the self or society. Instead, they organize signs in 
order to multiply one identity by another’.397  
 
It is not that the new modernity would be based on translation in the manner of the 
other being accepted and recognised through the act of translating, but that 
translation here comes as an impossibility of a single language, a unity – there are no 
roots and therefore, Bourriaud proposes, ‘We must reach the age of translation’. 
 
Translation as the Language  
 
Translation implies adapting the meaning of a proposition, enabling it to pass from 
one code to another, which presupposes a mastery of both languages and also 
implies that neither of them is self-evident. Benjamin’s essay ‘The Task of the 
Translator’ invokes the ideal of translation as a desire for the one true language 
where translation would be unnecessary. Here, the act of translation appears as a 
necessity that would be ideally overcome. However, as Benjamin writes, ‘all 
translation is only a somewhat provisional way of coming to terms with the 
foreignness of languages. An instant and final rather than a temporary and 
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provisional solution of this foreignness remains out of the reach of mankind; at any 
rate, it eludes direct attempt’.398 This conception of relationality is intertwined with 
the mythology of a ‘true’ language that would bridge the differences entrenched in 
the modernist ethos. Meanwhile, considering ontology otherwise – there is no ‘pure 
language’ – when we speak, we translate – helps us to grasp what Bourriaud means 
by translation. From an ontological perspective in which there is no place for a 
‘proper’ origin or an identifying essence open in advance, we open ourselves to a 
relation involving risk, precariousness and wandering. We become who we are in 
our translation between ourselves, across borders and into new contexts of cultural 
and aesthetic constellations. Therefore we take neither ourselves nor the stranger as 
given. Translation is not a process of recognition of the other – ‘where are you come 
from’ – but a constant unfolding on sense, which is otherwise lacking. The identity 
of the Self is not to be found in an image of the same and nor is the meaning of 
translation to be found in a pure and objective rendering. The work of translation, 
like the work of mourning, involves being able to move away from the object of 
loss. Translation becomes the means of rethinking ethics for an altermodern 
understanding of subjectivity. As Bourriaud writes, ‘…to be radicant means setting 
one’s roots in motion, staging them in heterogeneous contexts and formats, denying 
them the power to completely define one’s identity, translating ideas, transcoding 
images, transplanting behaviors, exchanging rather than imposing’.399 In other 
words, Bourriaud’s idea of translation refers to the lack of a centre as such – whether 
it is a centre or a periphery.  
 
Cunningham appears to support the claim that ‘we should move away from analysis 
of art as merely ‘reflective’ or ‘illustrative’ of global processes…towards an analysis 
of the ways in which cultural practices may inform such processes, and hence help 
to produce certain ‘new and unexpected realities within circuits of globalization,’400 
but while appealing, he finds such a move still a matter of fiction – too Deleuzian 
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and too vague to form an alternative to the transnational world of the market and art 
institutions. If altermodern strategy is to become meaningful, Cunningham argues, 
then ‘it will have to make productive the social contradictions inherent in the 
formation of any putatively global public space around it.’401 However, the goal of 
the altermodern strategy is precisely to disconnect, displace this global public space 
through the construction of a work of art as ‘pure difference’. What is at issue is not 
to resist globalisation factually, but through works of art in the ethical sense – the 
use of fiction as an expression of autonomy can reveal ‘…how precarious our so-
called ‘natural context’ is’.402  
 
The most cynical approach to Bourriaud’s proposition, according to Cunningham, 
would be to view it as something that ‘…at best, compensates for the progressive 
loss of other sites for ‘positing theories [and] exploring histories’, in particular 
specifically political forums such as were once sustained by the Left, and, at worst, 
risks aiding the wider processes of de-politicization at work in advanced capitalist 
societies today, reducing such theories and histories to so much fodder for art’s own 
reproduction’.403 Yet the point at issue is not to reduce any theories and histories. 
According to Chakrabarty, the critique of the ‘grand narratives’ cannot be reductive. 
The task, rather, is not to ‘relativise’ them but to understand, to ‘open’ the 
circumstances that have made them indispensable. If Chakrabarty is correct and the 
notion of modernity cannot account for the time of non-European peoples, then the 
‘global’ transformation of the art world specific to the time of contemporaneity also 
does not make sense. It is through pluralising modernism that we can then 
understand that there are multiple histories, multiple modernities. Rather than 
consigning the art of our time to the realm of ‘post-history’, thus emptying it of its 
historical substance and meaning, Bourriaud suggests that time is not uniform, but 
what characterises it is its heterochronicity, ‘a vision of human history as constituted 
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by multiple temporalities’. The consequence of privileging contemporaneity in this 
way is that it welcomes a universal time or a non-time. The nature of the modern, 
then, is not a structure of time, but its absence.  
 
Bourriaud claims that in order to stir up a new imaginary we must free ourselves 
from concepts such as emancipation, resistance, alienation etc., born out of 
Enlightenment philosophy; that the question we should ask is not about what social 
entities must be emancipated, but how to create an ‘emancipatory’ form. Bourriaud 
says, ‘It is what I call a ‘trajectoral form’, allowing artists to articulate elements 
disseminated in time and space. Artists like Pierre Huyghe and Franz Ackermann 
combine space and time in their works; while Seth Price and Kelly Walker produce 
signs that have no material support anymore. The place of the artwork is now a 
journey or a line rather than a unified space. In parallel, have you noticed how the 
‘past’ is now explored by many artists as the last terra incognita?’404 Altermodern 
then can be envisaged not as something that belongs to its time, but as something 
that constructs times and histories in the first place. It appears that the modern 
moment in contemporary art can be located in its form that protects the 
precariousness of the world. If anything is modern, it is only what art can 
deconstruct and then reconstruct for everyday life. By emphasising the transitory, 
unstable essence of modernism, it can also reveal the arbitrary and contingent nature 
of institutions and systems. Bourriaud writes,  
 
‘If contemporary art is the bearer of a coherent political project, it is surely this: to 
introduce precariousness into the very heart of the system of representations by 
means of which the powers that be manage behaviors, to weaken all systems, to 
endow the most well-established habits with the appearance of exotic rituals’.405  
 
According to Bourriaud, such registration of impurity and multiplicity can produce 
an ethical form of aesthetic inspiration with a truly populist appeal – what we have 
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in common is not a shared goal or a leader, but the lack of origins – it challenges the 
meta-political fantasy of a harmonious community, and the possibility of a universal 
order, meanwhile, creates a sense of solidarity based on what Bourriaud calls a 
‘strategic cultural form’.  
 
Bourriaud’s idea of ‘strategic universalism’ appears to be concerned not with 
politics as the sphere of activities and structures, but rather with what Chantal 
Mouffe describes as a ‘political’ as the very constitutive moment, the ontological 
horizon of every ordering of social relations. This is the moment that dislocates 
some established aspects and institutes new ones. The political dimension is 
something that constitutes ordering and not an entire order. Mouffe writes, ‘The 
political, for its part, concerns the symbolic ordering of social relations, what Claude 
Lefort calls the ‘mise en scene’, the ‘mise en forme’ of human coexistence, and this 
is where lies its aesthetic dimension’.406 This type of art that Bourriaud attempts to 
theorise under the term of altermodern, does not act as ‘politics’ such as artistic 
activism or, on the contrary, production of distinct sub-systems within the social 
system, but brings back the political moment as raising the issues of the complex 
processes of identification and not identity, ordering and not an order. The 
altermodern trajectory of ordering, which can only be temporal, incomplete and 
mobile instead of working out an alternative order, corresponds to Chantal Mouffe’s 
idea about the ‘decentered’ subject – which community would ‘divided’ subjects 
produce? In Bourriaud’s view this could be a community in which the identity of 
one would change the identity of the other. Mouffe writes,  
 
‘The regimes of collective identities resulting from this process of articulation are 
ensembles whose configurations are always something more than the addition of 
their internal elements. As always in social life, there is a “gestaltic” dimension, 
which is decisive in understanding the perception and behavior of collective 
subjects’.407  
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The idea of pluralised modernism corresponds to Mouffe’s understanding of 
pluralism not as a fact, but as ‘an axiological principle’. This type of deep pluralism 
celebrates differences without reducing them to homogeneity of any kind. Mouffe 
elaborates, ‘Indeed, I submit that all forms of pluralism that depend on a logic of the 
social that implies the idea of ‘being as presence’, and sees ‘objectivity’ as 
belonging to the ‘things themselves’ necessarily lead to the reduction of plurality 
and to its ultimate negation. This is indeed the case with the main forms of liberal 
pluralism, which generally start by stressing what they call ‘the fact of pluralism’, 
and then go on to find procedures to deal with differences whose objective is 
actually to make those differences irrelevant and to relegate pluralism to the sphere 
of the private’.408 Was not this the case with postmodernism, when a work of art was 
explained through the status or origin of the artist, thus leading to the proliferation of 
ethnic essences instead of modernist abstract ethos?  
 
We can see that in altermodern theory differences are envisaged as the ‘condition of 
possibility’ rather than the condition of its possible reconciliation – as Enwezor 
notes, ‘The altermodern is to be found in the work of art itself; the work of art as a 
manifestation of pure difference in all social, cultural and political signs it wields to 
elaborate that difference’.409 In Enwezor’s view, the dynamics of the pluralisation of 
modernism, which prevents both the closure and the total dissemination of different 
modernisms, opens original paths and possibilities. The core ideas of modernism and 
its other various multiple versions contaminate each other and instead of 
denominating to any stable value or a system, find their legitimacy in this plurality 
of signs. Artists share the common symbolic space – that of art – but understand and 
implement it in a multiplicity of ways.  
 
It appears that Bourriaud’s and Enwezor’s idea to provincialise modernism, or, as 
we prefer to understand this, to pluralise it in the era of globalisation, corresponds to 
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Mouffe’s attempt to redefine modern democracy in the post-political era. Mouffe 
envisages radical and plural democracy as the space of the paradox; as the tension 
between liberty and democracy, which prevents the full development of both logics. 
She states, ‘Hence the need to relinquish the illusion that a rational consensus could 
ever be achieved where such a tension would be eliminated, and to realize that 
pluralist democratic politics consists in pragmatic, precarious and necessary unstable 
forms of negotiating its constitutive paradox’.410 Bourriaud’s radicant strategy, then, 
as ‘…setting one’s roots in motion, staging them in heterogeneous contexts and 
formats, denying them the power to completely define one’s identity, translating 
ideas, transcoding images, transplanting behaviors, exchanging rather than 
imposing’,411 can help us to visualise this tension, this multiplicity of ways in which 
the democratic game can be played.  
 
Mouffe speaks about the Derridean notion of the ‘constitutive outside’ as something 
that is not the ‘outside’ of a concrete content but something that challenges any 
‘concreteness’. The constitutive outside’ is ‘…not a content which would be 
asserted/negated by another content which would just be its dialectical opposite – 
which would be the case if we were simply saying that there is no ‘us’ without a 
‘them’ – but a content which, by showing the radical undecidability of the tension of 
its constitution, makes its very positivity a function of the symbol of something 
exceeding it: the possibility/impossibility of positivity as such’.412 
 
Applied to the notion of plural modernisms, this could be understood as the 
trajectoral form that comes as a symbol exceeding its own positivity – the aesthetic 
principle of the universal as something that constantly exceeds and escapes its own 
possibility. 
 
‘Decentred’ Artistic Practice – Decentering Identities  
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What might such a ‘decentred’ artistic practice look like? It would certainly be 
something that opens possibilities – producing more differences rather than closing 
them down, narrowing art to some higher, knowledgeable capacity for 
differentiation. Could we envisage artistic-political fusion as practices that mobilise 
effects in ways that run not against the dominant forms of subject articulations but 
pluralising them in such a way that the identity of one would change the identity of 
the other, so that it would be impossible for them to become totalities?  
 
While Chantal Mouffe speaks of ‘oppositional identities,’413 as a result of artistic 
critical practice, which aim to act against the position of supremacy of any 
hegemonic order; developing an altermodern ethos, one can speak of artistic 
practices that construct compository or shimmering identities, the ones that make 
such supremacy problematic.   
 
In this way we find the works of an American artist Silvia Kolbowski interesting and 
relevant to the altermodern thinking. The way in which Kolbowski makes art 
contains elements that perform a kind of resistance to universalisation while, at the 
same time, not avoiding the language of art. Rather, she uses art to speak, because 
speaking different languages is impossible in times of globalisation. For example, 
Kolbowski’s installation ‘Proximity to Power’ (2004) at the Secession (see 
Appendix, fig. 10) involves more subtle negotiations about what masculine Austrian 
power looks like. Kolbowski’s critique of this power is the artist’s blindness and 
confusion about such power’s location. Attempting to navigate through Austrian 
history, culture and knowledge reached the ‘dead end’. Kolbowski writes,  
 
‘An easy question like “who are the men in power here?” produces no definite 
answer in Vienna. There is no fixed media power in Austria, a colleague answers, 
because the major media corporation is owned by a Canadian. The titular head of 
the Austrian government has no real power, I am told, and museum trustees are not 
powerful. Austrians and Germans I speak to in Vienna equivocate about the power 
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of the Church…I find myself at a loss. I am the provincial and local artist. I can only 
bring to Vienna an American view of masculine power. The spectator at the 
Secession has to navigate an inquiry into masculine power that is neither universal 
nor generic, hence the addition of “American Style” to the title of the project.’414  
 
Kolbowski plans to translate the language in the three projects to be exhibited in this 
installation but then she is assured that all visitors speak English. Finally, the artist 
presents the exhibition with her inability to locate Austrian masculine power – this is 
a different form of resistance – the one of the unreliable critic, who questions the 
given subject of criticism by problematising, and dissolving or widening it to the 
point where neither the artist nor the audience find themselves at home. Kolbowski 
says, ‘At the symposium, audience members ask angrily why the projects were not 
translated into German and why the projects were not site-specific to Austria?’415  
 
Kolbowski speaks of ‘aesthetic voices’ that travel between languages since ‘the 
repeated attempts to use language to communicate always meet their dissolution’.416 
She situates an artist as ‘blinded by the foreignness of any context’ and all he or she 
can do is to ‘blind’ the audience. Her art contains the language that resists 
universalisation but at the same time is recognisable as art.  
 
Another example that, in our view, corresponds to the altermodern pluralising 
vector, is Jonathan Hernandez and Pablo Sigg’s approach to identities’ fusion. When 
faced with the femur of their ‘Mexican elephant’ (2010, see Appendix, fig. 11), we 
encounter an intriguing problem: can there be such a thing as a Mexican elephant, 
since only African and Asian elephants exist? If this femur belongs to an elephant 
that lived in captivity in Mexico, it then belongs to a foreign animal or, at most, to a 
‘Creole’, one born in Mexico to foreign parents. But since passports are not issued to 
elephants, nor do they have a nationality, the artists decided to paint the femur with 
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the colours of the Mexican flag. In this way we have a femoral pachydermal and 
patriotic identity as false as Magritte’s pipe which, as we know, is not a pipe. Is 
there a Mexican identity? Is there Mexican art? Or are there, in reality, only 
representations? Hernandez and Sigg ask, ‘Why do we invent identities in order to 
criticize or worship them? What about inventing more of them so that the space in-





Can art take over the empty location of power, through performing a kind of 
resistance to universalisation - being a symbol of openness and democracy?  
Perhaps, altermodernity theory could be the way to think about this question. The 
answer is that there are many answers – the idea to pluralise modernism could also 
be linked to many ‘democracies’. When we pluralise modernism, perhaps, we can 
pluralise modern democracies too. Bourriuad elaborates, ‘As I was attacked last year 
by the tenants of decolonization, about the fact that China or Iran were perfectly 
right to refuse ‘western’ democracy in the name of their ‘specific’ way to handle 
politics, i.e. in the name of their right to defend themselves against a ‘colonial’ 
ideology of human rights, I am happy to see that the local people share my views in 
Lybia, Egypt or Tunisia: dictatorial regimes, wherever they are, are not ‘anti-
western’, they only are an abomination…Why are those populations attracted by 
such horrible ‘western theories’ on freedom? A closer look at history would show us 
that they are not that ‘western’ after all’. 418 
 
Democracy is an inter-cultural value, but by showing that there is no single culture 
but rather decentred locations, what Enwezor calls ‘the off-centre’, perhaps we can 
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also pluralise ‘democracies’. Enwezor points out the possibility to proceed with the 
project of modernity when ‘[r]ather, the off-centre is structured by the simultaneous 
existence of multiple centers. In this way, rather than being the decentering of the 
universal, or the relocation of the centre of contemporary art, as the notion of the 
offshore suggests, it becomes, instead, the emergence of multiplicity, the breakdown 
of cultural or locational hierarchies, the absence of a singular locus or a limited 
number of centers’.419  
 
Ernesto Laclau pointed out that ‘There is no future for the Left if it is unable to 
create expansive universal discourse, constructed out of, not against, the 
proliferation of particularisms of the last few decades.’420 Certainly, Bourriaud’s line 
of thinking about altermodernity attempts to give difference a positive status by 
organising particularities in such a way that it would be impossible for them to 
become totalities. Attempting to address the destiny of modernity and the aesthetic 
principle of universal and suggesting that the objective is to create a new way of 
thinking that can capture the current emergence of plural cultural fields and new 
structures of their legitimisation that follow from their diverse practices, Bourriaud 
also addresses the destiny of the ‘modern democracy’, suggesting its ‘off-centre’ 
positioning. Perhaps, to be ‘modern’, after all, could mean not making one single 
sense of our fleeting world, but to make many senses, many worlds – to broaden the 
space of the possible, preventing through wandering, any possible ‘ends’ to what art 
might mean, to what ‘democracy’ should look like. Perhaps, while there cannot be a 
single God, there could be many of them according to various understandings – and 
each of them could be constructed independently of the others.  
 
If, as Enwezor argues, altermodern artistic practices ‘…are measured against the 
totalising principles of grand modernity’, then the artwork could be measured 
against the totalising impulses of the ‘individual work of art’. Modern liberal 
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democracy thus also could be measured against its totalising tendencies. What is at 
issue is not to reject or accept modernism, but to pluralise it. What follows is that the 
real issue concerns not rejecting the actual liberal democracy or accepting that there 
is no alternative beyond capitalist globalisation, but creating a multi-hegemonic 
world. We need to question the idea that there is only one form of democracy, one 
form of Enlightenment and artistic practices, because their strategic positioning in 
the current hegemony can play a decisive role in showing that there are many 







































How do we envisage the evolution of artistic-political practice today if we accept 
that neither the revolutionary politics and modernism nor capitalist pluralism and 
postmodernism provide an adequate framework with which to effect change in 
existing power relations? The problem today is not that artistic and cultural practices 
are not political or that political opinions have became the core of the aesthetic 
judgments. What is really at issue is to envisage how artistic practices, which are 
inevitably political, can be both radical and democratic. Certainly, the link that we 
want to establish today, after the era of the avant-garde, depends on our 
understanding of aesthetics and of democratic politics, which will then help us 
define what ‘today’ really is since we make sense out of otherwise contingent and 
meaningless reality by practicing various subject-formation mechanisms, whether it 
is art, politics, economy, the legal sphere etc.  
 
Despite radical efforts to re-politicise artistic practices, to constitute subject at the 
expense of itself, the real political significance of contemporary art’s frenzy to 
become a new form of a political discourse corresponds, in our view, to our 
unwillingly proactive support and stabilisation of the consumerist post-democracy. 
What this ‘noise’ really stands for is the ultimate silence – an acceptance of the mute 
condition in exchange for fantasy, celebratory creativity and ultimate indifference. 
The current resistance to aesthetic forms should be understood in terms of resistance 
to think politically. This does not make artistic practices the surrogate of politics, but 
reduces politics to a surrogate of life forms. Of course this does not apply to all 
artistic practices, but specifically to those that actively claim its political relevance 
and status. In fact, a simple display of a beautiful flower in our public spaces without 
public is more political than endless artistic-political discourses staged in the art 
sphere. As Gregory Sholette has observed,  
 
‘...only a radically failed society could give birth to fantasies of triumphant 
communality such as relational aesthetics or to the hyperbolic pragmatism of self-
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organised mock-institutions. It might also be giving birth, circumstances permitting, 
to a new conception of the political party or even the state’.421  
 
The subject of ‘Art and politics’ then is not the name of the topic, but of a problem. 
Is this not a caricature of something more complex?  
 
Why do we resist thinking politically? Since the Frankfurt school, capitalism has 
become a universal excuse for not forming collective political identities. In what was 
perceived as ‘one-dimensional’ society, deprived of free individual choice, hopes 
were placed with preserving one’s authenticity considered in terms of individual 
consciousness and reflection enabled through practicing some sort of universal and 
neutral aesthetic or linguistic ideal. Politics were refused to the ‘police’ of the systems 
and democratic politics to resistance, refusal and disdain for this ‘systems’. The 
Frankfurt school was also pivotal in how the relationship between art and politics was 
envisaged as both belonging to distinct areas (politics, art, the economy etc). The 
political act of art was seen to save the heterogeneous sensible that is the heart of the 
autonomy of art and its power of emancipation. The way to act as a critical artist was 
to reveal the strategies of the ‘capitalist system’ in order to unveil a ‘true 
consciousness’.  
 
However, the Frankfurt school’s critique of inauthenticity and of the conformist 
domination of a society that destroys any differences was satisfied with the 
emergence of the post-Fordist model, which, contrary to the Frankfurt school’s 
expectations, did not fully enter into the field of culture, but rather artistic and 
cultural production has ‘entered’ into capitalism in a way that suited the latter. 
Today authenticity is the driving force of modern production based on the constant 
creation of new desires and fantasies. What follows is that the matrix of culture, 
perhaps, is not how we should approach the dynamics of changes that our societies 
went through. Luc Boltanski and Eve Chiapello contend that aesthetic resistance to 
capitalism ‘vindicates an ideal of liberation and of individual autonomy, singularity 
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and authenticity’. Whether or not this is truly the legacy of what Herbert Marcuse 
called ‘the Great Refusal’, it is difficult to ignore that unorthodox cultural practices 
are a central metaphor within the orthodoxy of the new economy. However, what 
Boltanski and Chiapello’s analysis allows us to grasp is that the transformation from 
Fordism to post-Fordism was, in fact, a complex process of rearticulating what they 
called ‘artistic critique’ – demands for autonomy and anti-hierarchical organisation 
into a new configuration where critical elements such as the aesthetic strategies of 
the counter-culture become the core of what they are supposed to undermine. 
Therefore, instead of one political agency, there is hegemony – ‘social agents lack 
any essence’ – a discursive construction that articulates a social ‘text’ that consists 
of different, multiple and conflicting positions in a particular direction. This 
transformation shows that neither is capitalism a totality, nor is culture a sub-system 
within the overall social system.  
 
Chantal Mouffe, who has been at the forefront of a ‘return to the political’, has 
repeatedly argued that ‘Every order is the temporary and precarious articulation of 
contingent practices’.422 These practices of articulation through which subjects and a 
given society are constructed are ‘hegemonic’ practices. A society is not dominated 
by any single unitary and positive logic – there is no central point of a hegemonic 
formation – but always emerges from a ‘surplus of meaning’ resulting from a 
displacement through a confrontation with other antagonistic practices. There is no 
refuge from hegemony and every ‘hegemonic practice’ would trigger ‘counter-
hegemonic’ responses. The way we envisage the relation between art and politics 
changes as soon as we focus on the political. Art and politics, then, appear not to be 
separate subsystems possessing their own autonomy, but parts of the hegemonic 
construction. If we cannot escape ‘the political’ – the ontological horizon of every 
ordering of social relations – then politics cannot promise the realisation of any 
‘deeper objectivity’. While the political refers to the dimension of antagonism, 
politics refers to the hegemonic nature of any social order in the sense that it reveals 
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that any society is hegemonically constructed – there are practices and institutions 
that conceal the original acts of their political institution and instead are taken for 
granted. Any ‘natural’ order or ‘common sense’ is the result of hegemonic practices 
and not a manifestation of any ‘deeper’ objectivity.  
 
This opposition between ‘the political’ and ‘politics’ creates antagonistic relations 
between those who wish to create unity in one way and those who want to create it 
in a different way. This is the opposition between ‘them and us’. The question, then, 
for democratic politics is not how to eliminate exclusion, but to construct them as an 
‘adversary’ rather than as the enemy. What is at stake in democratic politics is not to 
realise the perfect social order, but to engage with the existing order with a view to 
transforming it, extending liberty and equality to maximum relations, to show the 
traces of exclusion, and not taking refuge in formulating a paradigm that would 
assign everything to its place. Capitalism, language and culture are not closed 
systems, but parts of hegemonic articulation. 
 
In this way, the transition from the Fordist to the post-Fordist regime should not be 
understood in terms of a matrix of culture or economy, but in terms of hegemony. 
What follows is that artistic and cultural practices’ political role cannot be envisaged 
pessimistically or optimistically. Both approaches – ‘spontaneous communism’ or 
‘communism of capital’ – are counter-productive if we acknowledge the hegemonic 
nature of the post-Fordist transition.  
 
Chantal Mouffe argues that the transition from the Fordist to the post-Fordist regime 
is better understood in terms of hegemony: it is not culture or economy that is the 
matrix of post-Fordism, but the rearticulation of some demands in a way that 
neutralises their critical potential. Potential is always there, but its realisation 
depends on the re-articulation of critiques. What is at stake is not to create more or 
to withdraw and concentrate on preserving art’s presupposed autonomy, but to 
engage with the current predicament in order to reveal its hegemonic character.  
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Envisaging what artistic critical intervention could mean today requires not only an 
adequate grasp of what democratic politics entail and a political understanding of the 
nature of post-Fordist transition, but also a different approach to aesthetics. There is 
a democratic paradox and there is also an aesthetical paradox – the questioning of 
the aesthetical judgment that reveals, through the ongoing practice of art, a 
conceptual impossibility of judgment per se.  
 
While the democratic paradox corresponds to the form in which the ethical forever 
interrogates the political, questioning the logic of inclusion/exclusion, an aesthetical 
paradox, which reveals an impossibility of judgment, shows how we can 
include/exclude or judge in a way that reflects the real meaning of liberal-democratic 
tolerance. While we have to make judgments, it is their form and not their content 
that really matters. The territory where these two paradoxes meet is the space for the 
formation of a new subjectivity – the one that is neither purely ‘political’ nor purely 
‘aesthetical’. The aesthetical here interrogates the ethical, which, in turn, questions 
the political in a different way. There is only ethical subjectivity rather than a 
‘subject’.  
 
For instance, Alfredo Jaar’s work is counter-hegemonic, it intervenes in reality but it 
does not show that ‘society’ is based on articulations that did not take place, that are 
hidden, missing or unsaid; but at the same time, the artist does not attempt either to 
fill these ‘gaps’ or to produce a ‘correct version’ without gaps and silences. 
Following Jaar, the role of critical art could be understood as a regime of visibility, 
which reminds us of a lack – that the present society is always lacking something. 
The recognition of this lack is the precondition of social critique. An artwork can 
present itself as a witness, as an image of ‘intolerability’, which stands in opposition 
to itself and thus to the reality it is supposed to represent. This artwork can never 
replace the lack of a ‘true’ reality. Jaar’s art is never a solution to this lack but rather 
an image of it, which is also lacking its representational capacities. Such 
presentation opens up the lacking present to the future, which can never be the realm 
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of certainty and positivity, but only the realm of continuous articulation and 
therefore of hope. 
 
Jaar’s works give voices to many individuals who are hidden from view in the neo-
liberal hegemonic order. However, they do it in a way that not only opposes the 
totalising images of society but also the totalisation of the sensible. In this way, the 
condition of lack is what is shared by both regimes: the social and the aesthetic one. 
The regimes prevent each other from closure and this is how the link between artistic 
practices and political theory could be envisaged. Democratic politics are about 
making the traces of power and exclusion visible and critical artistic practices can 
create spaces that show the ‘missing’ elements, but in such way as to resist the 
possibility of a ‘full picture’ – all societal systems are flawed and always will be. 
Power is blind to itself and any order will be lacking something. From this point of 
view, the only thing artistic practice can do is not to represent a better order or to 
criticise the existing one, but to make the relations of ‘ordering’ problematic in the 
sense that they no longer appear as a ‘common sense’ but a ‘lack of sense’. If 
‘democracy’ is a self-refuting ideal, then the role of critical artistic practices is not to 
provide us with any privileged starting point of vision.  
 
The central argument of the Emancipated spectator is a reassessment of aesthetic 
agency in artworks that exists in the absence of any credible political narrative. This 
aesthetics invokes taking the precariousness and ungrounding of things as a source 
of positivity, seeking to take up the modernist ethos of creation from a constitutively 
inauthentic position. When purity and destiny no longer make any sense to us, how 
can sense be made, and what kind of sense? Perhaps Nicolas Bourriaud’s new line of 
thinking, entitled ‘altermodernity,’ can help us with theorising how art can become a 
symbol of the empty location of power. What Bourriaud has in mind is not the idea 
of a ‘negative’ aesthetic experience as a claim about the brutal nature of a social 
reality, but rather a ‘positive’ vision of a new cultural era in which thinking about 
the visual is free from all kinds of determinism. 
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Within the complex lines of thinking that have made up modernism, there is an 
aesthetic working at the uncertain and ruptured world in order to create a meaning 
out of it. While purity and destiny do not any longer make sense for us, sense can be 
made out of precariousness and displacements. It is not that an individual artwork 
must be translated into a wider symbolic network, or a particular culture into a wider 
cultural framework of understanding and relating, but rather the altermodern is 
located in the work of art and not outside it. This means taking translation as the 
opening, de-centering of any master narratives. There is no true language, only 
translation - the impossibility of a final, an original, meaning or a root. For 
Bourriaud the ethics of translation serves as a model of subjectivity, which does not 
‘…seek an ideal state of the self or society. Instead, they organize signs in order to 
multiply one identity by another’.423  
 
With helpful insights from Okwui Enwezor, the project of altermodernity could be 
understood as the idea to pluralise modernism. By emphasizing the transitory, 
unstable essence of modernism, what also could be institutionalised is the arbitrary 
and contingent nature of institutions and systems. Thus, the idea to pluralise 
modernism in the era of globalisation helps us to redefine modern democracy in the 
post-political era.  
 
Instead of making one single sense of our fleeting world we can make many senses, 
many worlds – to broaden the space of the possible, preventing through wandering, 
any possible ‘ends’ to what art might mean, to what ‘democracy’ should look like. A 
new artistic-political fusion could then be envisaged as practices, which mobilize 
effects in ways that run not against the dominant forms of subject articulations, but 
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